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Managing food price instability 
in developing countries
Food price instability has dramatic consequences in developing countries
where it hits consumers hard and causes food insecurity. The risk it entails
for producers is so great that it discourages them from investing. It therefore
obstructs green revolutions, and thereby blocks the road to economic deve-
lopment. In certain cases, price instability also generates political instability
and macroeconomic imbalances. Ever since the crises of 2005 (in the Sahel)
and 2008 (on international markets), the management of price instability
has figured large in the policies of developing countries and is back on the
international agenda (G20 action plan; work by FAO's Committee on World
Food Security).
Based on a comprehensive review of the theoretical and empirical literature,
this book identifies and analyzes four “pure” strategies that can be employed
to manage food price instabi l ity.  It  c learly underl ines the l imitations of
conventional solutions that rely on mixing a risk management strategy (using
insurance-based instruments) with a crisis management strategy (using emer-
gency aid). It explains why more structural solutions that require considerable
State involvement are needed to stimulate the modernization of agricultural
production and markets, and recapitalize vulnerable households.This cannot
be achieved solely by facilitating access to inputs and by transferring assets
to poor households: public intervention is necessary to prevent prices from
reaching extreme values. Such interventions must be based on a combination
of instruments that match the specificities of the national or regional context.
The international community has a key role to play in the success of these
policies. 
This book is intended for policy-makers, researchers, teachers, students, and
all those interested in price instabil ity, food security and the agricultural
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Foreword
This book is to a great extent based on the results of a study conducted in 2009, called
“Which instruments best tackle food price instabil ity?" Financed by the Agence
Française de Développement (AFD) and the French Ministry of Foreign and European
Affairs (MAEE), the study was entrusted to the European Consortium for Agricultural
Research in the Tropics (ECART). It involved four research institutions: the Centre
de coopération internationale en recherche agronomique pour le développement
(CIRAD), the Institut de recherches et applications des méthodes de développement
(IRAM), the Natural Resources Institute (NRI) and the Wageningen University and
Research Centre (WUR).
The study was directed by Bruno Vindel (AFD) and Benoît Faivre-Dupaigre (MAEE)
and was coordinated by Franck Galtier (CIRAD). The study report was co-authored
by Franck Galtier (CIRAD), Jonathan Coulter and Gideon Onumah (NRI), Gerdien
Meijerink and Kees Burger (WUR) and Jean-François Sempéré (IRAM). These also
coordinated the work packages on the different instrument categories.  
Other researchers and experts also took part in the study, as follows: Roger Blein
(Bureau Issala), Nicolas Bricas (CIRAD), Jérôme Coste (IRAM), Benoît Daviron (CIRAD),
Johny Egg (INRA), Françoise Gérard (CIRAD), Denis Michiels (IRAM), Marcel van
Asseldonk (WUR) and Tancrède Voituriez (CIRAD and IDDRI). 
A number of boxes have been included in the second chapter of this book. They
provide a wealth of empirical evidences on instrument implementation.. The following
researchers  and experts  took part  in  prepar ing these boxes :  Hashim Ahmed
(EDRI), Kees Burger (WUR), Antony Chapoto (MSU), Jonathan Coulter (consultant,
ex-NRI), Hélène David-Benz (CIRAD), Paul Dorosh (IFPRI), Johny Egg (INRA), Franck
Galtier (CIRAD), Thom Jayne (MSU), Jackson T. Kiraka (EAGC), Elodie Maître d’Hotel
(CIRAD), Anne Mbaabu (AGRA), Gerdien Meijerink (WUR), Denis Michiels (IRAM),
Pamela Mulozi (ex-ZNFU), Nsanya Ndanshau, (EAGC), Gideon Onumah (NRI), Sam
Rutto (EAGC), Jean-François Sempéré (IRAM), Peter Timmer (Harvard University and
CGD) and Tancrède Voituriez (CIRAD and IDDRI).  
A preliminary version of chapter 1 of this book was circulated in the form of a working
paper. We wish to extend our warmest thanks to the researchers and experts who,
through their comments on this paper, enriched the analysis presented today in this
book. They are: Jean-Marc Boussard, Derek Byerlee, David Dawe, Chris Gilbert,
Christophe Gouel, Rod Gravelet Blondin, Thom Jayne, Paul Jorion, Adrian Mukhebi,
Marc Sadler, John Staatz, Ludovic Subran, Peter Timmer and Steve Wiggins. They of
course are not responsible for the opinions expressed in this book. 
The conclusions drawn in this book, and its recommendations, are solely those of the
author.
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5THE KNIGHT
I hear it often said by people who believe themselves to be agile of mind, that one
should no more bother with wheat than with the leather of which to craft shoes; that
no police order ensures the supply of shoes, and yet one has never been unshod.
THE COUNT
That is most true, and this reasoning has always appeared to me to be sound. Do you




And why so? Are shoes not almost as necessary as bread?
THE KNIGHT
I grant you that, but should the need for the one and the other be equally great, that
for the shoes is not so pressing. […]. Thus, all other commerce may run itself for in
all there is some time, and sufficient to restore an equilibrium. But the supply of
bread is pressing and must be safeguarded, for should the equilibrium arrive too late,
the people will already have starved to death.
Ferdinand GALIANI
Dialogues sur le commerce des blés 
(1770 : 165-166)
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9Preface
C. Peter TIMMER [ 1 ]
Cabot Professor of Development Studies, Emeritus,
Harvard University, Cambridge, MA
Franck Galtier and his colleagues have produced an essential guide book to mana-
ging food price volatility. This is important for two reasons: first, just five years ago
the economics profession thought such a guide was not only unnecessary, but
wrong-headed. Now there is a serious re-thinking of these issues. Second, and more
personally, the themes developed in this book resonate with my own work over the
past four decades. There is a certain satisfaction with “coming in from the cold,” to
seeing the issue of food price stabilization back on the policy and academic agendas.
As fate would have it, this longstanding concern for food security, and the role of
food price stability in the political calculus of developing countries, also caught the
eye of the Global Development and Environment Center (GDAE) at Tufts University,
which awards annually the Leontief Prize for Advancing the Frontiers of Economic
Thought. The prize this year honored research and policy analysis in agricultural and
food policy, and I was asked to represent this field, with Michael Lipton, for the award.  
As the Galtier volume notes, the field nearly disappeared from academia after the
mid-1980s, when commodity prices collapsed and no one thought increasing agri-
cultural output was a good idea. Most departments of agricultural economics now
devote themselves primarily to natural resource and environmental economics.
Agriculture is just one of several sub-fields in these departments.
Such a trend might be understandable in the United States, where we now have
more lawyers than farmers. But this change in focus, and capacity, severely hampers
the ability of US-trained academics — foreign and domestic– to understand the role
of agriculture in the development process. Consequently, in academia and in the
donor community, we forgot about agriculture and stopped funding it. Jobs disap-
peared. Despite running a food policy program at Harvard for over two decades, I sent
April 2013 / Managing food price instability in developing countries /©AFD [ ]
[ 1 ] This Preface draws on material developed for an address delivered at the ceremony awarding the Leontief 
Prize for Advancing the Frontier of Economic Thought, April 3, 2011. The prize is awarded by the Center for 
Global Development and Environment (GDAE), Tufts University, Medford, MA. Relevant publications that 
developed the analytics and empirics of the story outlined here are listed in the main bibliography.
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more students to Goldman Sachs than to careers in agricultural development or food
and nutrition policy (they were smart students — they went where the jobs were…).
That neglect has now come back to haunt us, because the jobs are back, but the stu-
dents are not. As I reflect on this, I realize that I was chosen for the Leontief Prize
because I am an economic historian, not an agricultural economist. Economic historians
cannot forget about agriculture — it was usually three quarters of the economy that we
studied – and I never stopped arguing for its key role in the development process. It
seems useful to bring that historical perspective to the debate discussed in this volume.
Stabilizing food prices has remained on my intellectual agenda for decades. Out of
a deep conviction that raising agricultural productivity was the essential first step in
propelling a society out of its traditional agrarian structure into a dynamic process
of modern economic growth, a body of work was generated that often seems dis-
connected to outside observers (and largely irrelevant to mainstream economists),
but which has a common intellectual strand, at least to me, and much of it shows up
in this volume.[ 2 ]
Six big lessons of this work are presented here to provide historical context to the
Galtier volume. All challenge the results produced by the standard neoclassical
model used by economists to analyze policy issues. Keeping with the focus on the
importance of agriculture in the development process, the lessons revolve around
food and agriculture. Although standard neoclassical models provide a starting
point, the approaches are eclectic and stress empirically-based analysis. All of this
work has an empirical focus, with factual data behind it. I have learned that in policy
debates, “three facts trump a theory.” Analysis based on facts is accessible to policy
makers. This is also a key theme of the Galtier volume.
1. The first, and perhaps the most important lesson, is that economic history matters.
Path dependency, beachhead effects, and hysteresis in economic activity are com-
mon features of innovation, trade and investment decisions. Neoclassical models
can capture these effects, but they must be empirically based and are often unique
to specific case studies. The fact that these cases are usually not generalizable makes
them of little interest to mainstream economics. My economic history professor,
Alexander Gerschenkron, used to say in his research seminar that “for example is not
proof… but it does show that something is possible.” Mainstream economics is not
nearly as interested in the merely possible, when proving a theorem is a general result.
Preface
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[ 2 ] The key references that are at the core of this body of work are listed in the main bibliography. 
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History is full of specific examples from which insights can be gained, but general
theorems not proven. I co-taught — with Dwight Perkins and Jeff Williamson —
the introductory Ph.D. class in economic history at Harvard (Gerschenkron’s old class),
which also served as the introductory course in development economics.[ 3 ] My
lectures examined the process of industrialization through the lens of the agricultural
sector — what policies were needed to stimulate agricultural productivity? In turn,
what was the role of rising productivity in agriculture in stimulating broad-based
economic growth, and how was it transformed in turn during this process? I was
able to use computable general equilibrium models constructed by the economic
history (and development) profession for an historically and geographically important
set of countries — across two continents and three centuries.
l England, during the era of the Corn Laws from the late 17th century to the early 19th
century. The Corn Laws protected English grain farmers and — as noted by Franck
Galtier – also stabilized domestic grain prices. The result was arguably to stimulate
the first agricultural revolution and provide the food, labor and market for the
first industrial revolution;
l France, as it fell behind a rapidly developing England in both rural and urban pro-
ductivity. France only began to catch up in the latter half of the 19th century when
it abandoned its long-time strategy of “provisioning Paris” as cheaply as possible,
and began to provide policy and investment support to the smallholder farmer
who dominated French agriculture. That support included minimum price supports
for farmers and protection from cheap imports;
l Germany, with rapid industrialization as a “conscious act of national policy,” where
Bismarck forged his “pact of steel and rye” to stimulate productivity growth in
German factories and on German farms. Again, price protection for German cereal
producers was a key feature of this pact;
l Russia, with its “forced pace industrialization” directed by rigid, centralized plans,
which would not have been possible without systematic and harsh extractions of
agricultural surpluses from the peasantry. The failure to develop a modern agricul-
tural economy, and to provide income support to Soviet farmers, was one major
factor in the ultimate collapse of the Soviet Union;
Preface
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[ 3 ] This macro, historical approach to economic development, which was unusual even at the time, although not 
totally unique to Harvard, has now disappeared entirely from the curriculum of leading universities teaching 
development economics. Although much is to be learned from randomized controlled trials (RCTs) as an 
approach to understanding what works and what does not, RCTs cannot answer the big questions in economic 
development
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l Japan, where very early investments in raising productivity on small farms paid
high dividends in feeding a growing non-farm labor force, and providing the workers
for it. As with earlier agricultural success stories, rice policy in Japan provided both
stability and protection to Japanese farmers;
l Thailand, where a land frontier made growth of extensive agriculture possible, in
contrast to Japan, but also made universal education much more difficult to
achieve for both supply reasons (a widely scattered rural population is hard to
school efficiently) and demand reasons (farm labor was not surplus and children
were needed to work the land). Thailand fell systematically behind Japan in per
capita incomes after 1880 as this education gap widened, but also because Thailand
taxed its farmers heavily and exposed them fully to the volatility of world rice
markets; and finally
l Indonesia, the country where I learned about modern development issues (from
the point of view of an economic historian as well as a commodity specialist). A
more-than-century-long struggle to achieve food security at the national (macro)
level was finally capped by an extraordinary spurt of rural-oriented, pro-poor
growth that pulled more people out of poverty in a 3-decade period than ever
before.[ 4 ] China ultimately topped that record, but Indonesia showed the way, as
the box 13 later in this volume indicates.
2. Food price stability is a good thing , not a bad thing , which is the starting point of
the Galtier volume. The standard model of international trade can show “gains to
trade” from highly unstable food prices, but these gains are illusory. 
Do not mistake my point. I believe deeply in the role of markets in exchange and
price discovery and as the foundation for economic specialization.[ 5 ] Markets usually
get these right, and governments usually get them wrong. But not always. And
the exceptions are important, especially in matters of health, education and food
security.
Preface
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[ 4 ] “Macro” food security refers to a society-wide sense that food is reliably available in urban markets and that 
adequate purchasing power is a sufficient condition for accessing this food. “Micro” food security requires 
that all households (urban and rural) have access to sufficient food, but that is only possible when poverty has 
been eliminated. “Macro” food security is often confused (especially politically) with food self-sufficiency, 
but imported food often plays a key role in providing macro food security.
[ 5 ] Indeed, I have often been accused of being too market oriented, including by the co-awardee of the Leontief 
Prize in 2102. My book on Getting Prices Right: The Scope and Limits to Agricultural Price Policy (Cornell, 1986) 
was often interpreted as a manifesto for free trade in food and agricultural commodities. But that was only for 
people who had not read it. Still, I am perhaps the only Leontief Prize winner who also received an award from 
the American Enterprise Institute (I served as their Wendt Lecturer in 2007). Markets really are important — too 
important to let them fail.
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To my consternation (and secret delight), food price volatility is finally back on the
intellectual and policy agenda, with this volume as an especially welcome addition
to the literature. My 1989 article that laid out the analytical case for stabilizing
food prices is being cited again — it provides the key analytical arguments in the
Galtier volume that justify the attention to managing food price volatility. It is not
easy to stabilize food prices, but it is not impossible either. We just need to stop
arguing that stable food prices are a bad thing and get on with the tough analyti-
cal and empirical work to learn how to do it effectively, efficiently, and honestly.
This volume is a critical first step in this direction, answering both “why” to stabi-
lize food prices, but also “how.” The “ABCD Framework” which was widely circu-
lated in an earlier Working Paper, is already used as the standard methodology for
thinking about how the various approaches to managing food price instability
relate to each other. The exclusion of “C Mechanisms” from the policy debate
since the mid-1980s (i.e. government efforts to stabilize food prices directly
through reserve activities or border controls) is shown to leave society with an
incomplete set of tools to address this critical issue.
3. Day-to-day prices in world commodity markets are a bad guide to long-run decisions
on funding agricultural research and investments in rural infrastructure. “Do markets
provide the right signals” to getting agriculture moving? Often not. 
Private decision makers in market economies have little choice but to follow market
prices closely as a guide to investment decisions, crop choices and food consump-
tion patterns. But governments, universities, public research institutions, donors
and foundations are not bound by the same short-run dictates of profit maximi-
zation or cost minimization. Longer-run decisions about investments in agricultural
research and technology, rural infrastructure and supportive public policies should
be based on longer-run opportunity costs. Only when they are, can we break the
recurrent cycle of world food crises that seem to strike every three decades or so.
4. Economic structure matters to the rate and distribution of economic growth.
“The structural transformation in historical perspective,” the introductory Ph.D.
course at Harvard for both economic history and development mentioned earlier,
offered many relevant lessons for modern development strategies. With half of
its population still working in an agricultural sector with low productivity, a country
faces opportunities and constraints that are vastly different from those facing a
country that has already modernized its agriculture and is mostly through the
structural transformation. A country undergoing rapid economic growth will also
be undergoing a rapid structural transformation, and the changed structure of
Preface
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the economy 2-3 decades into the future needs to inform current investment
strategies for such long-lived assets as education, health care and infrastructure.
Structure also matters in the short-run, despite assertions by macro economists
that it does not. Justin Lin, vice president and chief economist at the World Bank,
is trying to revive the role of economic structure in development models, but that
is a difficult task if factor markets are assumed to be working pretty well. The
whole reason that sectoral structure is important in economic development is
precisely because these markets, even many commodity markets, are not working
well in the conditions of poor countries. These failures tend to have a number of
unique characteristics in each country, and time period, thus explaining why “one
size does NOT fit all” in food policy analysis, design, and implementation. This is also
a theme emphasized in this volume. One clear example is the “domain of relevance”
for stabilizing food prices. Rich countries can live with substantially more instability in
food prices than can poor countries, if for no other reason than Engel’s Law.  
5. Pro-poor growth is feasible and comes with low opportunity costs in the long run.
Markets do not usually get this right, and active government intervention is needed
to ensure that the poor participate in, and contribute to, the growth process. One
of the main entry points for government intervention is through investments to
raise agricultural productivity and to stabilize the prices of key outputs.
We have lived for long enough with the assertion that initial income distribution
does not matter to the rate or distribution of economic growth. Clearly it does,
even in rich countries. The key question is whether the existing political economy
can frame a set of public policies and investments that consciously seek to include
the poor in a process of economic growth. The Asian experience, where invest-
ments to enhance macro food security had a high political imperative whatever
the form of government, suggests that investments in raising productivity on
small farms, while building human capital within those farm households, was the
surest pathway out of rural poverty.
A way must be found to make markets work to deliver long-run growth, but
political survival requires that this growth be stable and equitably distributed.[ 6 ]
No alternative exists to organizing economies around market-based transactions
Preface
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[ 6] The source of the measurable “unhappiness” of many citizens in the transition economies of the former
Soviet Union can be traced primarily to unprecedented instability in incomes, growing income inequality, and the 
loss of public goods. Most Asian governments consciously tried to balance “equity, growth and stability” during 
their early periods of rapid industrialization.
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if societies are to reach their goals of greater material welfare and broad political
freedom. Markets produce both. But markets also fail in important social tasks, at
least during turbulent times when short-run price signals are hard to interpret.
Responsible governments must find a way to prevent those failures through careful
regulation and to alleviate them when innocent workers and consumers cannot
participate in the promises of market outcomes. This volume by Franck Galtier
provides clear guidelines on how to do this.
6. “Political economy” is a behavioral field, not a field of positive economics, so
understanding why political leaders try to stabilize food prices when their economic
advisors tell them it is a bad idea will require a new approach. The foundation for
understanding modern political systems and policy options lies in understanding
how citizens regard their relative economic status, the impact of changing economic
prospects on their behavior, and their sense of security and control, all within the
framework of government policies and services.
Economists are often upset when politicians reject their optimal policy designs to
enhance social welfare. Traditionally, these designs have been based on the Pareto
criterion that at least one individual is better off and no one is worse off. But if
most individuals care more about their relative status than absolute levels of income
or consumption, the Pareto criterion spells political trouble. Only a new behavioral
focus on the design of policy interventions can help real policy makers bring about
real improvements in welfare.
The neo-classical solution to food price instability, as explained so clearly by Franck
Galtier in this volume, has been to allow full expression of price volatility in markets
because of the information content of prices. Any problems for firms in the supply
chain can be managed with financial instruments to hedge price risks. Problems
for poor consumers can be managed by implementing safety nets that kick in when
food prices spike.
This approach fails at both ends, as this volume stresses repeatedly. The financial
instruments are themselves very volatile and subject to outside speculative pres-
sures, are not widely accessible to most market participants, and fail to exist at all
in many developing countries.
Emergency safety nets face their own problems of transactions costs and behavioral
responses that make effective implementation very difficult. Using community-
based information and organizations to target resources to the poorest of the poor
often runs afoul of the widespread sense of fairness in these communities that
requires external resources to be shared equally. Targeting is thwarted and fiscal
Preface
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costs rise, or the poor do not get the resources they need to cope with shocks to
their welfare. Either way, safety nets have a poor record of coping with sudden
price shocks.
The empirical regularities of behavioral economics, especially loss aversion, time
inconsistency, other-regarding preferences, herd behavior, and framing of decisions,
present significant challenges to traditional approaches to food security. The forma-
tion of price expectations, hoarding behavior, and the welfare losses from highly
unstable food prices all depend on these behavioral regularities. At least when
they are driven by speculative bubbles, market prices for food staples (and especially
for rice, the staple food of over 2 billion people), often lose their efficiency proper-
ties and the normative implications assigned by trade theory. Theoretical objections
to government efforts to stabilize food prices thus have reduced saliency, although
operational, financing, and implementation problems remain important, even critical.
Understanding these problems does not yield to broad theorizing , but depends
fundamentally on local realities on the ground.
Beyond reducing food price instability, building the institutions and human capital to
sustain inclusive economic growth will be essential. It may be that finding a way to
allow governments to deliver effective and efficient safety nets that are part of
the long-term structural approach to solving poverty will be the key to allowing
markets to deliver their long-run promise. If so, designing and implementing them
becomes the essence of effective policymaking. But governments, like the poor,
live in the short run. Their vision and strategic design for inclusive, stable, long-run
growth must survive the day-to-day challenges of managing power. Only input
from “behavioral political economy,” broadly for development policy and more
narrowly for food policy, can help governments to meet these challenges. This
volume is a critical first step in recognizing the depth of these challenges, and in
building the understanding to meet them.
Preface
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Summary
The consequences of food price instability for developing countries (DCs). Food
price instability inside DCs is generally very marked and has serious consequences: it
affects food security (some poor households are obliged to reduce their consumption
as prices rise), and obstructs green revolutions (producers do not invest if prices are
too unstable). This in turn compromises the entire process of economic develop-
ment (Timmer, 1988; World Bank, 2007). In some cases, price instability can also
cause political and macroeconomic instability. Food price instability on international
markets, which affects DCs in various ways, has grown over the last few years and
could continue to do so under the impact of climate change, decreasing global grain
stocks, the boom in biofuels and the increasing financialization of agricultural futures
markets. This instability may further increase producer and consumer price instability in
DCs. In certain importing DCs it may also cause balance of payments problems resulting
in import rationing or a reduced exchange rate. The problem is further accentuated by
the fact that food price instability on both a national and international scale is a self-
sustaining phenomenon for it prompts behaviors that tend to cause even more
instability, e.g. low levels of agricultural investment, mean that production remains
highly sensitive to weather hazards and little responsive to price incentives; household
self-consumption strategies and country self-sufficiency strategies, leading to market
narrowness; and restrictions on exports when prices soar. 
The crisis of conventional solutions. How can food price instability be managed?
Ever since the late 1980s, a specific doctrine has dominated both in academic and
political circles and inside countries and internationally. Its main message is that it is
preferable to reduce the effects of price instability without impeding price fluctuations.
This can be achieved by encouraging trade, managing price risk (through private insu-
rance instruments) and managing crises (through emergency aid). But this doctrine
was called into question in the 2000s: the 2005 crisis in the Sahel highlighted the
limitations of emergency aid and the 2008 crisis on the international markets clearly
demonstrated the limitations of solutions based on free trade and risk management. 
Fresh thinking. Fresh thinking was therefore required in this field that had been
almost entirely abandoned by researchers for 25 years. A study was commissioned
in 2009 to review the theoretical and empirical knowledge in this field and make
recommendations. It was financed by the Agence Française de Développement and
the French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs (MAEE), and was entrusted to a
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European consortium, ECART. Based on a comprehensive review of the theoretical
literature and lessons learned from past experience, this study led to a critical eva-
luation of the different possible options for managing food price instability. It is this
critical evaluation that is presented herein.  
The range of possibilities. We kicked off by distinguishing between the different
possible strategies based on whether they aim to manage food price instability by
stabilizing prices or by reducing the effects of price instability. We then considered
how action could be taken, based on the market or on public interventions. This led
us to define the four following strategies: 
Prices may be stabilized by making food markets more efficient: this is strategy A. It
is based on the idea that rendering production more responsive to price incentives,
and boosting storage and facilitating trade will stabilize prices by balancing surpluses
and deficits between years and between areas. Market instruments may also be used to
ensure that price instability does not generate income instability: this is strategy B
that relies mainly on futures markets and agricultural insurance. Finally, public inter-
ventions may be used either to prevent prices from reaching extreme high- or low-
values (strategy C), or to transfer goods to vulnerable households (strategy D). In the
first case, the government regulates the quantity available on the domestic market
by using public stocks or measures on imports or exports (tariffs, subsidies, quotas or
bans). The second type of public intervention takes the form of targeted transfers and
may vary with the nature of the goods being transferred (food, cash, food vouchers,
inputs or assets), the level of support (free distribution or simple subsidy, as in the
case of moderately priced sales), the matching contribution (if any), the definition of
the beneficiary group, and whether transfers are activated structurally (to recapitalize
vulnerable households) or only in emergency situations. These four A, B, C and D stra-
tegies (which rely on different instruments) are complementary, not exclusive, and
should be considered as “pure" strategies that can be combined to form “mixed"
strategies.




Based on the market Strategy A Strategy B 
Based on public interventions Strategy C Strategy D
ASavoir_N17_GB_BAT_2_(V2).qxp  12/04/13  8:36  Page 18
19
The current controversy: risk and crisis management vs price stabilization. The
dominant doctrine since the 1980s has been, and still is, based on risk management
(strategy B) and crisis management (strategy D). Although it considers that food markets
play a positive stabilizing role and recommends doing away with all trade barriers, it
does not go as far as to push for proactive market modernization (strategy A). It also
condemns any public interventions made to stabilize prices (strategy C). Dealing
with the consequences of instability rather than with instability itself (which is the
core of the doctrine) offers the opportunity to provide different levels of protection:
by paying a higher premium, the most risk-averse actors can acquire more protective
B-instruments; D-instruments are targeted on the households most in need. However,
despite this advantage, the doctrine may be considered to have failed. The much
anticipated development of risk hedging instruments (B-instruments) never materiali-
zed in DCs. And the D-instruments used were unable to prevent vulnerable households
from suffering decapitalization and falling resilience, and therefore failed to protect
them from food insecurity (as highlighted by the 2005 Niger food crisis, cf. Michiels
and Egg , 2008). The very rationale behind the dominant doctrine (founded on risk and
crisis management) was called into question. 
Should an alternative option be given its chance, based on a reduction in price instabi-
lity? Some are against this option on the grounds that as prices aggregate information
on the scarcity of goods, and as this information guides production and trade behaviors,
any moves to prevent prices fluctuating freely will be prejudicial to the appropriate
allocation of resources. They also hold that producers are covered by a kind of “natural
insurance" where price risk and production risk partially compensate one for the other
(for when harvests are poor, then prices are high, and vice versa ). As price stabilization
would reduce the correlation between prices and harvests, this could ultimately increase
the instability of producer incomes (Newbery and Stiglitz, 1984). 
However, if the different causes of price instability are considered, it can be seen
that the scope of these criticisms is greatly reduced. For instance, in situations of
“endogenous" instability (panics, speculative bubbles, cobweb), prices, rather than
conveying the appropriate information, tend to mislead economic actors. In these
situations, price stabilization is liable to improve resource allocation. Moreover, even in
the absence of “endogenous" instability, price stabilization may still improve resource
allocation by improving the quality of price expectations on which production and
storage decisions are based. And regarding producer “natural insurance", it only comes
into play if there is a negative correlation between price and the harvest volume for
individual farmers. But this is rarely the case, particularly when the product is traded
over a sufficiently large area (nationally, regionally or internationally) for climatic shocks
Summary
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not to be correlated. The arguments put forward against price stabilization are there-
fore ill founded. By contrast, public intervention is necessary to prevent food prices
from reaching extreme values in DCs. This protects vulnerable households from price
spikes (thus contributing to maintaining their resilience by reducing their need to sell
assets) and producers from price risk (thus stimulating agricultural investment and
green revolutions, as happened in European, North American and Asian countries). 
How can prices be stabilized? The aim is not to stop prices from fluctuating , but
simply to stop them reaching extremely high or extremely low levels. Which instru-
ments should be used to achieve this? As the effectiveness of the different instru-
ments depends greatly on the different causes of price instability, we analyzed which
instrument should be used to counter each cause of food price instability in DCs: 
l “natural" instability stemming from harvest concentration in time and sensitivity
to natural hazards such as rainfall, disease and attacks by pests;
l “imported" instability due to international price instability being passed on through
imports and exports;
l “endogenous" instabil ity due to the dysfunction of domestic markets: panics,
speculative bubbles and cobweb dynamics.
As the price instability of a given product in a given country may be due to several
causes, and as these causes may be difficult to identify, it is necessary to design and
implement a stabilization scheme that can counter all these causes. We show that
such a scheme must be based on instruments that facilitate the modernization of
production (pillar 1) and markets (pillar 2), on information systems that provide price
and harvest forecasts (pillar 3), and on public instruments of market intervention
(pillar 4). The scheme in question is therefore based on a combination of A-instruments
(pillars 1, 2 and 3) and C-instruments (pillar 4).
What accompanying policies should be used? From food price stabilization schemes
to food price instability management schemes (FPIMS). Stabilizing prices is not
enough. Even a moderate price increase may be sufficient to push some poor house-
holds into the red. If insolvent consumers are to be protected from food insecurity,
they need help during price shocks (this is the role of emergency aid) and they need
to be recapitalized in order to increase their resilience (this is the role of multiannual
safety nets). Also, in the medium and long term, if price stabilization allows a green
revolution to take place, then many households will have to leave agriculture. Social
transfers then have a major role to play by helping them during this structural mutation,
namely dealing with problems arising from a shortage of non-agricultural jobs in rural
[ ] ©AFD / Managing food price instability in developing countries / April 2013
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Summary
areas and the resulting exodus to the towns. D-instruments are therefore a crucial
part of the food price instability management scheme: this is pillar 5. Insurance-based
instruments (B-instruments) also have a role to play. Firstly, given that price stabilization
policies do not affect harvest risk and do not entirely neutralize price risk (as they
allow prices to fluctuate within a set band), it may be useful to encourage DC pro-
ducers and traders to use B-instruments. Also, whether they aim to stabilize prices
(C-instruments) or support vulnerable households (D-instruments), public interventions
may simply transfer the instability to the State budget. The State (or donors) can hedge
against this by using futures markets or weather insurance (Faruqee et al., 1997; Dana
et al., 2006). This dual role of B-instruments constitutes pillar 6.
On what scale should DC domestic price instability be managed? Although price
instability management schemes have hitherto nearly always been implemented on
a national scale, the idea of a regional approach is drawing increasing interest. Expected
benefits include economies of scale, a greater market stabilizing effect (as the regional
market more greatly diversifies the weather risk by connecting a larger number of
production areas) and reduced spillover effects caused by the “porosity" of borders
between the countries in a given region. But the regional scale also has disadvantages,
due to its need for collective action. 
How should price instability management schemes (FPIMS) be governed? The
main problem is how to coordinate public and private instruments. The literature often
pits C and D-instruments against A-instruments: the constant threat of a public
intervention that is likely to drive prices down is thought to cause private actors to
stock or import less. This “crowding out effect" may ultimately lead to public interven-
tions increasing , instead of decreasing , price instability (Govereh et al., 2008; Chapoto
and Jayne, 2009). But compliance with a few simple rules means that public and private
instruments can cohabit harmoniously. Firstly, public interventions must be predictable,
meaning that they must follow rules that are known to all. For example, stabilizing
interventions must only be triggered once a predefined floor price or ceiling price
has been reached. Secondly, these intervention prices must be set at realistic levels
in consideration of production and marketing costs, consumer purchasing power,
and the State’s limited resources (too high a floor price will result in an extremely
expensive intervention and may thus compromise the scheme's financial sustainability,
whereas too low a ceiling price will discourage private storage). Finally, State interven-
tions must follow open, competitive procedures (calls for tender, auctions) to avoid
any collusion between State agents and private actors. 
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What role does the international community have to play? The international com-
munity has a key role to play in the success of these policies: it should help DC
governments finance their food price instability management scheme (FPIMS) and
create a more favorable environment by reducing price instability on international
markets. This can be achieved both through policies that target certain causes of
instability (such as the lack of information on stocks, excessive speculation on futures
markets, the boom in biofuels, and climate change) and through policies that aim to
increase global stocks (thus reducing the amplitude of price surges, whatever their
cause). 
How can the schemes (FPIMS) be adapted to suit each case? Choosing a combination
of instruments suitable for national or regional specificities. The FPIMS must of
course be modulated to suit each context: the instruments chosen and their combi-
nation must consider the specificities of the different countries or the Regional
Economic Communities in question. In order to provide guidance on these choices,
the second part of this book describes the main advantages, limitations and perverse
effects of the different instruments, and the complementarity and substitutability
relations between them. The main obstacles to instrument development are presen-
ted, and the means to overcome them are discussed. Text boxes provide a wealth of
empirical evidences and lessons learned from different countries of Africa, America
and Asia. 
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Introduction
The 2008 price crisis coupled with the urban riots it sparked in some 40 developing
countries and the media attention it drew served to heighten the awareness of policy-
makers, researchers and public opinion to the problem of food price instability. 
Food prices often undergo roller-coaster variations with surges being followed by
collapses. The plots below illustrate the magnitude of this phenomenon both on
international markets and in developing countries (see figures 1 to 3).
Source: IMF.













































































Wheat Maize   Rice    
ASavoir_N17_GB_BAT_2_(V2).qxp  12/04/13  8:36  Page 23
24
A SAVOIR
Although most media attention focuses on international price instability, it is food
price instability in developing countries (DC) that has the most serious consequences as
it directly impacts on the income of DC producers and the purchasing power of DC
consumers. International price instability above all becomes a major problem when
it generates price instability in DCs (as occurred in 2008). Moreover, the international
market is only one source of instability among others. And in actual fact, price insta-
bility in DCs often has mainly internal causes. For instance, the price of millet was
subject to great instability in Mali between 1994 and 2007 despite the fact that grain
prices on international markets were relatively stable over the same period (as illus-
trated by the amazing stability of the price of imported rice in Mali, see figure 2).
The main problem to be tackled is therefore food price instability inside developing
countries, with action on international prices being simply one means (among others)
of contributing to this. 
Introduction
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Food price instability has very serious consequences in developing countries for it
impacts on: 
l food security, with some poor households being obliged to reduce their consumption
when prices rise;
l agricultural modernization, as producers do not invest if prices are too unstable;
this brings green revolutions to a standstill and subsequently obstructs economic
development (Timmer, 1988; World Bank, 2007); 
l political stability, if price rises spark urban riots;
l macroeconomic stability, as food price instability may in certain cases affect the
State's budget, the trade balance, exchange rates or even growth and inflation rates.
Introduction
April 2013 / Managing food price instability in developing countries /©AFD [ ]
Source: Observatoire du marché agricole.
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Moreover, food price instability is a self-sustaining phenomenon as it prompts behaviors
that tend to maintain high levels of instability (vicious circles). 
Price instability means that production remains highly sensitive to climatic hazards
and little responsive to price incentives (and this in turn maintains price instability).
Price instability generates a risk for farmers, which leads them to invest very little
(both because they are risk-averse and because banks are reluctant to lend while the
price risk is high). These low levels of agricultural investment mean that production
remains highly sensitive to climatic hazards (with very little use of irrigation or drought-
resistant varieties) and responds only sluggishly to price incentives, with producers
finding it difficult to boost production when prices rise. But production sensitivity
to climatic hazards and its poor responsiveness to price rises further accentuates
price instability. Price instability and low agricultural investment therefore form a
vicious circle.
Another vicious circle is formed between price instability and market narrowness.
When faced with unstable prices, it is perfectly rational for households to develop
self-consumption strategies, i .e. producing what they consume, no more, no less.
This leads to market narrowness. For instance, it is considered that less that 20% of
the millet and sorghum produced in Sahel countries is actually marketed. But this
market narrowness further enhances price instability. The same vicious circle is seen on
the international scale. Countries react to international price instability by developing
food self-sufficiency strategies. This narrows the international market and further
enhances price instability.[ 1 ]
The outlook is bleak indeed when we realize that price instability could worsen in
the years to come given that different parameters are working together to render
food prices even more unstable. First is climate change that should cause more mar-
ked hazards and in consequence more variable agricultural production. Second is the
fall in global grain stocks caused by recent changes in agricultural policies in the USA,
the European Union and China (Mitchell and Le Vallée, 2005). Third is the development
of biofuels that creates a relationship between energy products and the price of
certain food products such as maize, rapeseed and sugar. Changes in the price of a barrel
of crude oil are therefore liable to have an impact on food prices. The fourth parameter
concerns changes taking place in futures markets. This inter-connection between agri-
Introduction
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[ 1 ] Today, only 10 to 11% of all grain produced worldwide is traded internationally. This percentage could further 
shrink in the near future as many countries are developing self-sufficiency strategies in the wake of the 2008 
crisis. An idea as to the magnitude of the phenomenon is provided by the land investment tables drawn up by 
IFPRI (Von Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 2009) and the International Land Coalition (http://landportal.info/landmatrix).
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cultural and energy prices could be further strengthened by the recent boom in the
trading of indices composed of these two commodity categories (Masters and White,
2008b). Also, over the last few years, many traders have been using agricultural
commodities futures (“ags") to diversify their portfolios. This has created a relationship
between the prices of securities and agricultural commodities. A crash on the securities
market can therefore result in a massive transfer of funds to ags, and this is liable to
create a speculative bubble. The 2008 crisis – where all the above-mentioned factors
may have played a role – may thus indicate that we have entered a new era charac-
terized by far more pronounced food price instability than has prevailed over the
last 20 years.
What can be done? A great many papers have been published on the instruments
that can be brought into play to reduce price instability or mitigate its effects. These
publications are run through with lively controversy between partisans of stabilization
and supporters of mitigation, between those who place their trust in private instruments
and those who believe that public intervention is necessary. It is this literature that
we have reviewed and discuss herein.
This book is based on three methodological choices
The first consists in covering all the possible strategies and instruments that can be
brought into play to manage price instability. This review of the different options,
and the overview it provides, are necessary in order to design effective and efficient
schemes to manage food price instability. Regarding its comprehensive approach,
our study follows on from that of Byerlee et al. (2005). 
The second choice consists in not pitting a priori one category of instruments
against another, in considering that market-based instruments and those based on
public intervention may be complementary and synergetic, as are instruments that
aim to reduce price instability and those intended to attenuate its effects. With
regard to this point, the study presented herein is a continuation of work – based on
a number of Asian success stories – that recommended the pragmatic stabilization
of grain prices in DCs by an approach combining private and public instruments
(Timmer, 1989; Dawe, 2001). 
Finally, the third choice consists in not considering that there is any universal solution to
food price instability, but rather that the optimal solution depends on the context.
This study therefore, in regard to this point, remains firmly on the tracks laid down
by Galiani (1770), who showed, in his time, that in matters of managing grain price
instability, what is beneficial here may be harmful there, and vice-versa. More parti-
April 2013 / Managing food price instability in developing countries /©AFD [ ]
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cularly, it takes up the idea that the relevance of the different instruments depends
on the cause of the instability. This means that different instruments must be used
depending on whether the instability arises from exogenous shocks or the endo-
genous dynamics of the markets (Ezekiel, 1938; Boussard et al., 2006), and whether
it is due to internal factors or is imported from the international market (Byerlee
et al., 2005). 
We shall begin by presenting the different strategies that may be used to reduce
price instability or mitigate its consequences (chapter 1), then enter more into the
details of the instruments that can be employed to implement these strategies
(chapter 2). 
[ ] ©AFD / Managing food price instability in developing countries / April 2013
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1. Developing a strategy 
to manage food price 
instability 
We will begin by presenting a panorama of the different strategies that may be used
to manage food price instability (1.1.). To do this, we firstly propose a taxonomy based
on two criteria: the goal – reducing price instability or mitigating its effects – and
the means adopted to reach this goal – based on markets or public interventions.
Building on this, we will then identify four “pure” strategies (called A, B, C and D) that
can be combined (1.1.1.). This “ABCD framework” will be used repeatedly throughout
the book to review the options possible, describe their advantages, limitations and
perverse effects, and the instruments with which they are associated. It will allow us
to provide a considerably simplified presentation of the literature that has analyzed
the properties of many instruments. This framework will first be used to present a
brief historical account of the debates and controversies that have surrounded the
management of agricultural and food price instability (1.1.2.). 
We will then focus on the controversy that currently opposes approaches based on
mitigating the effects of price instability and those that aim to reduce price instability
(1.2). We first consider the option that has predominated since the 1980s, and whose
aim is to reduce the effect of price instability “without touching prices” (1.2.1.). This may
be considered as a “mixed" strategy combining the two “pure" B and D strategies and
we have dubbed it the “optimal strategy" as it claims to provide an optimal economic
solution to the price instability problem. This strategy unfortunately failed to live up to
its great expectations (1.2.2.). It failed when put to the test and today is widely viewed
as a disappointment. This failure of the optimal strategy leads us to ask whether an
alternative strategy is possible (1.2.3.). We begin by presenting the objections to price
stabilization and at this point gain the impression that we have reached a dead
end. Does failure of the optimal strategy and the apparent impossibility of finding an
alternative strategy condemn us to live with unstable food prices and suffer all the
consequences (namely food insecurity and a halt to green revolutions)? An examination
of the different causes of price instability nevertheless allows us to make some progress
for, in the light of these different causes, the criticism leveled against price stabilization
appears to be ill founded and this rehabilitates price stabilization-based strategies. 
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This encourages us to analyze price stabilization-based strategies in detail (1.3), firstly
by considering how the targets (intervention prices) of stabilization policies can be set
(1.3.1.). The aim here of course is not to stabilize prices entirely as this would prevent
the market from operating. Stabilization must simply aim to prevent prices from
reaching extremely low or high values. These “extreme” values may be decided by
an approach that is either technical (notion of “abnormal" price) or political (notion
of “unacceptable" price for a given society). We then address the question of price
stabilization methods (1.3.2.). A multitude of instruments are available for this based
either on an improvement in the market (A strategy) or public interventions (C stra-
tegy). Should only A-instruments be used, or is recourse to C-instruments also
necessary? We begin by establishing that the effectiveness of stabilization strategies
depends on the main cause of the price instability. We then analyze successively the
different strategies that can be employed in situations of “natural", “imported" and
“endogenous" instability. Finally, considering the difficulties arising from the multiple
causes of price instability leads us to specify the different pillars on which the price
stabilization schemes must rest (1.3.3.).  
We then broaden our analysis, for although price stabilization is an essential compo-
nent in the management of food price instability, it alone is insufficient (1.4.). We
therefore present the policies that necessarily must accompany this stabilization,
based on public (1.4.1.) or private instruments (1.4.2.).
We then study in detail the concrete conditions for implementing food price insta-
bility management schemes (1.5.). We discuss the most relevant scale on which the
scheme may be implemented, in particular the expected benefits of regional schemes
(1.5.1.). We then determine how the scheme can be adapted to match the specificities
of each country or group of countries (1.5.2.). Finally, we show that the success of
price instability management schemes depends greatly on the manner in which they
are designed and implemented, and this leads us to put forward a few guiding princi-
ples that guarantee good governance (1.5.3.). 
We wind up by discussing the role the international community should play in
managing food price instability (1.6.). 
1. Developing a strategy to manage food price instability
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1.1 . Panorama of the different possible strategies that may 
be used to manage food price instability
1.1.1. The ABCD framework
As mentioned in the introduction, it is because food price instability causes instability
in incomes and purchasing power that it generates such a host of development pro-
blems: food insecurity, a lack of investment in food production, macroeconomic
instability, and even political unrest. 
The problem of price instability may therefore be resolved by two non-exclusive
approaches. The first consists in stabilizing prices. The second consists in reducing
the effects of price instability on income and purchasing power.
Each of these approaches can be implemented either by developing markets or by
using public interventions. 
We therefore propose to distinguish between four possible strategies by examining
their goal – stabilize prices or reduce the effects of instability – and the means adopted
to reach this goal – market development or use of public interventions (see table 1).
1. Developing a strategy to manage food price instability
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1Table The different strategies for managing price instability
Source: author.
Strategy A consists in making production, trade and consumption more responsive to
prices such that low magnitude price movements are sufficient to correct disequilibria.
For instance, if prices rise a little but producers increase their production (more land
sown, more use of inputs), the rise will be limited. If, in addition, production is rendered
less susceptible to climatic hazards, the relationship between price and production is
strengthened. Likewise, if traders take advantage of price differences between localities
by buying where prices are falling and selling where they are rising , this both limits
price drops in regions where the supply is too great and limits rises in those where it




Market development Strategy A Strategy B 
Public interventions Strategy C Strategy D
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is insufficient. The same can be said of price differences over time: by making use of
storage, producers and traders can use good-year surpluses to compensate for
poor-year deficits. 
The instruments associated with strategy A (or A-instruments) aim to facilitate
arbitrage by market actors (producers, traders, processors, consumers). This arbitrage
may be made in time (choice of time to buy and sell), in space (choice of where to buy
and sell), between products (choice by producers to allocate their plots, choice by
households to consume) and between production techniques (choice by producers
of methods that are more or less intensive, resulting in more or less sensitivity to
natural hazards). As these decisions are based on prices, the first step in their facili-
tation is to inform market actors of price movements: this is the role of Market
Information Systems (MIS). But information is often not enough. For example, a far-
mer may be looking to intensify his production but is unable to do so if he lacks the
means to purchase fertilizer or has little access to credit. A trader may be looking to
buy in one locality and sell in another, but is unable to do so because he lacks any
means of transport. A-instruments can therefore be split into two major categories:
provision of inputs for agricultural production (fertilizers, pesticides, irrigation services,
seeds, equipment, credit, advice, etc.) and market infrastructure and institutions (means
of transport, communication, processing and storage, seasonal credit, grading systems,
warehouse receipt systems, commodity exchanges, etc.). 
Strategy B consists in enabling producers and traders to hedge price risk and correlated
risks. This means that economic actors who hedge on the futures markets receive
financial compensation if price movements cause them to lose money. The futures
markets therefore provide a sort of insurance against price risk (even if they function
very differently from insurance companies). Their aim is not to stabilize prices but
simply to ensure that price instability does not generate income instability. As harvest
risk sometimes correlates with price risk (when harvests are good the price falls, and
vice versa ), strategy B also includes hedging harvest risk.
B-instruments may therefore be split into three groups. The first two concern instru-
ments used to hedge price risk and harvest risk. For instance, the futures markets
offer different instruments, mainly futures, call options and put options, that hedge
price risk. Crop insurance and weather-indexed insurance enable producers to protect
their income from the negative consequences of natural hazards. It should also be
noted that “mixed" instruments can be used to hedge both price risk and harvest risk.
This is in particular the case for revenue insurance. These two groups of B-instruments
provide ex ante protection. A third group of B-instruments enables actors to react
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ex post, after their income has fallen due to a poor harvest or a price shock. These
instruments concern producer or consumer credit .[ 2 ]
Strategy C consists in public interventions to ensure that supply meets demand.
Interventions may act on production, on stocks or on foreign trade. 
C-instruments used to control production mainly take the form of input subsidies
and production quotas. Instruments used to regulate foreign trade either take the
form of taxes or subsidies and quantitative restrictions (quotas, bans or licenses) on
imports or exports. Finally, C-instruments that impact on storage consist mainly of
public stocks (buffer stocks managed directly by the State), though indirect forms of
control over private stocks may also be envisaged and are used in certain countries. 
Strategy D aims to support the income of households rendered food-insecure due
to price rises. This support relies on public transfers that are generally restricted to high-
price periods and target certain categories of households considered as vulnerable.
D-instruments may vary with the nature of the goods being transferred (cash, vouchers,
food, inputs or assets), the target, the level of support (free distribution or simple
subsidy, as in the case of moderately priced sales), the matching contribution required
(this, if any, may take the form of work or a household's commitment to adopt certain
behaviors, such as the schooling of children), and whether transfers are activated
structurally (to recapitalize vulnerable households) or only in emergency situations.
1.1.2. Short account of past debates on managing the instability 
of agricultural prices
A great many papers (run through with lively controversy) have been published on
how to manage the instability of agricultural prices. 
For many years people turned to C-instruments in their efforts to find a solution to
the price instability problem. After World War II, leading economists (including Keynes)
recommended that mechanisms should be set up to stabilize international prices.
This was translated into action by the signing of several “International Commodity
Agreements" (ICAs) that aimed to stabilize the price of sugar (1954), coffee (1962),
cacao (1972) and natural rubber (1980). The heyday of this drive to stabilize prices
April 2013 / Managing food price instability in developing countries /©AFD [ ]
[ 2 ] It should be noted that credit is part of both A- and B-instruments. It helps producers, traders and consumers 
to arbitrate as it provides them with the capacity to respond to price movements, but it also helps economic 
actors maintain their production or consumption levels even when their income falls. 
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was reached in 1976 with the Integrated Program for Commodities proposed by the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) which aimed to
build a “new international economic order" by stabil izing the price of ten major
commodities. But, during the 1980s, the beneficial effect of price stabilization was
contested by academics (Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981) and policy makers gradually
abandoned price stabilization mechanisms (Gilbert, 1996).[ 3 ]
The spotlight has ever since been focused on B-instruments, with the idea predomi-
nating that the stabilization of agricultural prices is not a good thing , for two reasons.
First, it prevents prices from playing their role of signals that are supposed to guide
production and trade behaviors. Second, by uncoupling price movements from pro-
duction movements it prevents farmers from benefiting from the “natural insurance"
procured by the negative correlation between price and harvest volumes. The best
option, therefore, was considered to consist in stabilizing incomes without “touching
prices" by using private risk hedging instruments (B-instruments), supplemented (in
the case of staple food crops) by safety nets for vulnerable populations (D-instru-
ments). But the expected boom in risk hedging instruments (B-instruments) failed
to materialize despite initiatives taken to promote their use by farmers, traders and
even DC States (CRMG, 2008). And D-instruments sometimes proved unable to
prevent the situation of the poorest households from worsening (as shown by the
2005 crisis in Niger).
This led to A-instruments being brought to the fore (Byerlee et al., 2005) with the
idea that grain market modernization could in part be the solution. 
Finally, the 2007-2008 food crisis led to C-instruments re-gaining a certain legiti-
macy as illustrated by International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and World
Bank proposals to stabilize grain prices on international markets (Von Braun and
Torero, 2008, 2009a and 2009b; Lin, 2008; Von Braun et al., 2009). 
1.2. The current controversy: reduce the effects of price 
instability or stabilize prices
The current controversy pits approaches that seek to reduce the negative consequences
of price instability against those that recommend proactive measures to reduce price
instability. The first have given rise to a mixed strategy based on strategies B and D.
[ ] ©AFD / Managing food price instability in developing countries / April 2013
[ 3 ] The only ICA stabilization scheme that survives today is that designed to stabilize the price of natural rubber.
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We have dubbed this the “optimal strategy" as it claims to bring an optimal economic
solution to the price instability problem. We will begin by describing this “optimal
strategy" (1.2.1), before showing that it has very largely failed in DCs (1.2.2). This will
then lead us to analyze whether an alternative strategy based on a reduction in price
instability is possible or not (1.2.3). 
1.2.1. The “optimal strategy": stabilize income 
“without touching prices" 
The “optimal strategy" was the dominant approach (both in academic and political
circles) from the end of the 1980s until the crises that occurred in the second half of
the 2000s. It still today constitutes the principal reference paradigm for international
organizations. Its main message is that it is preferable to treat the consequences of
price instability without stopping prices from fluctuating. This means that B- and
D-instruments should be employed rather than A- and C-instruments. 
The optimal strategy relies primarily on B-instruments, i.e. instruments that hedge
price risk and harvest risk. Most of these instruments are based on the notion of
compensation: economic actors protect themselves by acquiring contracts that provide
cover with regard to a particular variable that can be price (futures, call options, put
options), harvest (crop insurance), climatic conditions (weather-indexed insurance)
or revenue (revenue insurance). If the variable covered in the contract exceeds a
certain threshold, the contract holders are granted financial compensation .[ 4 ]
The protection afforded by this set of instruments has characteristics that appear to
bring an “optimal" solution to price and harvest instability. 
Firstly, it is symmetrical: B-instruments can protect against both excessive drops and
rises in prices. For example, producers can use futures or put options to hedge
against income losses arising from price drops. Likewise, purchasers can protect
themselves from price rises through recourse to futures or call options. 
Secondly, it is flexible. Economic actors can be offered a full range of contracts (options,
insurance) providing different levels of protection. This allows actors who are little risk
averse to cover themselves moderately while leaving others the possibility to acquire
greater protection (by paying more). Price stabilization cannot offer such flexibility
for it generates the same level of protection for all.
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Finally, it is predictable. The level of protection offered by most B-instruments is
known in advance. For example, a producer in possession of a put option knows that
selling will bring him at least the floor price guaranteed by the option. 
These three characteristics are not the exclusive prerogative of B-instruments, but
for each of these characteristics, B-instruments do have an undeniable comparative
advantage .[ 5 ] Symmetry, flexibility and predictability: it is easy to see why so much
hope was placed in B-instruments and why so many researchers saw them as the
"optimal" solution to the price instability problem. 
But better still, thanks to the different complementarities between B-instruments, the
set of B-instruments provides great consistency. These complementarities come into
play between instruments that hedge different risks (namely those that protect against
harvest risk and those that protect against price risk). They also unite instruments
that afford ex ante protection (by guaranteeing financial compensation in the event
of a poor harvest or unfavorable price movements, e.g. crop insurance or futures )
and those that intervene ex post (credit helping market actors respond when faced
with a fall in income). In this regard, actors who have price risk or harvest risk cover
find it easier to obtain credit from banks or microfinance institutions. Finally, B-ins-
truments are also complementary in scale. If the risks run by actors in a given area
are correlated (for instance the risk of a poor harvest) the actors supplying them
with B-instruments (insurance companies, credit institutions, etc.) themselves run a
risk… that they pass on to their customers. This has the effect of increasing the cost of
B-instruments. But these B-instruments providers may in turn use B-instruments to
protect themselves. For example, a company that provides the farmers in a particular
area with crop insurance or microcredit can protect itself with weather-indexed
insurance (this type of insurance may be offered by a company that operates over a
[ ] ©AFD / Managing food price instability in developing countries / April 2013
[ 5 ] For instance, D-instruments are not symmetrical: they focus more on dealing with increases in food prices than 
on decreases. Likewise, A-instruments are not entirely symmetrical in the sense that they are better at managing 
price decreases than increases, for private storage is better at absorbing surpluses than making up for deficits 
(Williams and Wright, 1991). The advantage of B-instruments is very clearly their flexibility. By stabilizing prices, 
A-instruments and C-instruments provide everyone with the same level of protection. D-instruments can provide 
different levels of protection depending on household characteristics, but here the level of protection is not chosen 
by the households themselves (unless self-targeting is used). Finally, with regard to predictability, here again 
B-instruments are best. A-instruments do not provide any guaranteed price. And given that most D-instruments 
are used only in crisis situations (and with ad hoc targeting), no vulnerable households in need can be absolutely 
certain in advance of receiving the social transfers D-instruments provide. C-instruments can provide an appro-
priate level of predictability on condition that public interventions are governed by rules, with interventions being 
triggered only if prices reach certain pre-defined thresholds (see 1.5.3.). Generally, the symmetry, flexibility and 
predictability of all instrument categories can be enhanced by appropriate means, and this is one of the conditions 
for improving their effectiveness (see 2.).
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larger geographic area, meaning that it diversifies the weather risks). In the same
manner, traders can protect themselves by using the futures market to purchase from
producers at prices that are agreed in advance. This provides producers indirectly with
the protection afforded by futures markets. 
Given these complementarities, B-instruments would appear to constitute an
appealing solution to the price instability problem. If we add to this the fact that
these instruments are symmetrical, flexible and predictable, it is easy to understand
why B-instruments have fascinated, and continue to fascinate, both researchers and
policy makers.
Yet, when ranged against the price instability affecting basic foodstuffs, B-instruments
are not enough. For many years, the debate surrounding price instability focused on
cash crops or mining products (coffee, cacao, rubber, tin, etc.). In this context, the
“optimal" strategy relied solely on B-instruments. The shift in focus to food prices led
to the consideration of D-instruments as it was obvious that vulnerable populations
in DCs did not have the means to use B-instruments to hedge harvest risk and price
risk. It was therefore necessary to offer them cost-free instruments able to play the
same protective role as B-instruments: i.e. D-instruments. 
D-instruments aim to transfer goods to certain household or person categories.
They differ by: a) the nature of the goods transferred, b) the nature of the matching
contribution (if any) c) the target beneficiary and d) the structural or conjunctural
character of the transfer. The goods transferred may take the form of food or cash,
food vouchers, agricultural inputs or assets (such as cattle). The matching contribution
may be work, cash (if the transferred goods are only partly subsidized, not distributed
for free) or the household's commitment to adopt specific behaviors (for instance the
schooling of children). Targeting may rely on a wide variety of methods. A particularly
interesting method is “self-targeting" that consists in creating conditions such that
only households requiring aid actually ask for it .[ 6 ] Finally, aid may be structural or
may be activated only in periods of crisis (if the harvest is poor or if food prices rise
substantially). A large number of instruments can be obtained by crossing the different
modalities of the four dimensions.
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[ 6 ] If, for example, grain provided as food aid is of a low quality, or if considerable queuing or work is required to 
obtain it, only households truly in need of the aid will be willing to make the effort necessary (for more details 
see 2.4.).
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When the optimal strategy was still predominant, D-instruments were viewed in the
same light as B-instruments, i.e. protecting economic agents from harvest and price
risks, without “touching prices".
Is the consistency of the "optimal strategy" strengthened or weakened by including
D-instruments? Several factors point to it being strengthened. B-instruments and
D-instruments appear to be complementary. Firstly, they are designed for different
actors. Secondly, they match risks that have different characteristics.
B-instruments are more aimed at producers and traders whereas D-instruments
are more intended for consumers. However, the distribution of roles between the
two instrument categories should be viewed with caution given that the distinction
between producer and consumer is rather fuzzy in DCs (many grain-producing house-
holds face deficits and must purchase grain during the lean period). Also, actors with
access to B-instruments are generally well off economic actors (or at least medium
sized), whereas those targeted by D-instruments are poor, vulnerable households. This
again should be considered with caution for certain poor households may have access
to certain B-instruments (such as microcredit). Likewise, operating difficulties in the
targeting may result in non-poor households receiving transfers from D-instruments.
But overall, B-instruments target the richest and D-instruments the poorest.
In addition, B-instruments and D-instruments are not relevant in the same situations.
B-instruments can only be used efficiently in the face of risks that follow known
statistical distributions. When this is not the case, insurers run a very high risk. This
is why recourse to public safety nets is necessary in situations of “wild" (high and
non-probabilizable) risk (Cordier and Debar, 2004). 
In all, the “optimal strategy" offers an extremely interesting combination of instruments.
B-instruments combine the advantages of symmetry, flexibility and predictability.
They are linked one to the other by different complementarities based on the type
of risk covered (harvest risk or price risk), the point at which they intervene in the
risk chain (ex ante mitigation or ex post reaction) and the scale of the intervention.
With respect to staple food products, the mechanism must be supplemented by
safety nets and other D-instruments for poor households and “wild" (non probabi-
lizable) risk situations. 
Also, beyond those directly afforded their protection, all market actors are liable to
benefit from B-instruments and D-instruments. This “multiplier effect" is caused by
the supposed knock-on effect exerted by these instruments on A-instruments: the
protection afforded by B-instruments and, to a certain extent by D-instruments makes
[ ] ©AFD / Managing food price instability in developing countries / April 2013
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private actors more secure and thus encourages them to invest in production and
storage. This generally has a stabilizing effect on prices. Therefore, were a sufficiently
large proportion of producers or traders to be afforded protection by B-instruments
and D-instruments, this would cause prices to be less unstable, which would be
beneficial for all.
For all these reasons, the “optimal strategy” has fascinated, and continues to fascinate,
both academics and decision-makers. The general feeling is that it should work. Yet,
with time, doubt started to creep in. 
1.2.2. Failure of the “optimal strategy" 
With the liberalization of agriculture and the dismantling of International Commodity
Agreements (ICAs), many people thought that the futures markets and insurance
markets would experience unprecedented growth. Others on the other hand rapidly
expressed their skepticism of B-instruments, claiming that their development would
be undermined from within by problems of adverse selection and moral hazard
(Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981). Use of the futures markets would also be limited by the
technicity and cost of the instruments proposed (futures, call or put options). Many
nevertheless believed that these problems could be overcome, with a solution in part
being found in the development of new instruments. For instance, weather insurance is
less subject to problems of moral hazard than is crop insurance. A solution was also
sought in the complementarities between instruments, and in particular between
weather or crop insurance and price-risk hedging instruments, as well as between
these two groups of instruments and credit. More recently, complementarities of
scale have taken centre stage (Larson et al., 1998). The idea here is that the problems
of moral hazard, adverse selection and systemic risk can, in part, be resolved by
B-instrument providers protecting themselves through B-instruments offered by
actors operating on a larger scale. Public support was also envisaged in the form
of technical support and sometimes subsidies (see actions by the World Bank's
Commodity Risk Management Group, CRMG, 2008). 
The facts nevertheless proved the skeptics to be right.The much anticipated develop-
ment of risk hedging instruments never materialized and the action taken has so far
failed to stimulate the development of B-instruments or boost their use by DC
producers and traders, at least as far as food products are concerned. Neither the
development of new instruments, nor the emergence of new actors pooling risks
and providing reinsurance, or multi-faceted support from public authorities, has led
to any real growth in the use of B-instruments. However, it should not be concluded
that these instruments are without potential. Efforts made to develop B-instruments
April 2013 / Managing food price instability in developing countries /©AFD [ ]
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and stimulate their use by DC actors must continue. But let us be under no illusion.
In DCs, the proportion of private actors with access to B-instruments will remain
low. Other solutions must therefore be envisaged. 
At the same time, D-instruments are also in crisis as revealed by the 2005 crisis in
Sahelian countries, particularly Niger. Here, analyses showed that the price and pro-
duction shocks experienced by households were not much greater than those of
previous years. The malnutrition problems observed were mainly due to the fact that
households whose capital had been reduced by a series of crises had little capacity
to react. And this is precisely the criticism leveled at D-instruments: their failure to
prevent the decapitalization and weakening of vulnerable households' resilience
(Michiels et al., 2008; Michiels and Egg , 2008; Blein and Egg , 2009). 
The absence of any significant development in B-instruments, and the crisis in
D-instruments, meant that the very rationale behind the optimal strategy (founded
on risk and crisis management) is called into question. This strategy has been unable
to guarantee the food security of poor households. It has failed to reduce the risk
faced by producers sufficiently to stimulate their investment and thus modernize
DC agricultures. Also, looking back into the past, not one single example can be
found of a green revolution being stimulated by B-instruments. By contrast, the
green revolutions achieved in European, North-American and Asian countries were
nearly in all cases accompanied and facilitated by price stabilization schemes. This applies
for instance to England and its corn laws, Europe and its Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP) and the green revolutions in India (Dorin and Landy, 2009) and Indonesia
(Timmer, 1997a). 
An alternative strategy based on price stabilization must therefore be considered.
Yet, the poor development of B-instruments and the crisis in D-instruments are not
sufficiently decisive arguments in favor of this alternative strategy. We might think (and
some do) that living with unstable prices and very imperfect risk hedging instruments is
preferable to price stabilization. We must therefore step beyond simply noting the
failure of B-instruments and D-instruments, and analyze the arguments against price
stabilization.
1.2.3. Is an alternative strategy possible? 
Objections to price stabilization
The informational role of prices and the “natural insurance” of producers are the main
arguments given against price stabilization. 
[ ] ©AFD / Managing food price instability in developing countries / April 2013
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Prices as signals. It has long been known that prices aggregate information on the
scarcity of goods. They therefore guide economic actors (Hayek, 1945). “Touching
prices" therefore means reducing the quality of resource allocation. 
“Natural insurance" of producers. Agricultural price stabilization has an uncertain
effect on the instability of producer revenues since the negative correlation between
harvest volume and price level (when harvests are poor, prices are supposed to be
high) provides producers with a sort of “natural insurance" (price and production risks
partially offset one another). Newbery and Stiglitz (1981) made this “natural insurance"
aspect a central theme of their arguments. As stabilizing food prices generally
means reducing the correlation between prices and harvests, this may ultimately
increase the instability of producer revenues (Newbery and Stiglitz, 1984). 
These arguments are nevertheless highly debatable and their validity depends on the
causes of the price instability. We will therefore begin by describing these causes before
returning to discussions on the relevance of a strategy based on price stabilization. 
The necessary consideration of the causes of price instability
We propose to distinguish between three types of instability [ 7 ] according to their
causes:
“Natural" instability. This is the type of instability considered (sometimes implicitly) in
most analyses. We have chosen to call it “natural" as it results from natural factors that
affect harvest date and size. It in fact covers two types of rather different phenomena:
seasonality and production variability. 
Seasonality is related to the fact that harvests are concentrated in time. As new harvest
produce arrives on the market, the price falls then gradually increases during the
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[ 7 ] There is also a fourth cause of instability: instability arising from markets for products linked to food products 
(inputs or substituable products). This mainly concerns oil and other energy products whose price affects food 
production costs through effects on the cost of fertilizer, the cost of pumping water, or transport costs. Thanks 
to the growth in biofuels, energy products have also become partially substitutable with food products 
(Voituriez, 2009b; Hertel and Beckman, 2010; Roberts and Schlenker, 2010; Tyner, 2010). Energy price instability 
may therefore lead to food price instability. However, the passing on of instability through production costs would 
appear empirically to have only a minor effect on food price instability in DCs. And regarding biofuels, if we 
exclude the case of sugar in Brazil, the main food products employed come from developed countries (maize in the
USA, rapeseed in Europe). Biofuels therefore mainly destabilize prices in DCs not directly but through their effects 
on international prices. This effect is therefore captured by one of our three cause categories: imported 
instability. Some experts consider that given the financialization of agricultural commodity futures markets, agricul-
tural prices may be affected by price fluctuations in other commodities (such as metals) or even securities. But here
again, should such effects occur, they will affect prices in DCs only indirectly through their effect on international 
prices. It is for the above reasons that the fourth cause category has not been explicitly included in this sub-section
(devoted to the causes of price instability in DCs). By contrast, it is discussed in the section devoted to the stabi-
lization of international prices (see 1.6.2.). 
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year (as stocks fall) to reach a peak in the period immediately before the next harvest
(the “lean season”). 
Production variability from one year to the next results from natural hazards (climate,
disease or attacks by pests). This variability of course depends on the intensity of
these climate hazards, but also on production sensitivity to these hazards (sensitivity
that can be reduced to a certain extent for example by drought-resistant varieties,
the development of irrigation systems or the use of phytosanitary products). 
An important difference between seasonality and production variability is that the
latter generates relatively unpredictable price instability (unlike the former that
occurs cyclically). The two phenomena may nevertheless interact, with production
variability in certain years offsetting seasonality. A comparison of producer prices for
rice (mostly irrigated) and millet in Mali is in this regard most illustrative (see figure 4).
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Source: Observatoire du Marché Agricole.
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“Imported” instability. Price instability within a country may also result from its
foreign trade since domestic prices are bounded by the prices that can be obtained
on the international market. The import parity price (PM ) designates the cost price
of grain imported onto the domestic market. This is therefore the international CIF
(Cost – Insurance – Freight) price converted into national currency plus import
tariffs and transport costs from the port to the domestic market. The domestic
price cannot rise above the import parity price, for if it does, the country will be
flooded by imports. A symmetrical situation is encountered for the export parity
price (PX): domestic prices cannot fall lower than the PX for in this case traders
export massively, stocks fall and the domestic price is held at the PX. The domestic
price is therefore held within a band bounded by the parity prices. 
Variability in the import parity price (PM ) or export parity price (PX) can therefore
cause price instability on the domestic market. This variability in parity prices in turn
stems from variability in international prices, but also other causes such as variability in
exchange rates, the cost of ocean freight and the cost of shipping goods from the port
to the domestic market.
“Endogenous" instability. Price instability is referred to as endogenous when it arises
from the functioning of the markets themselves, not from exogenous shocks such
as those affecting production (Boussard, 1996; Boussard et al., 2006). 
In this case, price instability results from the interplay between expectations and
behaviors. It is well known, for instance, that most decisions by economic actors are
taken on the basis of their expectations for future prices. This is obviously the case
for production decisions (choice of land area allocated to different crops and amount of
inputs employed), given the time lag between these decisions and harvesting. But
this is also the case for buying and selling decisions. If expectations are based on past
price movements, this may lead to endogenous instability given that the instability
of the expectations leads to unstable behaviors which lead to price instability that
further accentuates the instability of the expectations. 
A famous example of this is the cobweb scenario, shown by Ezekiel (1938). In its simplest
version, the cobweb mechanism supposes that the expected price is equal to the
current price. Here, if Pt is high, many producers increase the areas sown or intensify
their production, thereby lowering Pt+1, discouraging production and in turn causing
Pt+2 to be high. It may be said that the mechanism described by Ezekiel is unlikely to
occur as it is based on the hypothesis of “naive" expectations: economic actors are
assumed to believe that tomorrow’s price will be more or less the same as today's.
April 2013 / Managing food price instability in developing countries /©AFD [ ]
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But other researchers have shown that the cobweb mechanism also comes into play
with less naive expectations, on condition that they are based on past price movements
(Nerlove, 1958). The root cause of the cobweb is the “simultaneous" nature of pro-
duction decisions: when a farmer sows maize he does not know what decisions are
being made by other producers in terms of areas sown with maize or the amount of
inputs used as, given the proximity of sowing dates and production lags, when some
farmers are sowing, others have not yet sold their harvest. Current prices cannot there-
fore reveal to some farmers the production decisions taken by others.[ 8 ]
Another scenario is that of speculative bubbles and panics. If market actors expect
prices to rise, they have every interest in holding on to their stocks and increasing
their buying , actions which cause prices to rise (self-fulfilling predictions). The phe-
nomenon may snowball: expecting prices to rise actually causes real price rises which
further feed price rise expectations. This is the mechanism behind “speculative bubbles"
where price movements are disconnected from fundamental dynamics, until the
market “bursts”. Panics have a similar mechanism: the fear of running short drives
consumers to increase their buying , which can cause a real shortage. Panics may also
occur in the other direction, with economic actors seeking to sell rapidly a product
whose price is collapsing (and thereby further depressing the price). Although spe-
culative bubbles and panics may occur both on physical markets and on derivative
markets, their likelihood is greater on the latter.[ 9 ]
Endogenous instability therefore takes two fairly different forms. Whereas the cob-
web mainly concerns production behaviors, speculation and panics mainly concern
trade behaviors for either futures contracts or physical products (stock retention by
traders, massive purchasing by consumers to build up stocks for precautionary rea-
sons). Another difference is that the cobweb tends to generate a negative price
autocorrelation (a high price at t tends to result in a low price at t + 1 and vice versa),
whereas speculative bubbles and panics have the opposite effect (a price rise in t
tends to cause a fresh rise in t + 1).
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[ 8 ] In the original version of Ezekiel's paper, and in the work that followed, the cobweb concerned only production
decisions. However, the mechanism involved seems to have a more general scope. Let us consider trader choices
concerning which areas to buy from. These traders have a choice between different rural markets and make 
this choice based on expected prices for the next market day. If expectations are based on the price on the last 
market day, then cobweb dynamics may well emerge as many traders will turn up at the market where the 
price was lowest, thus causing demand and therefore prices to soar. 
[ 9 ] This is due to the fact that the price of futures on futures markets is an aggregate of all expectations for the price 
in the future. It is therefore perfectly rational for economic actors to revise their expectations based on changes 
in this price. Therefore, as a rise in the price of futures means that most actors expect the price to rise, actors who 
think otherwise will tend to change their minds and also expect a rise, and therefore buy futures. This in turn will 
cause a fresh rise.
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The differences between the three types of instability [ 10 ] can be more clearly unders-
tood if represented graphically. 
Natural instability may be represented by a shift in the supply curve (see figure 5).
Seasonality may be represented by a gradual slide in the supply curve: located at O1
immediately post-harvest, it gradually shifts leftward to reach O2 in the period imme-
diately before the next harvest, which causes the price to increase from P1 to P2
(until new harvests shift the supply curve to the right and cause prices to fall).
Regarding production variability, this may be represented by the fact that during the
harvest the supply curve is randomly located between O1 and O2 (depending on natural
hazards affecting the plants), which leads prices to be randomly located between P1
and P2.
April 2013 / Managing food price instability in developing countries /©AFD [ ]












(b) Period of short supply
Q Q
D O1 D O2
[ 10 ] It should be specified that, in this book, each time we deal with price instability inside DCs, natural instability and 
endogenous instability refer solely to internal factors. Thus, natural instability or the cobweb refers only to that 
country's production. Likewise, speculative bubbles refer to the selling and buying behavior of economic actors 
(producers, traders, processors and consumers) in that country. Imported instability on the other hand refers to 
instability derived from international markets, regardless of whether this is caused by weather hazards, speculative
bubbles, the cobweb, panics or energy price instability (see footnote 6). This distinction is justified from an ope-
rational standpoint: although a country can tackle internal (natural and endogenous) causes of instability, it has 
no control over external causes (it can only attempt to protect itself from imported instability, and in doing so 
lends little importance to the causes of this instability). By contrast, on the international scale, any price stabilization
strategy must address the causes of international price instability (see 1.6.2.). 
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Imported instability may be represented by an upward or downward shift in the band
established by the parity prices (see figure 6). In the example shown, the country is
disconnected from the international market when the international price is high
(case a), but becomes an importer when the international price is low (case b). This cau-
ses the domestic price to fall to the import parity price. Other situations are possible.
For instance, the country becomes an exporter when the international price rises
(here domestic price rises to PX). The country may also structurally be an importer
(or exporter), and domestic prices in this case fluctuate with variations in PM (or PX).  
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(b) Period of low international price
Q Q
D O1 D O1
Endogenous instability may be represented by a shift along the supply or demand
curves (see figure 7). Prices in this case fluctuate not because of exogenous shocks but
because of the dynamics of the domestic markets, particularly the interplay between
price expectations and production or trade behaviors. This may generate cobweb
dynamics, speculative bubbles or panics that result in erratic shifts along the supply
or demand curves. 
Let us consider the case of the cobweb in its most simple form, as represented in
figure 7. During the first period the production level causes the price to settle at P1
with supply and demand in equilibrium. Given that producers expect the price to
stay at this level, production decisions for the next period are taken in view of P1. But
at this price demand is unable to absorb all the supply so that ex post the price falls
to P2. New production decisions are based on this price. Production therefore falls
and prices rise. Alternating high and low productions over the following periods
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cause price instability. Here it should be noted that it is the parity price band that
bounds price and production instability (see figure 7b). 
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Source: author. 


























Empirical examples can be provided for each of the above causes. The Sahel crises of
the 1970s were mainly due to poor harvests caused by drought (natural instability).
The 2008 price crisis that affected many developing countries resulted from soaring
international prices (imported instability). According to Amartya Sen, the famine
that affected Bengal in 1943 can mainly be explained by speculative dynamics, and,
for him, this is also the case for most famines (Sen 1977, 1980, 1981a and 1981b) .[ 11 ]
According to Ravallion (1987), the famine that occurred in India in 1974 was the result
of a panic stemming from erroneous expectations that caused the panic-buying of
stocks, creating a real shortage (endogenous instability). 
The different causes of price instability may of course work together simultaneously,
which further complicates the problem. For example, the harvest may be poor (making
the country deficient) at the same time that international prices rise, causing domestic
prices to soar. Likewise, the cobweb or speculative bubbles may be fed by instability in
harvests, international prices or exchange rates. For instance, the 2005 crisis in Sahelian
countries was very likely due both to the cobweb (producer prices were low the pre-
[ 11 ] Sen's analysis has been contested by certain experts (both as regards the causes of famines in general and the 
specific case of Bengal). This gave rise to a controversy in Food Policy (Bowbrick, 1986 and 1987; Sen, 1986 
and 1987).
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vious year) and attacks by locusts (natural instability). Later in this book we will examine
in depth how to manage instability stemming from a combination of causes.
Now that we have looked at the causes of price instability we can discuss the argu-
ments advanced against stabilization and contest their validity. This will lead us to
rehabilitate price stabilization-based strategies. 
Rehabilitating price stabilization-based strategies 
Although the optimal strategy has been predominant since the 1980s, it has poorly
withstood the test of time: the much anticipated development of B-instruments
never materialized and D-instruments failed to prevent the nutritional situation of
many vulnerable households in developing countries from further deteriorating.
But should an alternative strategy based on price stabilization nevertheless be envi-
saged? Criticism has been leveled at the notion of price stabilization, but, as we will
now see, the theoretical foundations of this criticism are shaky if we consider the
different causes of price instability. We may therefore call into question the idea of not
“touching prices" to avoid disturbing market signals and the idea that price stabilization
would have little effect on farmers’ revenue instability due to the natural insurance
provided by the negative correlation between price and production. 
The informational role of prices with regard to endogenous instability 
and imperfect expectations
It has long been known that prices guide the behavior of economic actors (Hayek,
1945). Stabilizing prices therefore means they are prevented from correctly fulfilling
their informational (and incentive) role. 
However, this is only true if price movements correctly reflect changing fundamentals.
And we know that this is not always the case. Markets are not always informationally
efficient. First, during speculative bubbles and panics, price movements considerably
amplify changes in fundamentals. Second, in cobweb dynamics, the information
conveyed by prices is not interpreted correctly, leading farmers to overreact to price
movements. These situations refer to what we early called endogenous instability.
Here, prices do not convey the appropriate information to economic agents, they
mislead them. It seems therefore that prices should be stabilized in a manner that
exactly removes the endogenous component without touching the natural or
imported price instability component. Price stabilization therefore strengthens the
informational role of the markets by ensuring that price movements match move-
ments in fundamentals. This is the idea behind the mechanism put forward by IFPRI
[ ] ©AFD / Managing food price instability in developing countries / April 2013
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to stabilize international prices (Von Braun and Torero, 2008). However, implementing
this idea would be difficult as it requires determination of the “real price", i.e. the
price on the market in the absence of any endogenous instability (it is this "real price"
that must serve to determine the trigger thresholds for public intervention), and it
is doubtless for this reason that the proposal has been revised by its authors (1.3.1).
Even in the absence of endogenous instability, price stabilization is still desirable as
it improves the quality of expectations and, by so doing, the quality of production and
storage decisions. It therefore may have a beneficial effect on resource allocation, even
in the absence of endogenous instability.[ 12 ] Price stabilization could therefore go
beyond the point necessary to remove only the endogenous component of instability. 
Controversial effects of natural insurance for producers
Natural insurance is based on the idea that as there is a negative correlation between
price level and harvest volume, the price risk and the harvest risk in part offset one
another. It therefore follows that price stabilization may further increase the instability
of producer revenues (Newbery and Stiglitz, 1984). This means that the problem of
price instability should be dealt with without stabilizing prices, and this is the core
doctrine underlying the optimal strategy. To what extent does such “natural insurance"
actually exist? Does it really benefit farmers? 
Whether natural insurance exists or not depends greatly on the type of instability.
In situations of imported instability, price changes on the domestic market are due
to changes in the (import or export) parity price, which in turn depends on the
international price, freight costs, and the exchange rate. It is therefore somewhat
improbable that domestic prices correlate with the country's harvest volume (except
for “big” countries – in the sense of the theory of international trade – whose pro-
duction level affects the international price). In situations of panics and speculative
bubbles, price instability is in no way linked to harvest instability, only to the variability
of agent expectations. Here therefore there is no “natural insurance". When instability
is due to the cobweb there is indeed a negative correlation between harvest volume
and price level, but this does not stabilize farmers’ income for the high production
– that is supposed to compensate for the low price – is obtained through increased
use of factors, raising costs. It is only in situations of natural instability that the price
risk can be partly offset by a harvest risk. But even in this situation, the notion of
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[ 12 ] In particular, if stabilization guarantees a floor price, it improves producer, trader and banker expectations 
and therefore stimulates investment (by making producers and traders more secure and facilitating their 
access to credit). 
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domestic prices being correlated to the harvest volumes of individual farmers is still
improbable.
Moreover, even when it does exist, this “natural insurance" has diverse effects on
farmers’ revenue. For deficit farmers, natural insurance works in reverse: when the
harvest is poor (and prices therefore high) these producers have to buy large quantities
on the market to feed their family! This is a real problem given that deficit farmers
account for a very large proportion of all farmers in certain countries (more than
50% in many African countries and even 73% in Ethiopia, see Jayne et al., 2006). 
The forgotten effects of price instability on consumers 
Most cost-benefit analyses of price stabilization focus on producers. The main refe-
rence publications in this field assume that the products concerned account for only a
very small proportion of consumer expenditures, and therefore that price instability
does not affect them (Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981; Williams and Wright, 1991). This is
due to the empirical background of these studies: international prices of tropical
cash crops such as coffee, cacao or natural rubber for Newbery and Stiglitz and
domestic price of grains in developed countries for Williams and Wright. By contrast,
when the question of grain and other staple food products is considered in develo-
ping countries, the assumption is obviously unacceptable. For instance, in Mali it has
been estimated that 64% of the household budget is devoted to food, and this rises
to 77% in the poorest rural quintile (Bocoum, 2011). Expenditures devoted solely to
grain are on average 18.4% of total budget for urban households and 34.9% for rural
households. This rises to above 44% for the poorest rural households! Moreover,
grain provides most of the calories in the diet, and this for all social categories. A large
proportion of the Malian population is therefore affected by rises in grain prices, and
this is particularly true given that incomes are very low: 72% of the Malian population
lives on less than 2 USD daily, and 36% on less that 1 USD (Gérard et al., 2008). 
In a such a situation where vulnerable households account for a large proportion of
the population, price stabilization may be more efficient than targeted aid. This is due
to difficulties encountered in targeting which can prove both costly and very imperfect
(some vulnerable households being overlooked while some non-vulnerable households
receive aid).
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We have seen that the arguments against price stabilization do not hold. This shows
there is much to be gained from stabilizing prices, even considering the informational
role of prices and natural insurance for producers. We must therefore, at this point,
analyze in more detail the practical means by which prices can be stabilized. 
1.3. How can prices be stabilized?
The first step consists in assigning the stabilization strategy a target (1.3.1), and here
two approaches are possible. The first, technical in nature, is based on the notion of
“abnormal" price, whereas the second, political approach, is based on the notion of
“unacceptable" price. The second step consists in identifying relevant instruments (1.3.2).
After first showing that instruments must be chosen in relation to the cause of price
instability, we will go on to analyze which instruments are relevant in situations of
“natural", “imported" and “endogenous" instability. The third step consists in com-
bining the instruments within consistent schemes that can counter all the causes of
price instability (1.3.3). 
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Proportion of grain in the diet and household 
expenditures in Mali (%)
2Table
Average for rural households 86.0 51.1 34.9
Average for the poorest   
20% of rural households 88.6 57.6 44.3
Average for the richest 
20% of rural households 82.0 44.1 26.5
Average for urban 
households 73.1 31.9 18.4
Average for the poorest 
20% of urban households 78.6 38.5 27.3
Average for the richest 
20% of urban households 68.0 27.4 13.6
Proportion 
of grain in total
expenditures 
Proportion 
of grain in food
expenditures 
Proportion 
of grain in dietary
calories 
Source: Bocoum (2011).
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1.3.1. Setting stabilization targets 
The ultimate aim of stabilization is to protect both consumers and producers and
guarantee some degree of political and macroeconomic stability. With this aim in
mind, what targets should be set? 
The aim of course is not to stabilize prices entirely as this would prevent them from
playing their informational role. It would also prevent the market from functioning
and would lead to all adjustments being made by public intervention. The stabilization
must therefore aim simply to prevent prices from reaching “extreme" values. But preci-
sely how are these extreme values to be set? Two approaches are in principle possible.
The first is technical and seeks to establish objectively the levels below and above
which prices are deemed to be “abnormal". The other, political in nature, seeks to set
the points below and above which a price becomes “unacceptable" for a given society.
The “technical" approach 
The technical approach may be illustrated by the Jaochim Von Braun and Maximo
Torero proposal. Considering that the 2008 crisis may largely be explained by a
speculative bubble on food futures markets, these IFPRI researchers put forward a
mechanism based on “virtual stocks" designed to dissuade such bubbles from forming
and, if needed, counter them (Von Braun and Torero 2008 and 2009a) (see 1.6.2.). 
What interests us at this point is their stated aim of tackling only the formation of
speculative bubbles. In other words, prices are left to fluctuate freely provided they
reflect fundamentals. Interventions therefore aim only to maintain this connection
with fundamentals by preventing speculative bubbles from forming. In this way, public
interventions would allow prices to better play their informational role. 
This is a very attractive but fairly conservative approach for it fails to address the
problems stemming from natural and imported instability.
Above all, it runs into a practical difficulty: when determining intervention thresholds
for the virtual stock (the “dynamic price band"), normal price movements (due to
fundamentals) would have to be separated from “over-reactions" (due to speculative
bubbles). To do this, the authors propose that a global intelligence unit should be set
up. But this may not suffice, for if economists underline so strongly the fundamental
role of price signals, it is precisely because of the great difficulty or even impossibility of
calculating what “normal" price movements (due to fundamentals) should be. 
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Faced with these criticisms, the authors revised their proposal. The scheme now put
forward is no longer based on the idea of removing the endogenous component of
price instability (and thus of reconnecting prices to fundamentals). It now focuses on
preventing prices from reaching “extreme values” (Von Braun and Torero, 2009b).
The idea consists in estimating the stochastic process that generates price series and
considering as “extreme” all price increases that have a less than 5% probability of
occurring (Martins-Fi lho, et al .  2010).  Although this renders the proposal more
operational, the threshold appears to be rather arbitrary. 
The “political" approach 
Contrary to the technical approach, the political approach considers that interven-
tion thresholds should depend upon collective values, aims and choices. Up to or
down to what level is a rise or fall in price considered to be acceptable by a given
country? 
Technical criteria nevertheless continue to fulfill an important role in the political
approach. Firstly, if the aim is stabilization (not income transfers between producers
and consumers) ,[ 13 ] prices should be stabilized around their mean value. The target
value therefore should be the average price or, as put forward by Newbery and
Stiglitz (1981, p. 32), “the price that conserves average quantity consumed". Secondly,
this target value must be updated to reflect the medium-term market trend. In
particular, if the good is tradable, the target price should not be disconnected from
the medium-term trend on international markets, otherwise it runs the risk of com-
promising the financial sustainability of the stabilization scheme (Guillaumont and
Guillaumont, 1989; Timmer, 1997a). By contrast, if the target value is updated too
quickly when the international price changes, the stabilizing scheme is no longer of
any great advantage .[ 14 ] Finally, the price band (around the target value) within which
the price is allowed to fluctuate must not be too narrow, or the market cannot function
(spatial and temporal arbitrage – through trade and storage – must remain possible).
The challenge therefore consists in finding the appropriate balance between bands
that are too broad or too narrow, too disconnected from or not sufficiently connected
to international price movements.
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[ 13 ] Stabilization policies have sometimes in the past been used as indirect means to support prices (case of 
international agreements on coffee and cacao), or tax producers (case of the caisses de stabilisation set up 
by many African exporting countries).
[ 14 ] As illustrated by experience gained with the international agreement on natural rubber (Gilbert, 1996).
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Certain authors have put forward asymmetrical schemes as a solution: a floor price
but no ceiling price (Coulter, 2005) or a ceiling price but no floor price (Von Braun
and Torero, 2009b). The first is intended to avoid any crowding out of private stocks.
It may, on the other hand, be imagined that a ceiling price is reassuring for producers
and traders as they know that if the price rises too high, pressure from the street
will oblige the State to intervene, but they do not know when that will happen. The
existence of a ceiling price (announced in advance) is therefore likely to reduce the
crowding-out effect, on condition that this ceiling price is set sufficiently high and is
respected, i.e. the State does not intervene while the price remains below the ceiling.
Those in favor of a ceiling price but no floor price focus on speculative bubbles and
panics (that indeed do cause price rises). But other types of endogenous instability
also cause excessive price collapses (cobweb). Therefore, symmetrical stabilization
based on a price band is perfectly justified from a theoretical standpoint. 
Also, it is often easier to implement from a political standpoint since it guarantees a
certain balance between producers and consumers and thus provides a solution to
the main food policies dilemma (Timmer et al., 1983). Thus, when the State intervenes
to prevent prices from falling too far, this is accepted by consumers since they know
that the State will in turn protect them if prices soar. The fact that they are symme-
trical and rules-based therefore lends stabilization policies a legitimacy that would
always elude an asymmetrical or discretionary policy.
Price thresholds that trigger interventions must consider technical criteria (leave the
market to play its role, consider limited budget resources), but the decision in the
end is political. This decision reflects the price levels considered as unacceptable by
a given society. Participative processes can be imagined to involve civil society actors
in this decision (see box 16 on the Madagascar multi-stakeholders platform).
It is clearly the political approach that is the most pertinent at a national or regional
scale for, when fixing price thresholds, countries have to make decisions that are
clearly political in nature such as arbitrating between producers and consumers and
between the short term and the long term. On an international scale the question
is more open as the technical approach has the main advantage of providing a
mechanical means of fixing and updating intervention prices. This considerably reduces
transaction costs (which can be extremely high for international collective actions). 
Once targets have been set in one manner or another, the question now arises as to
which strategies and instruments should be used to reach them.
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1.3.2. Choosing instruments based on the different causes 
of instability
A major feature of the literature is that the effectiveness of price stabilization instru-
ments is usually discussed without any consideration of the cause(s) of price instability.
But, a given instrument may have a stabilizing effect, a destabilizing effect, or no effect
at all, depending on the type of instability it is facing. 
Let us consider the case of customs duties and other restrictions on international trade. 
If the instability is natural, free trade will have a stabilizing effect on international prices
since deficits in certain countries will be compensated by surpluses in others, and
thus the climatic risk is diversified on a planetary scale. On the other hand, if inter-
national prices are unstable because of the cobweb, free trade will have a destabilizing
effect: it will cause the different national cobweb dynamics to synchronize (Boussard
et al., 2006). 
On a national scale, doing away with customs duties will have a stabilizing effect if
domestic price instability is primarily natural or endogenous for it will tighten the parity
price band. By contrast, it will increase domestic price instability if this is primarily
imported from the international market. 
This leads to the idea that instruments must be chosen in relation to the type of
instability. This idea is nothing new as the different causes of instability have gradually
been elucidated over the years since the 16th century (Clément, 1999). For instance,
various documents attest that the mercantilists were already acutely aware of the
fact that speculation and panics could cause prices to soar. Boisguilbert, then the
Physiocrats, had already analyzed certain forms of cobweb. But although different
solutions were put forward to address these different problems, the idea did not
emerge that solutions to one type of instability could have an amplifying effect on
other types of instability. Galiani (1770) showed that a price stabilization instrument
that works in one place may be harmful elsewhere, and vice-versa. But he did not
link this role of the “context" with the causes of price instability.[ 15 ] To the best of
our knowledge, Ezekiel (1938) was the first to demonstrate that an instrument which
is stabilizing when the instability is natural may be destabilizing if the instability is driven
by cobweb dynamics. This theory was then practically “forgotten" in debates and
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[ 15 ] The novelty of the contemporary approach is its discovery that what matters in the “context" are the causes 
of price instability plus a few other variables that restrict a country's capacity to use instruments (see 1.5.2.).
ASavoir_N17_GB_BAT_2_(V2).qxp  12/04/13  8:37  Page 55
56
A SAVOIR
papers on price instability, with the notable exception of Jean-Marc Boussard whose
work showed that certain instruments may have very different effects depending on
whether the instability is natural or endogenous (Boussard et al., 2006; Boussard 2007).
More recently the idea was put forward that a distinction must be made between
natural instability and imported instability, and that different instruments must be
brought into play in the two cases (Byerlee et al., 2005). The ideas expressed in this
book may be considered as following on from this tradition. They are novel in that
all three types of instability are considered, and all the instruments that could be
used to tackle them are analyzed systematically. 
We will  now consider successively the situations of “natural", “imported" and
“endogenous" instability. The means to tackle "mixed" forms of instability (cumulating
several causes) will be analyzed later (1.3.3).
Stabilizing prices when the instability is natural in origin
Natural instability is caused by two phenomena: harvests concentrated over a few
months of the year (generating price seasonality) and variable harvest volumes due
to natural hazards such as drought and attacks by locusts. Here it may be underlined
that a poor harvest in year t will affect not only price levels in t but also in t+1 as
“poor years" generally lead to a depletion of stocks. The following campaign is
therefore conducted without a safety net as stocks are too low to provide any buffer
effect for another possible poor harvest. A succession of poor harvests may therefore
have dramatic effects. Also, even if the harvest in t+1 is normal, prices will doubtless
stay relatively high as the stocks depleted in t need to be replenished, putting upward
pressure on prices. 
Natural instability therefore causes three problems:
l price seasonality, i.e. a collapse in prices immediately post-harvest (which harms
producers) followed by a progressive rise until prices reach very high levels during
the period immediately before the next harvest (the “lean period”);
l price variability from one year to another, depending on the current year’s harvest
volume (soaring prices in “poor years” and substantial price drops in “good years”);
l price variability from one year to another, depending on the previous year’s harvest
volume, since harvest volume in t affects stock levels in t+1 (these stock levels may
be insufficient if the harvest was poor in t or may conversely be excessive if a
bumper harvest occurred in t).
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Price stabilization aims to provide a solution to all three problems and may be achieved
by different means that are not mutually exclusive: production modernization, market
modernization and public interventions aiming to stabilize internal availabilities. We will
now consider these different options one after another.
Modernizing production
This is the most intuitive approach given that, as natural price instability is caused by
production characteristics (concentration in time, variability), it seems quite logical
to try to solve the problem by acting on production .[ 16 ]
Price seasonality can be reduced by spreading harvests over time. And this (depending
on the crop), means developing off-season varieties, using glass-houses or resorting
to irrigation (if this provides for several harvests a year). 
The impact of production variability on prices can be lessened by reducing production
hazards or decreasing production susceptibility to these hazards. The first option is
virtually impossible in practice, except perhaps on an international level (talks on cli-
mate change). The only possible option on the national scale is therefore to reduce
production susceptibility to hazards, which means using the appropriate equipment
or inputs (irrigation, drought-resistant varieties, phytosanitary products, etc.). 
Reducing the impact of production variability in t on prices in t +1 means rendering
production more responsive to price movements. If producers react vigorously to a
price rise by increasing their production plans for the following year, a poor harvest
in t will probably be followed by a good harvest in t+1, and this will allow traders to
replenish their stocks without putting upward pressure on prices .[ 17 ] Rendering pro-
duction more responsive to price movements means that producers are able to sow
more land or increase yields. The first option depends on land availability and on land
rights .[ 18 ] It also depends on the possibility of product substitution in plot allocation.
Increasing yields means intensifying production using high-productivity equipment
or inputs.
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[ 16 ] The modernization of production is a worthy goal in itself as it is a necessary step along the road of economic 
development (Timmer, 1988 and 2009a; World Bank, 2007). But it is envisaged here solely from the angle of its 
potential contribution to a reduction in price instability. 
[ 17 ] If expected, production's response may even have an immediate effect on prices: as producers and traders 
expect the harvest to be good in t +1, and prices low, they will get rid of their stocks during year t and this will 
temper the price rise induced by the poor harvest in year t. 
[ 18 ] According to certain experts, land availability is the key to tackling the problem of food price instability in 
Africa (De Janvry and Sadoulet, 2008).
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The key to the three problems appears to lie in using appropriate inputs or equip-
ment. However, each problem requires specific inputs. For instance, the use of early,
late and off-season varieties can reduce seasonality by spreading the harvesting period,
whereas drought-resistant varieties can render production less sensitive to natural
hazards, and high-yield varieties can render it more responsive to price .[ 19 ] Moreover,
the timing is different for the different problems. Reducing price seasonality and
production variability requires the use of appropriate inputs ex ante, whereas the third
problem can be solved by increasing inputs ex post if the harvest is poor, thereby
stimulating production the next year (reducing the probability of two successive poor
harvests). 
The solution therefore lies in encouraging producers to invest in different inputs
and equipment. This supposes i) that these inputs are available; ii) that producers
have access to them; and iii) that the risk is not too high. Producers only have access
to inputs if aware of their existence, know how to use them, and are aware of the
advantages they can procure. Also, these inputs must not be too costly, and must be
available on credit. In general, the market in developing countries is insufficient for
all these conditions to be met. Technologies may on occasion have undergone little
development or may be overlooked by private research (see for example the case of
millet varieties). The inputs market is often oligopolistic. Also, most producers in deve-
loping countries find it difficult to gain access to credit, and almost impossible to
procure any form of risk hedging mechanisms (weather insurance, futures).[ 20 ]
State support is therefore required to stimulate producer investments. This support
can take three forms:
l production of public goods (research and extension services);
l setting up of temporary input subsidies (seeds, fertilizers, pesticides), accompanied
if necessary by the possibility to defer payment;
l interventions to maintain prices within a predefined band. 
The first is unlikely to cause controversy, though recourse to private research and
private agricultural advisory services should also be envisaged when possible. 
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[ 19 ] These categories show a great deal of overlap: many inputs both increase yields and reduce sensitivity to 
natural hazards.
[ 20 ] It should also be specified that recourse to some risk hedging instruments may lead to an increase in production 
variability. For instance, crop insurance may encourage producers to replace drought-resistant varieties with 
high-yield varieties. The same effect may occur with other risk hedging instruments such as futures markets 
(Newbery, 1987). 
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The aim of subsidies is to promote producer access to inputs. For the same reason,
subsidies may need to be accompanied by credit, with payment for the inputs being
deferred. The effectiveness of these subsidies to a great extent depends on how
they are allocated (governance issues may arise as subsidized inputs have sometimes
been used in the past by politicians to maintain a network of cronies, see Bates,
1981). These subsidies are destined to disappear (after a possible tailing-off period)
with the development of green revolutions, the growth of an inputs market and
rising producer incomes. 
Price stabilization aims to increase farmers’ investments by two means. First, by reducing
the price-risk they face (they are known to be risk-averse). Second, by facilitating
their access to credit (banks are reluctant to lend them money if the price risk is too
high). If it is to reach this goal, stabilization must aim to maintain the price within a
predefined band, thereby protecting producers against price collapses (this is the
role of the floor price) and against unpredictable price-reducing State interventions
(this is the role of the ceiling price). This price stabilization is vital if we are to break
the vicious circle consisting of “price instability – low agricultural investment – pro-
duction susceptibility to natural hazards – price instability". Moreover, successful
green revolutions of the past have coupled access to high-performance technology
with price stability (Timmer, 1988). 
Modernizing markets 
Modernizing food product markets (nationally or regionally) is the second (comple-
mentary) means of reducing natural price instability and consists in facilitating the
emergence of efficient institutions and infrastructure for the marketing and storage of
food products (development of A-instruments). The aim here is to boost the intensity
of spatial arbitrage (through trade) and temporal arbitrage (through private storage). 
Price seasonality can thus be reduced by trade and private storage. If supplies for
cities are drawn from many areas that are sufficiently far apart for harvests to take
place at different times, then this trade provides urban consumers with low prices for a
large part of the year. This mechanism is pushed to the extreme with international
trade that pools the production of many countries located in different climatic areas.
It therefore follows that international prices virtually never show any seasonality.
Storage (by producers or traders) also plays a decisive role. By purchasing immediately
after the harvest (when prices are low) and selling in the lean period (when prices
are high), traders tend to reduce price seasonality. And because of the competition
between them, the price difference between the post-harvest period and the lean
period should match storage costs. However, if traders lack access to credit, private
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storage may not be competitive (with stocks being concentrated in the hands of a
small number of big traders). 
The impact of harvest variability on prices can also be considerably buffered by
trade and storage. Trade between regions that are sufficiently far apart for natural
hazards not to be correlated will diversify risks. Given that there is no valid reason
for regions that are far apart to experience a drought or locust attack at the same
time, some regions will be in deficit while others are in surplus. Trade can therefore
compensate the deficit of some by the surplus of others. Storage may also to a certain
extent soften the impact of harvest variability on prices for if sufficient in scale it can
draw on the surpluses of previous years to compensate for current deficits. However,
the quantities stored are unlikely to be sufficient to buffer significantly the effects of
a poor harvest (and even more so a succession of poor harvests) since producers and
traders very seldom practice multiannual storage (precisely because it is extremely risky
due to harvest variability) .[ 21 ]
Note should be made that market instruments can reduce natural instability only if
they sufficiently promote trade (by connecting distant regions) and private storage
(by encouraging producers and traders to build up stocks for the following year). 
This means that market instruments (A-instruments) must be greatly developed. To
stimulate long-distance trade, transport costs must be reduced, but also, more broadly,
traders must be informed of large-scale opportunities for arbitrage. Transaction
costs must also be reduced i.e. the costs entailed by searches for trading partners,
negotiations with these partners and commitment enforcement (delivery of the right
quantity and quality at the right time; payment). This can involve the setting up of
infrastructure (namely for transport and communication) and many market institutions
such as weights and measures systems, grading systems, Market Information Systems
(MIS), dispute settlement systems or commodity exchanges (2.1.3). Specific actions
may also be undertaken to strengthen the connection with international markets
(other than reducing import and export tariffs or quotas). Roads may be improved
to reduce shipment costs between ports and the country's interior. And specific action
can be taken to render locally-produced grain “tradable" on the international market by
standardizing quality (in order to constitute homogeneous lots) and centralizing stocks
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[ 21 ] Economic models showing that competitive private storage is an optimal solution to the problem of crop 
variability are based on the (totally unrealistic in developing countries) assumption that the producers and 
traders who build up stocks are risk-neutral, i.e. either their behavior is unaffected by the price risk they are 
facing , or they have full and cost-free cover against this risk (Williams and Wright, 1991). 
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(so that sufficient volumes may rapidly be mobilized to fill containers.[ 22 ] Efforts may
also be made to render non-tradable goods more substitutable with tradable
goods .[ 23 ] Similarly, efforts to encourage storage may require the setting up of market
institutions. For instance, difficulties encountered in obtaining credit (one of the main
obstacles to storage) can be reduced by using the stocks themselves as collateral.
This can be achieved using warehouse receipt systems. These different instruments (and
their contribution to the stimulation of trade and storage) are described in detail in
chapter 2 (see in particular 2.1.3.). 
But the development of market instruments (A-instruments) may be obstructed by
a whole array of factors .[ 24 ] Firstly, certain A-instruments need to be backed up by
public goods that are often lacking (for instance, in order to function properly,
warehouse receipt systems need a regulatory framework and a body of accredited
certifiers, see 2.1.). Secondly, the development of market instruments is often hindered
by “circularities" (a market actor's drive to use an instrument often depends on the
extent to which this instrument is used by other actors; the development of many
A-instruments requires others A-instruments to be already in place [ 25 ] ). Thirdly, price
instability may discourage the development or use of market instruments: their
development requires risky investments by market actors whereas their use often
entails exposure to price-risk. Moreover, many households react to price instability
by developing self-consumption strategies in order to disconnect themselves from
the market. Finally, price instability tends to favor the largest actors (able to pool the
price-risk as they conduct many transactions), thus reducing competition on the market
(Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981) .[ 26 ] These mechanisms generate vicious circles as a lack
of development in A-instrument, market narrowness [ 27 ] and a lack of competition
contribute to maintaining high levels of price instability.
In short, markets must be modernized, but this is a long and uncertain process that
requires State support. The State must: i) provide the public goods necessary for
A-instruments to function (legal framework, transport and communications infra-
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[ 22 ] As we shall see later, warehouse receipt systems can play a major role in both these actions (2.1.3).
[ 23 ] For example, in West Africa, were (non tradable) millet to be processed in such a manner that rendered it simple
and rapid to prepare, this would enhance its substitutability with (tradable) rice.
[ 24 ] For a more developed analysis of the main obstacles to the emergence of A-instruments (and how to over
come these obstacles), see 2.1.5.
[ 25 ] For an illustration, see the case of warehouse receipt systems in box 3.
[ 26 ] In fact, the wholesale sector in West Africa is far more concentrated in Sahel countries (where natural instability
is far more marked) than in coastal countries (Galtier et al., 2012).
[ 27] For instance, in Sahelian countries, only 20% of the millet and sorghum produced is marketed.
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structure, control of weights and measures, accreditation of certifiers, etc.); ii) tem-
porarily subsidize certain instruments such that they reach the critical size required
to develop by themselves and enable other A-instruments to develop more easily
(overcoming circularity problems); and iii) maintain prices within a given band through
public interventions in order to reduce the risks run by private actors and thus prompt
their investment in A-instruments, and encourage them to rely on the market. In
order not to prevent markets from functioning , the price should be free to fluctuate
within the predefined price band whose bounds must be set realistically and must
be known in advance. We will return to this subject in more detail later (see 1.5.3.). 
Intervening to hold prices within a predefined band
We have already seen that price-stabilizing public interventions are necessary both to
compensate for the current limitations of production and markets, and to facilitate their
modernization by stimulating producer and trader investment. Does this mean that
public intervention is necessary only temporarily “in the meantime" until the country
develops efficient infrastructures and institutions for production and markets? At
first glance, it seems that we can answer in the affirmative given that if a country can
rely on efficient farms and markets, prices are more stable because production res-
ponds to price movements and spatial and temporal arbitrage is intensified.
Moreover, price instability is less of a problem when production has already been
modernized. However, the question is somewhat more complex for even when highly
efficient production and trade systems are in place, price instability can still be
excessive for consumers. First, private stocks are far too low to prevent prices from
soaring after a poor harvest. One reason for this, as already mentioned above, is that
harvest variability from one year to the next makes multiannual storage a very risky
business. Second, even supposing that storers are entirely covered for price-risk (or are
risk-neutral, which comes to the same thing), private stocks would still be insufficient to
prevent the price soaring after a poor harvest (Williams and Wright, 1991). Therefore,
even with modern farms and markets, public interventions (based on C-instruments)
are still necessary to protect consumers. The floor price can be gradually lowered, then
discarded as green revolutions develop ,[ 28 ] but the ceiling price must be maintained
since staple food products account for a significant part of household expenditures.  
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[ 28 ] The floor price must be reduced gradually, and not too rapidly, or too many households will abandon agriculture
all at the same time, and redeploying this labor newly released by green revolutions will be a problem.
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What can be done to stabilize prices? Natural hazards affecting production can
drive the price up to the import parity price (PM) or down to the export parity price
(PX). Here, external trade plays a regulatory role by managing surpluses (that are
channeled onto the international market when prices fall to PX) and deficits (that
are supplemented by imports when the price reaches PM). Price movements are the-
refore bounded by the parity price band (see figure 5). However, this band can be
too low or too high (due to unstable international prices) and too wide (especially
for landlocked countries because of transport costs from ports). Foreign trade is
therefore not enough to prevent prices from reaching very high levels (affecting
food security) or very low levels (discouraging production, storage and more gene-
rally investment in production and market modernization). The situation is even
worse for "non-tradable" products, i.e. those not liable to be involved in internatio-
nal trade .[ 29 ] As they are often in part substitutable with tradable products, move-
ments in their price are restricted by the parity price of these latter products, but
the price band in this case is often very wide .[ 30 ] Public interventions are therefore
required to prevent the price from rising or falling to excessively high or low levels. 
Which instruments should be used? We have two options. 
The first is to regulate the parity price band, which means using the international
market to dispose of surpluses or supplement deficits, and thus stabilize the amount
available on the domestic market. This option is based on variable measures (tariffs,
subsidies or quotas) that aim to regulate imports and exports. 
The second option is to set up public stocks that are able to purchase surpluses
(thus withdrawing them from the market and preventing the price from collapsing) and
make up for deficits (by destocking). The aim is to hold the price within a narrower
band than that bounded by the parity prices. 
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[ 29 ] Millet, sorghum, cassava and yam are good examples of non-tradable goods.
[ 30 ] This can be illustrated by the case of the millet consumer price rise during the 2005 “locusts’ crisis" in Mali. In 
this country, millet consumer price is capped by the price of imported rice. Thus, following a poor harvest, when 
the millet consumer price spiked, its rise was only stopped when consumers massively substituted imported rice
for millet (the price of millet stabilized at 250 FCFA/kg, i.e. 25 FCFA/kg below the price of imported rice, see 
Galtier et al., 2010). The parity price of rice proved to be an effective ceiling price for millet price (thanks to its 
substitution by imported rice, millet ceased to rise in price as of June 2005, four months before the next harvest). 
However, this ceiling was very high: the price of millet nevertheless rose by 150% (from 100 FCFA in October 
2004 to 250 FCFA/kg in June 2005)! 
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Two arguments support recourse (when possible) to regulation through the international
market rather than through buffer stocks. First, it is likely to be more effective given that
for small countries ,[ 31 ] the international market is akin to a limitless stock .[ 32 ] These
countries can always turn to the international market to make up for their deficits
or absorb their surpluses .[ 33 ] By contrast, public stocks are limited in size, and situations
will inevitably arise where stocks are exhausted and can no longer temper price rises
(Townsend, 1977). Stocks would need to be colossal to cope with a succession of
poor harvests, or absorb a succession of bumper harvests, and would therefore be
very costly. The second argument is that recourse to the international market is
likely to be less costly: tax exemptions or subsidies on imports or exports only have
a cost when implemented, whereas public stocks have a cost even when not used
(logistics cost and financial cost) .[ 34 ]
But, in certain situations, stabilization by recourse to the international market is
impossible, ineffective or costly. Impossible if border controls contravene World
Trade Organization (WTO) rules or the country's other international commitments
(e.g. if the country is part of a customs union or a free trade area). Impossible again
if the country's borders are “porous", i.e. difficult to control by the State. Ineffective if
there is little or no competition in the import (export) sector of the product concerned,
as this enables importers (exporters) not to pass on tax reductions. Ineffective again
if the country has a limited import capacity (e.g. low foreign exchange reserves).
Or again, if the country that seeks to stabilize prices is considered as “large" by the
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[ 31 ] For the theory of international trade, a country is deemed “small" for a given product if its imports or exports 
of this product account for a sufficiently small proportion of international trade for them not to have an effect 
on the international price.
32 ] To what extent can the regional market play the same “limitless stock" role as the international market for 
a given country? This question is of the utmost importance given that many grains that are non-tradable 
on the international markets are traded in large quantities on the regional market (e.g. millet and sorghum in 
West Africa). If regional trade is to play the same role as the international market, at least two conditions must 
be fulfilled: i) natural hazards in the country and in the other countries in the same regional area must not be 
correlated, and ii) the regional market must be able to absorb all the country’s surplus and make up for all its 
deficit (which means that this country should be “small" in relation to the regional market). Even when these 
conditions appear to be met, the effect is not guaranteed, as illustrated by the 2005 Niger crisis where very few 
grain imports were obtained from Nigeria (Michiels and Egg, 2008). 
[ 33 ] The limitless nature of the "stock" represented by the international market may be called into question by 
speculation or panics that lead a large number of exporting countries banning exports. This question definitely 
needs to be raised given the wave of speculation and panic that swept the international rice market in 2008. It 
should also be noted that the same problem arises with the regional market (see grain export bans decided by 
many West African countries in 2008 despite customs unions and free-trade areas). 
[ 34 ] A study on wheat and rice in India showed that, for the same sum spent by the authorities, it is possible to obtain 
a 4-fold greater decrease in the price coefficient of variation by using variable border measures rather than buffer
stock, even when complying with WTO restrictions (Srinivasan and Jha, 2001). 
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theory of international trade, for in this case the international market no longer
constitutes a limitless stock from which the country can draw what it lacks, or into
which it can pour its surpluses. Ineffective, finally, when international prices or
exchange rates are themselves unstable (this corresponds to a “mixed" situation where
the instability is both natural and imported). Finally, recourse to the international
market can prove costly for a landlocked country for, in this case, the parity price
band may be very wide. In such cases, efforts to stabilize domestic prices may require
substantial tax cuts or generous subsidies. More details on this debate can be found
in chapter 2 (2.3.3.).
Conclusion regarding the treatment of natural instability 
In conclusion, what strategies and instruments should be used to combat natural
instability?
It is essential, though insufficient, to modernize production and markets. This moderni-
zation needs State support in the form of public goods or subsidies. Public goods
mainly take the form, firstly, of agricultural research and extension services (aiming
to develop and disseminate technological packages) and, secondly, the setting up of an
enabling environment for markets (e.g. legal framework, control of balances, certifier
accreditation). Subsidies concern both inputs (agricultural stimulus packages) and
certain market institutions. In this latter case the aim is to resolve the circularity
problems created by the fact that an actor's drive to use an instrument may depend
on i) the use made of this instrument by other actors, and ii) the existence of other
instruments. These subsidies must be designed to be temporary, i.e. they must be
gradually reduced then phased out as production and markets are progressively
modernized. 
Also, given that production and market modernization is dependent upon investment
by producers and traders, and that these are risk-averse, this modernization will not
come about if the price risk is too high. Public intervention is therefore required to hold
prices within a predefined band. This will facilitate production and market moderni-
zation by stimulating the necessary investment, on condition that these interventions
are triggered only when the price reaches the predefined thresholds which must be
known to all and set at levels that allow the market to function (the floor price must
not be set too high nor the ceiling price too low). These interventions may be based
on the regulation of imports and exports, or on recourse to public stocks. This public
price-stabilization scheme must be maintained (in a lighter form) even after production
and markets have effectively been modernized, and this to protect consumers from
price surges (which means keeping the ceiling price). Let us now consider the case
of instability stemming from international markets, or “imported" instability.
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Stabilizing prices when the instability stems from international markets 
“Imported" instability stems from instability in international prices, exchange rates or
freight costs. For importing countries, it translates as unstable import parity prices:
the cost price of imports may vary markedly from one month to the next. This
potentially affects the balance of payments, the price of imported food and the
price of locally produced food. Soaring international grain prices inflate the bill paid
by grain importing countries and generate an increase in the price of imported grain
which can in turn be passed on to the price of local grain (through consumer substitu-
tions). Mirroring this, if international prices collapse, this can depress domestic prices,
which is harmful for producers. The same mechanism comes into play for exporting
countries through the export parity price, i.e. the price received by exporters. Here,
a surge in international prices (as occurred in 2008) translates as an increase in exports,
and this puts upward pressure on domestic prices. 
Parity price instability can be passed on in only a mitigated or delayed manner under
the effect of private storage given that importers can use their stocks (built up
before the price surge) to delay and spread the price rise over time. They may also
be driven to cut their margins (Daviron et al., 2008; Dawe, 2008; David-Benz et al.,
2010; Gilbert 2010b). But private storage has only limited effects on the market
when international prices are subject to marked instability, which is why public inter-
ventions should be envisaged. 
How can countries (or Regional Economic Communities) protect themselves from
turbulence on international markets? As "imported" instability affects domestic pri-
ces through the import or export parity price, two options are possible to protect
domestic prices from imported instability. The first consists in stabilizing parity pri-
ces by variable taxes or subsidies on imports or exports. The second aims to discon-
nect domestic prices from parity prices, which can be achieved by i) putting quotas
on imports or exports, or ii) recourse to public stocks. We will now consider these
two options.
Stabilizing parity prices
Parity prices of a given product in a given country are dependent upon international
price (Pint), freight cost (Cf), exchange rate (ER), transport cost from the border to
the country's interior (Ct), and also the tariffs placed on imports (tM) or exports
(tX). Import parity price (PM) and export parity price (PX) are therefore given by the
following expressions:
PM = [(Pint + Cf). ER] (1 + tM) + Ct 
PX = [(Pint - Cf). ER] (1 - tX) - Ct
[ ] ©AFD / Managing food price instability in developing countries / April 2013
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Parity prices can therefore be adjusted upward or downward by varying the tariffs
placed on imports (tM) or exports (tX). These tariffs can be adjusted in an ad hoc
manner. They can also be adjusted automatically by indexing to Free-On-Board
(FOB) and Cost Insurance Freight (CIF) prices converted into local currency. By
varying tariffs, it is therefore possible to fully stabilize parity prices [ 35 ] or, more
modestly, to prevent them from rising or falling to excessively high or low levels. It
may prove necessary to convert taxes into subsidies. For example, if the internatio-
nal price soars, as in 2008, removing all import tariffs (tM = 0) may not be enough to
prevent the import parity price from rising. A negative tariff must in this case be
implemented (tM < 0) i.e. subsidies on imports. Here it should be specified that
indexed variable tariffs are perfectly predictable by market actors since they adjust
automatically. 
However, this parity price stabilization strategy may prove difficult to implement in
practice. Firstly, WTO greatly restricts the use of variable tariffs, but countries never-
theless have some room for maneuver (see 2.3.). Secondly, cuts in tariffs (or subsi-
dies) generate losses for the State, and this may compromise long-term use of these
measures. However, these losses may in principle be compensated by the revenues
generated in periods where tariffs are high. Variable tariffs therefore generate more
an instability than a decrease in fiscal revenues. Another obstacle to variable tariffs
is their political feasibility. For example, the producers' lobby may be opposed to any
reduction in import tariffs (and even more so to subsidies). The solution to this pro-
blem lies in symmetry: the variable tariffs system must be designed to protect both
consumers (if international prices soar) and producers (if international prices fall).
This requires recourse to taxes indexed on prices since ad hoc changes in tax rates
do not guarantee reciprocity (producers will more readily accept reductions in
import duties if they have the guarantee that these duties will be increased if inter-
national prices fall). Another difficulty lies in the passing on of tariff reductions when
there is little or no competition in the food products import or export sector. In this
case, the State may act itself as an importer or exporter (injecting competition into
this sector). An alternative solution is to regulate importer or exporter behavior by
signing contracts with them where, in order to benefit from the tax reduction,
importers (exporters) must commit to a certain selling (buying) price. Compliance can
be checked through State-monitored stores .[ 36 ] Finally, and obviously, the country
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[ 35 ] The CIF price corresponds to the cost price of imports at the port where delivered. It is therefore Pint + Cf and 
the CIF price converted into local currency is (Pint + Cf) ER. If tM varies in such a manner to compensate for 
variations in the CIF price converted into local currency, (Pint + Cf) ER (1 + tM) is entirely stable, as therefore is PM.
[ 36 ] However, it is difficult to enforce this type of contract in periods of marked international price instability, as shown 
by the example of Mali in 2008 (Galtier et al., 2010). 
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must be able to control its borders. Unfortunately, many countries have porous borders
with their neighbors and, through re-export trade this can lead to the country becoming
porous to the international market .[ 37 ]
Let us now consider the complementary strategy that consists in reducing the passing
on of parity price instability to domestic prices.
Reducing the passing on of parity price instability to domestic prices 
Two options are possible in efforts to reduce the passing on of parity price instability to
domestic prices: i) place quotas on imports or exports, and ii) disconnect the
domestic market from the international market through the use of public stocks. As
we shall see, these two options are very different in terms of cost and effectiveness
depending on whether the country is an importer or an exporter, on whether we
consider price rises or falls, and on whether the country is close to or far from self-
sufficiency (greatly in surplus or deficit). 
Let us consider the case of an importing country. If the international price falls, this
country cannot rely on public stocks, for, in order to prevent the domestic price
from falling beneath the import parity price, public stock would need to buy all the
supplies available on the international market! In such a situation, the country can
theoretically protect itself by placing quotas on imports (but WTO forbids such
measures). By contrast, when the international price rises, quotas are powerless but
public stocks can to a certain extent be effective, on condition however that they
are sufficiently large to allow the country to forgo imports. This assumes that the
country is not far from food self-sufficiency. Otherwise, stocks may run out if inter-
national prices remain high for some time (as illustrated by the Indonesian crisis of
1997-1998, see Gérard, 2000).
Let us now consider the case of an exporting country. If the international price falls,
export quotas are of no assistance. By contrast, if public stocks purchase part of
domestic production, this will support the producer price. But this is not problem-free
as the State finds itself burdened by a huge stock that it has difficulty off-loading
onto the international market (as illustrated by Thailand's experience with rice). If
the international price rises, export quotas are the most suitable instrument. WTO
authorizes such quotas for food products (even export bans are allowed) .[ 38 ]
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[ 37 ] A famous example of this is Benin that for many years re-exported rice to Nigeria during the period that 
it banned or heavily taxed rice imports (Galtier and Tassou, 1998).
[ 38 ] The prohibitions placed on quantitative measures – quotas, licenses, bans – does not apply to the export of 
food products (see article 11 of GATT 1994 and article 12 of the Agricultural agreement). For more details on 
how WTO rules restrict the use of C-instruments, see box 13.
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Quotas and public stocks are therefore incomplete instruments (depending on whether
the country is an importer or exporter, they tackle only rises or falls in international
prices). But they are also complementary: public stocks can be used to tackle situations
that quotas are unable to manage, and vice versa. More precisely, quotas can hold
domestic prices at a point outside the parity price band (Pdom > PM or Pdom < PX).
Conversely, public stocks can be used to hold domestic prices within a narrower
band than that bounded by parity prices (PX < Pdom < PM).
Does this mean that a combination of public stocks and quotas is a satisfactory answer
to imported instability? No. And this for two reasons. Firstly, import quotas are
prohibited by WTO. And secondly, the public stocks required would necessarily be
huge as they must be able to absorb all a country's surpluses or compensate for all its defi-
cits. This is the price to be paid for being able to temporarily disconnect from the
international market. 
Conclusion regarding the treatment of imported instability 
The ultimate weapon against imported instability would be to apply variable tariffs or
subsidies on imports or exports (indexed on FOB and CIF prices in local currency).
But this instrument is currently prohibited by WTO. Only ad hoc decreases and
increases in tariffs are tolerated. But this means that all the benefits of indexed
tariffs are lost (guaranteeing reciprocity between producer interests and consumer
interests, rendering changes in tax predictable). Also, ad hoc increases in import
tariffs are possible only within certain limits (the price must remain below the
“consolidated level" or must comply with the conditions of the Special Safeguard
Clause) .[ 39 ] Other instruments can also be used (import and export quotas and
public stocks), but they are asymmetrical: depending on whether the country is an
importer or exporter, these instruments can either mitigate only increases or only
decreases in international prices. Also, possible recourse to quotas and public stocks
is often restricted either by WTO rules (the case for import quotas) or by the cost
of these instrument (the case for public stocks). 
It should also be noted that regardless of which instruments are used, all policies
designed to provide protection against imported instability are liable to be rendered
ineffective by spillover effects. This occurs if the borders with neighboring countries
are porous. If country A manages to protect itself from soaring international prices,
then the price on its domestic market will be far lower than that in neighboring
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[ 39 ] See 2.3.5. for more details on WTO rules concerning price stabilization instruments. 
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countries. This is likely to induce (legal or illegal) exports to these countries, thus raising
the price in country A and compromising the policy implemented by this country to
mitigate imported instability. A symmetrical situation may arise if the country manages
to maintain a relatively high producer price despite falling international prices. Here,
the product is liable to flood into the country from neighbors (capitalizing on the
high price), driving prices down. The answer here lies in better border control (when
possible) or in choosing to tackle imported instability by implementing measures on
a regional scale .[ 40 ]
Despite all these difficulties, it is possible for a country that deploys adequate resources
to control imported instability. Shining examples of this are China and India during
the 2008 price crisis (see figure 8). 
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[ 40] This problem arises with all stabilization policies but it is particularly acute for imported instability for here the 
price instability correlates in all countries. 
Source: OECD, 2009.
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We should also note that a country close to self-sufficiently will obviously find it far
easier and less costly to protect itself from soaring international prices than will
major exporting or importing countries. The success of the 2008 Chinese and Indian
stabilization policies was partly due to a long-term policy aiming to ensure self-
sufficiency in wheat. After a long period of suffering deficits, these two countries
have now reached self-sufficiency, without being in surplus (see figure 9).
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Source: United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) PSD. 
China and India have reduced their connection





























































































































































Last but not least, it should be noted that all the measures taken by countries to protect
themselves from imported instability may increase price instability on international
markets, and thus affect other countries. Policies designed to achieve self-sufficiency
make international markets narrower and therefore more unstable (because more
susceptible to natural instability). Variable import tariffs render the demand of impor-
ting countries less sensitive to variations in international prices, enhancing instability
on international markets. Finally, if exports are restricted in response to soaring
international prices, this reduces supplies on the international market, further
increasing prices (as occurred in 2008 for the rice market, see Headey 2011). These
effects are nevertheless negligible for “small" countries, i.e. those whose imports and
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exports of the product considered account for only a small proportion of international
trade. We will return to this point when addressing the role of the international
community (see 1.6.), but let us now consider situations where price instability is of
endogenous origin. 
Stabilizing prices when instability is endogenous in origin
Although there are different types of endogenous instability, all are caused by a
vicious circle between “expectation instability" and price instability (see 1.2.3.). It is of
course perfectly normal (and desirable) for economic actors to adjust their expecta-
tions when receiving new information. But, if they base their price expectations on
past prices, this can generate a self-sustained instability of expectations. In this situation,
expectation instability causes instability in production and storage behaviors, which in
turn generates price instability that further feeds expectation instability (see figure 10). 
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Mechanism responsible for endogenous instabilityFigure 10
Source: author.
D Expectations




This mechanism applies to all the different types of endogenous instability, namely
the cobweb, speculative bubbles and panics. The cobweb mainly concerns production
behaviors (plot allocation to different crops, amount of inputs employed). These
behaviors depend on expectations for t + 1 prices and these expectations in turn
depend on past prices. High prices induce overly optimistic expectations, excessive
production and low prices. This then leads to pessimistic expectations and insufficient
production in t + 1 which in turn causes high prices, overly optimistic expectations
and further excessive production. Speculative bubbles and panics mainly concern
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behaviors related to storage (stock retention by traders, massive purchasing by
consumers to build up stocks) and futures trade (when such a market exists). If some
economic actors expect prices to be high, they will increase their buying and their
stocks, and reduce their selling. This diminishes supply, drives up prices and leads
other actors in turn to anticipate a rise. This then snowballs. Let us take note that the
cobweb generates cycles (alternating low and high prices) whereas speculative bubbles
and panics cause either a cumulative rise or a cumulative fall (a price rise in t will tend
to cause a fresh rise in t + 1). 
Fighting endogenous instability therefore means breaking the vicious circle illustrated
in figure 10, and this can be achieved by tackling each of the causal relationships.
Endogenous instability can therefore be dealt with by three (complementary)
approaches. The first consists in reducing the effect of price instability on expectations,
and is based mainly on the provision of information. The second consists in reducing
the effects of expectation instability on production or storage behavior (meaning
this behavior must be rendered less sensitive to price movements). The third consists in
organizing public interventions to prevent herd behavior from impacting prices. This
means intervening to pierce speculative bubbles, dampen panics or control the cobweb
effect, by preventing prices from reaching extreme values. Let us now consider these
three approaches individually.
Providing information to improve the quality of expectations 
Here, the information made available to economic actors must be broadened such
that they no longer base their expectations solely on past prices (the engine of
endogenous instability). 
This information must first and foremost concern future changes in the causes of price
instability. The quality of price expectations could thus be improved by disseminating
information on harvest forecasts and on trends and perspectives in international prices,
exchange rates and freight costs. Data on the latter three could also be aggregated
by directly providing information on expected changes in parity prices, as is already
provided by certain market information systems (MIS) .[ 41 ]
Information must also be provided about public interventions for these can also feed
expectation instability: if a rumor is circulating that the State is preparing to intervene
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[ 41 ] Weekly bulletins from the South African Grain Information Service (SAGIS) providing this kind of information 
on parity prices are available online (http///www.sagis.org.za).
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on the market, this affects production and storage behavior, and ultimately causes
prices to soar or collapse. The solution to this problem lies in making public inter-
ventions predictable by announcing intervention prices in advance and complying
with these prices. If these conditions are fulfilled, public interventions have a doubly
stabilizing effect on the expectations of private actors by guaranteeing that the State
will not intervene while prices remain within the predefined band, and by rendering
it improbable that prices will move outside this band. Here it may be added that, in
order to ensure this, public interventions must be credible, i.e. private actors must
believe that the State will comply with the announced intervention prices (see 1.5.3.). 
Finally, information on stocks also plays a decisive role: since actors expect stocks to
absorb shocks, large stocks have a stabilizing effect on expectations (regardless of
the cause of the expectation instability). The more visible the stocks, the greater the
effect, for stock visibility i) provides information about the size of stocks, ii) guarantees
the credibility of this information, and iii) renders this information common know-
ledge (everybody knows it and knows that the others know it). This last point is
extremely important as it generates a stabilizing effect through cross-expectations:
each actor expects prices to remain stable not only because of the expected buffering
effect of stocks but also because he knows that other actors will also expect price
stability and therefore will not panic or overspeculate. The increase in stock volumes
and in stock visibility can be stimulated by the development of warehouse receipt
systems or the constitution of public stocks.
Therefore, both A-instruments (MIS providing price or harvest forecasts, warehouse
receipt systems that increase stock volumes and visibility) and C-instruments (interven-
tions aiming to hold the price within a predefined band, public stocks) can contribute
to improving the quality of market actor expectations. 
Finally, it should also be specified that all measures that aim to improve the quality
of expectations must be set up in a “preventive" manner rather than be improvised
ex post to slow herd behavior (speculative bubble or panics). Information disseminated
by governments during the storm (in the hope of an “announcement effect") often
fails to have any impact.
Reducing the effects of expectation instability on behavior 
This approach is complementary to that immediately above and consists in reducing
behavioral sensitivity to the erratic instability of price expectations. Concerned are
production and storage behaviors, and the buying and selling of futures when a coun-
try has such a market. 
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In practice, it is very difficult to influence storage behavior (unless extreme measures
are taken such as the requisitioning of stock). 
By contrast, it is possible to render economic agents on the futures market less sensi-
tive to the erratic variability of their expectations. This can be achieved through
quantitative restrictions (placing a ceiling on the number of contracts an agent can
hold) or through taxes (very low taxes on futures transactions). The first of these
measures (position limits) would appear to be more or less unanimously approved
on condition that these limits apply only to non-commercial operators (i.e. those not
involved in the physical market). The question then arises as to the level at which
these limits should be set, given that too restrictive a level could reduce futures market
liquidity. The second measure (a tax on futures transactions) draws its inspiration from
the proposal made by J. Tobin to avoid the formation of speculative bubbles on foreign
exchange markets, but, for now, would not appear to enjoy much support from
decision-makers (although this is beginning to change). 
Finally, let us consider the case of production price elasticity, i.e. its responsiveness to
price movements. Given that it is precisely because production reacts excessively to
price movements that cobweb dynamics are able to develop, reducing the price
elasticity of production would at first sight appear to be an effective solution to this
problem. This could be achieved by halting all support for the modernization of pro-
duction, or even by levying taxes or placing quotas on production. 
However, despite the fact that this kind of solution has been recommended by some of
the main specialists in the cobweb ,[ 42 ] reducing the price elasticity of production is
in general a very poor idea. 
Firstly, measures designed to contain production price elasticity are contrary to the
logic of production modernization (which very precisely aims to increase this elasticity).
This is a problem because the modernization of production is a necessary step
in economic development (Timmer, 1988; World Bank, 2007; De Janvry, 2009) and
long-term food security. This modernization is the only means to decrease the average
price of food products, and, in so doing , ease access by the many to food. 
Secondly, production that is elastic to price movements has a stabilizing effect on
natural instabil ity (see 1.3.2.) .  Any measures intended to reduce production price
elasticity therefore run the risk of increasing the instability of prices.
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[ 42 ] Jean-Marc Boussard for instance recommends using production quotas to solve the cobweb problem.
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Thirdly, marked production price elasticity has a rather beneficial effect in countering
speculative bubbles and panics for if production “responds" to price incentives, supply
increases and speculative (or panic) dynamics come to a halt. It is true that this effect is
considerably restricted by production lags, but in some cases, due to actor expectations,
prices will tend to decrease before the new harvest arrives on the market. 
Finally, in some cases, investments in agricultural equipment can render production
insensitive to price falls, and this has a stabilizing effect on the cobweb. This is in parti-
cular the case if the equipment is specific to the product concerned. It should be noted
however that this may increase natural instability as, in this case, very pronounced
price falls may be necessary to restore the market equilibrium. 
Measures can nevertheless in certain cases be envisaged to lower downward price
elasticity of production, i.e. the magnitude of the fall in production that results
from a price slump. This elasticity may sometimes be excessive, particularly because
drops in price cause producer income to fall and this may compromise their production
capacity.[ 43 ] This phenomenon tends to amplify price instability, be it natural (the
reduction in production plans will exceed the reduction level required to restore
market equilibrium) or be it due to the cobweb (when prices fall, production falls
excessively due both to excessively pessimistic price expectations and the cash flow
problems of certain producers). Specific actions are needed in this case to conserve
the production capacity of vulnerable households. This can be achieved by facilitating
producer access to risk hedging mechanisms and to credit, but access to these B-
instruments is notoriously difficult for the most vulnerable. Another option would
be to use D-instruments (safety nets), and this will be considered later (see 1.4.1).
Reducing the effects of behavioral instability on prices
This approach is based on public interventions that aim to bring speculative, panic
and cobweb dynamics to a halt. These interventions may in principle involve regulating
production, regulating imports and exports, or using public stocks. For instance, in a
situation of runaway prices, it may be possible to i) initiate an agricultural stimulus
package to boost production (by subsidizing inputs), ii) sell part of public stocks, iii)
remove tariffs from or subsidize imports, and iv) limit exports (tariffs, bans or quotas).
Agricultural stimulus packages are often used by governments to counter soaring
prices. But, it should be recognized that their effect on prices is not immediate and
is relatively uncertain. Also, these stimulus packages are liable to enhance the cobweb
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[ 43 ] This phenomenon was already known to the Physiocrats and even (before them) to Boisguilbert (Clément, 1999).
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effect. We are therefore left with instruments based on public stocks or the regulation
of imports and exports. We will not return here to the advantages and disadvantages of
these two instruments (cf. 2.3.3 for a detailed discussion on this point). Depending
on the situation, it may be preferable to turn to one, the other, or both. Suffice to
say here that timing is crucial if speculative bubbles and panics are to be prevented.
The instrument employed must have a very rapid effect on prices, and this tips the
balance in favor of public stocks. Or must at least make it desirable to combine
public stocks and the regulation of import and export flows, with public stocks here
being used to manage the problem posed by import timelines. 
Another parameter to be taken into account when choosing instruments is the
possibility of speculative attacks: private operators betting on the failure of stabilizing
interventions. These attacks above all concern interventions based on public stocks for
as stocks are of a limited size, speculators may bet on stocks running out and therefore
maintain their expectations of a price rise. Given the limitless nature of the “stock"
represented by the international market, this risk is less pronounced for instruments
based on the regulation of imports or exports. But risk there still is as private operators
may speculate that the removal of import tariffs will be dropped as the measure
cannot be sustained by the State budget. Overall, if the risk of attack is considered,
then the preference must be for border measures (e.g. the removal of import tariffs
or the setting up of import subsidies) [ 44 ] or the constitution of large stocks .[ 45 ]
Finally, it should be recalled that public interventions, regardless of the type of ins-
trument on which they are based, must be predictable and transparent, i.e. must be
founded on intervention prices that are announced in advance. This has the disad-
vantage of allowing speculative bubbles to inflate within the defined intervention price
band, and this may also increase the risk of speculative attacks (for private operators
know at what point the State will intervene). But this also enables public interventions
to play a stabilizing role both ex ante (by stabilizing expectations and dissuading specu-
lation, the cobweb and panics) and ex post (by containing speculative spirals and panics).
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[ 44 ] Except in the specific case where speculation arises from the grain importing sector. In this case, a lifting of import 
tariffs will likely have little effect. 
[ 45 ] Keeping stock volumes secret can reduce the risk of speculative attacks (Salant, 1983). But this also reduces 
the transparency of public intervention and thus runs the risk of increasing the crowding out effect of public 
storage on private storage. This is why, although almost all agree that transparency is required on intervention 
prices, the question is more controversial for stock volumes. 
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Conclusion regarding the treatment of endogenous instability 
In short, the problem of endogenous instability can be tackled by providing pros-
pective information (production forecasts, scenarios on the future course of the
international market and parity prices), by increasing stock volumes and visibility (e.g.
by developing warehouse receipt systems) and by rendering public interventions more
predictable. 
The problem of vulnerable households reducing their production excessively when
faced with falling prices can be tackled by facilitating their access to B-instruments
(price risk hedging tools and credit) and, above all, by using D-instruments (safety nets). 
Finally, a public intervention scheme should be used to hold prices within a predefined
band. Such a scheme, based either on public stocks or the regulation of imports and
exports, will reduce endogenous instability in two ways: ex ante by stabilizing expec-
tations (thus rendering speculative, panic and cobweb dynamics less probable) and
ex post by bounding runaway prices within the floor price and the ceiling price. 
We have examined above the various instruments that can be used in response to
the main cause of price instability (natural, imported or endogenous). If, in a given
country, price instability of a given product has a single cause, or at least one dominant,
easily identifiable cause, the pages above should give us some fairly precise indications
on the combination of instruments that may be brought into play. But, as we shall
see shortly, the problem is in fact often more complex. 
1.3.3. Combining instruments to tackle multiple-cause instability: 
designing price stabilization schemes
Practical difficulties of tackling multiple-cause instability
The price instability of a given product in a given country may have several causes.
A particular rise in the price of millet in Mali can be explained by a drought or a locust
attack, another by a rise in international prices (as in 2008) whereas a third may stem
from persistent low prices in previous years (driving down farmer production through
pessimistic price expectations and the reduced production capacity of some farmers). 
Also, several factors may exert effects simultaneously and cause prices to soar or
collapse. Sometimes these are mere coincidences. For example, a country's harvest
may be poor at the same time that international prices soar. A natural hazard may
affect production while producers – discouraged by low prices in previous years –
have also reduced areas sown and the quantity of inputs used. This to some extent
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is what happened in the Sahel in 2005 with the “locust crisis". But the different causes
may also be correlated and this increases the likelihood of multi-cause price rises
and collapses. For example, natural instability in "large countries" is likely to engender
unstable international prices, meaning that natural instability and imported instability
are correlated: if a large importing country suffers a poor harvest, it imports rise, this
drives up the international price, and therefore increases the import parity price in
this country. Symmetrically, a bumper harvest in a large exporting country will drive
the international price down. Also, shocks due to natural hazards tend to strengthen
cobweb dynamics. For instance, drought that causes a poor harvest leads to price
rises that may in turn lead to optimistic expectations, excessive producer responses
and ultimately surplus production the next year. 
As price instability of a given product in a given country can stem from different
causes or even a combination of causes, this raises the question of how this or these
cause(s) can be identified. Different methods have been developed for this purpose,
but all are flawed .[ 46 ] This means it is sometimes difficult to untangle the effect from
the different potential causes (as illustrated by the many controversies surrounding
the causes of the 2008 crisis). As certain instruments can only reduce certain types
of instability (and may even, for some of them, increase other types of instability),
the difficulties in identifying the cause(s) of price instability further complicate the
choice of instruments to be used. 
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[ 46 ] The first method consists in analyzing price series. We know from the theory that the price series generated by 
natural hazards is random, whereas that produced by endogenous sources (cobweb, speculative bubbles, 
panics) is chaotic. However, imported instability may generate price series that are either random or chaotic, 
depending on the source of the international price instability (and that of exchange rates). This method cannot 
therefore separate imported instability from the other two types of instability. Also, according to Boussard (2007), 
existing “chaoticity" tests are not 100% reliable as they test chaos-related characteristics (such as “sensitivity to 
initial conditions") that themselves also possess certain purely random series. Also, the cobweb tends to generate 
a negative autocorrelation of prices, whereas natural hazards, speculative bubbles and panics tend to induce a 
positive autocorrelation (Gouel, 2012). But here again, this method is not 100% reliable although it can give 
pointers. Strictly speaking, therefore, it is impossible to identify the main cause of the price instability on the sole 
basis of price series. The second method relies on econometrical analyses that aim to explain price changes 
through changes in the variables that cause natural instability (climatic hazards) and imported instability (parity 
prices) and determine whether there is an unexplained residue (Hazell et al., 2005). This method's limitation is that 
it estimates endogenous instability only indirectly, through the unexplained residue. The third method consists in 
estimating endogenous instability through the endogenous variables that interact with prices: for the cobweb, 
land area sown and quantity of inputs used; for speculative bubbles and panics, the quantities of food products 
bought and sold on the markets, stock levels and, for the specific case of futures markets, the quantity of contracts 
held and traded by non-commercial operators. Finally, the fourth method consists in using dedicated 
instruments (see the next section on generic and dedicated instruments) as “revealers" of the main cause of 
instability. For example, trade liberalization is known to have a stabilizing effect if the price instability is mainly 
natural (for it connects together a multitude of production areas that are sufficiently far apart for natural hazards
not to be correlated), but a destabilizing effect if the instability is due mainly to the cobweb effect. Hence, if the 
level of international price instability is compared between different periods in the past that were more or less 
protectionist, this should point to the main cause of international price instability. 
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Designing effective price stabilization schemes: distinction between 
“generic" and "dedicated" instruments
If we are to overcome the difficulties induced by multiple causes and the problems
related to their identification, we must make a distinction between "generic" and
"dedicated" instruments. We shall call all instruments that tackle several sources of
instability "generic instruments". More precisely, we will say that an instrument is
generic with respect to instability types x and y if it has a stabilizing effect both
when price instability is mainly of type x and when it is mainly of type y. By contrast,
an instrument is said to be “dedicated" if it has a stabilizing effect only when facing
one of these types of instability. If, in addition, it has a destabilizing effect when facing
the other type of instability, we shall say that it is “strongly dedicated". For instance,
all the instruments designed to strengthen the connection between the domestic
market and the international market [ 47 ] are “strongly dedicated" instruments. They
reduce a country's vulnerability to natural instability and the cobweb, but increase
its exposure to imported instability.
The idea is therefore to prefer generic instruments. As these instruments can tackle
several causes of instability, there is no problem if several causes are involved or if
they cannot be clearly identified. For example, public interventions based on public
stocks or on import and export regulation can reduce price instability whatever its cause
(natural instability, cobweb, speculative bubbles, panics and imported instability) .[ 48 ]
The scheme can be further supplemented by recourse to “weakly dedicated" instru-
ments that reduce some of the types of instability without worsening the others.
They can therefore tackle part of the problem. Instruments that deal with market
modernization are usually weakly dedicated for by boosting stocks and improving
spatial arbitrage on the domestic market they tackle the natural component of price
instability without affecting imported instability. 
“Strongly dedicated" instruments should be avoided for although they have a beneficial
effect on certain types of instability, they have an amplifying effect on others, and
their net effect may be weak (or even negative). Examples of this include conjunctural
agricultural stimulus packages and all related measures (such as the proposal to build
up land reserves that may be used only in the event of soaring prices).
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[ 47 ] We are referring mainly to free trade measures, roads to reduce transport costs between ports and a country's 
interior, and actions taken to render local food products more “tradable" on the international market (such as 
grading systems).
[ 48 ] It should be noted that fixed import tariffs are “strongly dedicated" instruments (they reduce imported instability
but increase natural instability), whereas variable tariffs are "generic" for, if properly used, they have a stabilizing 
effect on both natural instability and imported instability. 
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By applying these principles to the different instruments analyzed in sections 1.3.2, it
is possible to design consistent schemes that are able to tackle all the causes of price
instability. We will now examine the main features and components of these sche-
mes in detail and will see later (1.5.2) how this “standard model" can be adjusted to
include the specificities of different countries and products. 
The standard model: price stabilization schemes resting on four pillars
We have shown that if price instability, regardless of cause, is to be reduced, then price
stabilization schemes must combine stabilization strategies based on the market
(strategy A) and on public interventions (strategy C) .[ 49 ] As strategy A may be broken
down into three components (modernize production, modernize markets and improve
the quality of expectations), the stabilization scheme must rest on four pillars:
Pillar 1: Instruments intended to modernize production
These instruments are intended to stimulate producer investment. They include:
l public goods (research and extension services);
l temporary input subsidies (seeds, fertilizers, pesticides) to facilitate producer access
to more intensive production techniques;
l private or public instruments that aim to protect producers from falls in productive
capacity due to falls in income (price risk and harvest risk management tools, credit,
safety nets).
The first two instruments render production less sensitive to natural hazards and
more responsive to price rises and, as such, have a stabilizing effect on natural insta-
bility and, to a certain extent, on speculative bubbles and panics (though here the effect
is weak due to production lags) .[ 50 ] The third instrument is intended to reduce the
effects of price or harvest instability on farmers' productive capacity (these effects
generally amplify price instability, regardless of whether this is of a natural origin or
due to the cobweb). 
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[ 49 ] In addition, although this not their primary aim, B-instruments and D-instruments can sometimes (slightly) 
contribute to price stabilization. This in particular is the case when price drops or poor harvests compromise 
the productive capacity of some small actors. Here, as already mentioned, if they can restore this productive
capacity, these B-instruments and D-instruments will have a stabilizing effect on prices. This is the third 
component of pillar 1.
[ 50 ] By contrast, they tend to amplify cobweb dynamics, though this does not throw doubt on their soundness. These 
instruments are necessary to modernize production, a desirable goal in itself, for this modernization, whatever its
effect on price instability, is necessary to reduce food costs and release labor for other sectors of the economy. 
Today, the “structural transformation of agriculture" is increasingly considered as a necessary step in a country's 
development (Timmer, 1988 and 2009a; World Bank, 2007; De Janvry, 2009). And stimulating green revolutions 
is therefore one of the main goals of price stabilization.
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Pillar 2: Instruments intended to modernize markets
These instruments are intended to stimulate spatial arbitrage (trade) and temporal
arbitrage (private storage). They include: 
l the public goods necessary for markets to operate correctly (legal framework,
transport infrastructure, control of balances, certifier accreditation, etc.);
l temporary subsidies for certain instruments such that they reach the critical size
required to develop and enable other market instruments to develop more easily
(overcoming circularity problems).
These instruments reduce natural instability given that trade between regions that
are sufficiently far apart for natural hazards not to be correlated will diversify risks
(deficits in some regions will be compensated by surpluses in others). Storage in
principle can be used to compensate the deficits of certain years by the surpluses of
previous years, even though it is unlikely that stock volumes will be sufficient to mitigate
significantly the effect of a poor harvest. By contrast, these instruments have little
effect on the other types of instability (imported instability, cobweb). Subsidies are
necessary because the development of market instruments is often hindered by
“circularities". A market actor's drive to use an instrument often depends on the
extent to which this instrument is used by others and also, sometimes, the existence
of other instruments. 
Pillar 3: Instruments based on the provision of information to improve 
expectations
These instruments are intended to reduce the expectation instability of economic
actors. Key is the provision of the following:
l harvest forecasts;
l prospective analyses of changes in the international market;
l stock estimates;
l data on policies and their likely effects on prices. 
These instruments are intended to reduce all forms of endogenous instability (cobweb,
speculative bubbles and panics). They are also likely to strengthen temporal arbitrage
and are thus complementary to pillar 2 instruments. The production and dissemination
of this information could be entrusted to regional and national MIS with support
from international organizations (namely International Grain Council [IGC] and the
Food and Agricultural Organization's Global Information and Early Warning System
[GIEWS]). Their support is especially needed for prospective analyses of changes in
the international market. 
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Pillar 4: Instruments based on public interventions to hold prices within 
a predefined band 
These instruments aim to regulate the quantity available on the domestic market
such that prices are held within a predefined band. This may include (depending
on country and product):
l public stocks;
l variable import and export tariffs or subsidies;
l variable import and export quotas. 
These instruments are generic and therefore have multiple roles to play. With regard to
natural instability, they aim to i) compensate for current weaknesses in production
systems and markets, ii) stimulate production and market modernization (by reducing
the risk faced by producers and traders, encouraging them to store and invest), and
iii) prevent prices from reaching excessively high values, even after production and
markets have been modernized. Pillar 4 instruments are therefore highly complemen-
tary to pillar 1 and 2 instruments. Only pillar 4 instruments can be effective in tackling
imported instability. Against endogenous instability, pillar 4 instruments play both a
preventive role (by stabilizing expectations and thereby discouraging the emergence
of speculative bubbles, panics and cobweb dynamics) and a curative role (interventions
to halt runaway prices). In order not to prevent the market from playing its role, public
interventions should tackle only extreme values, leaving the price free to fluctuate
as long as it remains within the predefined price band, The bounds of this band
(floor price and ceiling price) must be set realistically and must be known to market
actors in advance. We will return to this subject in more detail later (see 1.5.3.). 
The price stabilization scheme must of course be adjusted to match a country's
progress along the development path. The first step is where the country has not yet
achieved its green revolution and has under-performing market institutions. The full
scheme is needed here both to protect consumers and stimulate the investments
necessary for production and market modernization.The second step is where the
country has managed to modernize its agriculture (both production structures and
markets). In this case, pillars 1 and 2 can be lightened (particularly by doing away with
subsidies for inputs and market institutions) and pillar 4 can also be lightened: although
the ceiling price must be maintained (to protect consumers), the floor price can be gra-
dually lowered ,[ 51 ] then discarded. Finally, once the country’s economic development
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results in staple food products accounting for only a small proportion of household
expenditures, the ceiling price may in turn be abandoned. This is the third step where
public interventions to stabilize prices are in theory no longer necessary. 
Here it should be underlined that although stabilization (using A- and C-instruments) is
a necessity in DCs, it is not sufficient to tackle all the problems generated by price
instability of basic food products: the scheme needs to be supplemented by lending
D-instruments and B-instruments a new role (see 1.4). 
1.4. Beyond stabilization: 
price instability management schemes 
1.4.1. A new role for D-instruments
Stabilizing the price of basic food products is not enough. If food security is to be
guaranteed, then a fifth pillar needs to be added to the scheme for transfers to vul-
nerable households (strategy D). As we shall now see, these targeted interventions
must in part be structural and this constitutes a new role for D-instruments.
D-instruments have long been thought of as food crisis management tools. Given that
crises were perceived as resulting from a problem of physical availability (stemming
from poor harvests), D-instruments were chosen to provide emergency aid in food
products, targeting rural households in “deficit" or “at risk" areas. Aid was triggered
mainly based on grain balance sheets. 
The general philosophy of D-instruments has gradually evolved under the influence of
two factors: increasing awareness of the perverse effects aid may have, and increasing
recourse to a definition of food security that goes beyond the question of physical
availability to encompass problems of access to food. As D-instruments were conven-
tionally based on aid in kind, public interventions sometimes drove prices down,
harming producers. This was particularly troublesome when too much aid was pro-
vided, or when it arrived in the wrong place or at the wrong time. Moreover, beyond
its short-term effect on producer and trader incomes, aid sometimes discouraged
investment in market infrastructures and institutions (particularly those related to
storage): like C-instruments, if poorly managed, D-instruments can harm the develop-
ment of A-instruments. Dealing with the perverse effects of aid led the Permanent
Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS) and the Club du Sahel
to draw up a Charter for Food Crisis Prevention and Management (signed in 1990).
More generally, the willingness to reduce distortions and recognize that food crises
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are not always caused by problems of physical availability but also by problems of
access, has led to the increasing importance of monetary aid, where rather than giving
vulnerable households food, they are given cash or food vouchers .[ 52 ] It has also
focused a great deal of attention on the question of targeting , and on occasion has
even led to “targeting obsession", i.e. excessive targeting that is both costly and excludes
some vulnerable households in need of help (see 2.4. for a more in-depth examination
of targeting-related questions). 
The 2005 food crisis in the Sahel countries (particularly in Niger) highlighted a new
dimension of the problem: that of the reduction in household resilience due to
recurrent grain price crises. This problem is particularly acute in the regions where
the frequency of these crises is high such as the Horn of Africa and the Sahel (for
instance, over the last 10 years, Niger suffered grain price spikes in 2002, 2005, 2008,
2010 and 2012). Grain price spikes generate both a reduction in the food consumption
of the poorest households (affecting the health and even the life of some of their
members) [ 53 ] and a reduction in the capital and resilience of a large proportion of
urban and rural households. In fact, many households, in order to maintain their
food consumption levels when prices rise, have to sell some of the few assets they
possess or reduce their investment in human capital (health expenditures, education).
This increases their vulnerability to future crises as they have less capacity to respond
to shocks (reduced savings, decreased productive capital and reduced human capital)
and as some of their members – whose health has been affected by cuts in health
expenditures – are more susceptible to reduced food consumption. By highlighting
how D-instruments were unable to prevent household decapitalization (although
they succeeded to some extent in maintaining household food consumption levels),
the 2005 Niger food crisis engendered a D-instruments crisis (Michiels et al., 2008;
Michiels and Egg , 2008; Blein and Egg , 2009). The main consequence of household
decapitalization is that a fairly moderate shock is sufficient to cause major food and
nutritional problems. As a result, the cost of managing crises increases with time,
thus questioning the sustainability of the standard crisis management model which
is based only on the emergency use of D-instruments (in fact, the cost of managing
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[ 52 ] When crises were perceived as arising from a deficit in physical availabilities, aid in kind received from donors 
was resold by governments at the market price, and this limited its distorting effect. The increasing focus (since 
the late 1990s) on household problems of access to food has led to new approaches – such as distribution of 
free or moderately priced food – that tend to render aid in kind more distortive. Monetary aid is therefore a 
means to take problems of access into account without generating too much distortion.
[ 53 ] For the poorest of the poor, this reduction may mean a deficit in caloric intake. For other households, it may 
mean a reduction in food diversity, these households being forced to reduce their consumption of oil, vegetables
or meat in order to maintain their grain consumption..
ASavoir_N17_GB_BAT_2_(V2).qxp  12/04/13  8:37  Page 85
86
A SAVOIR
the Niger 2010 food crisis was twice that of managing the 2005 crisis in the same
country). 
The solution would appear to lie in broadening the scope of D-instruments by using
them not only in times of crisis (as emergency tools) but also in a structural manner to
rebuild household capacities and thus strengthen their resilience. This means imple-
menting medium- and long-term programs that every year transfer cash or assets to
vulnerable households. Programs such as these have already been used in East Africa,
for example through European Union actions in Malawi (Social Cash Transfers) and in
Ethiopia (Productive Safety Net Programme). Such programs are indispensable for
although price stabilization can prevent certain households from falling into the
poverty trap, it cannot help those already in it. 
Another potential structural effect of D-instruments lies in their capacity to strengthen
market development. The idea here is not only that D-instruments must not disturb
markets, but also that they must facilitate their modernization. D-instruments can
help develop markets in several ways. Firstly, by recourse to cash transfers rather than
to aid in kind. Consumers who otherwise would have been insolvent are in this way
connected to the market. However, this is only possible if markets function correctly
and are sufficiently supplied. When this is not the case, aid in kind is still necessary.
States and aid agencies can sometimes procure grain and other food products in
other developing countries (see for instance the Purchase for Progress program
developed by the World Food Programme [WFP]). This is the second way in which
D-instruments can promote market modernization as these purchases can help develop
market institutions, for example by the dissemination of quality standards, the deve-
lopment of a “culture" of compliance with contracts and improved producer and
trader access to credit. But this often leads to a market within the market, with a few
actors specializing in supplying aid agencies. This problem could perhaps be resolved
by the use of warehouse receipt systems whereby aid agencies procure their grain
by purchasing warehouse receipts (possibly through commodity exchanges if such
structures exist) .[ 54 ] The WFP already uses this system in certain African countries
such as Ethiopia and Zambia. Were aid agencies to develop such practices, this would
have the effect of both aligning their quality criteria with those of the market (those
used by warehouse receipt systems) and opening up their supply market to a larger
proportion of actors. 
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The structural role of D-instruments must go beyond household recapitalization
and the development of food markets. In cases where green revolutions have been
successful, certain households will specialize, invest, increase their yields, and produce
more, whereas others will no longer be competitive and will have to leave agriculture
(partially or entirely). Vulnerable households often belong to the second category. A
long-term vision of D-instruments must therefore consider their role in preparing this
transition through actions that aim to diversify the activities of vulnerable households,
their sources of income and connect them with the (rural or urban) labor market. 
Emergency and structural D-instruments constitute the 5th pillar of food price instabi-
lity management schemes. And here we may add that, as well as supporting vulnerable
households, D-instruments may also play a role on the international scale, helping
countries in difficulty. This point will be addressed later (1.6.1.). For the moment, let us
consider the new role of B-instruments.
1.4.2. A new role for B-instruments
If successful, stabilization will reduce price instability, but will not make it disappear.
Also, production variability remains. Thus, it still makes sense to promote price risk and
production risk hedging instruments. New promising instruments (such as weather-
indexed insurance) could lead to B-instruments being more often used by market actors.
But, we must not delude ourselves, in DCs only a small minority of food producers
and traders will have access to these instruments. History teaches us that it is only
when the modernization of agriculture is well advanced that producers are able to
use B-instruments. 
In addition, some experts entrust B-instruments with a new role: that of enabling
countries, States and aid agencies to protect themselves from the consequences of
price instability. And this particularly given that price instability can, in certain countries,
cause macroeconomic imbalances. This in particular is the case for importing countries
that have low foreign exchange reserves. For these countries, any increase in the food
imports bill caused by soaring international prices or a poor domestic harvest (obliging
the country to import more) may well lead to import rationing and a fall in the exchange
rate. The governments of these countries can use B-instruments to hedge this risk,
particularly weather insurance or instruments that safeguard against price risk such as
futures or options (Sarris et al., 2011). States (or donors) can also turn to B-instruments
because price stabilization policies (based on C-instruments) or public interventions
intended to support vulnerable groups during a crisis (emergency D-instruments) may
result in a transfer of the instability to their budget. Here again, the State (or donors)
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may find recourse to B-instruments useful (Faruqee et al., 1997; Dana et al., 2006
and 2007). Although interesting , the idea has its limits. For instance, certain products
(such as rice) do not have a futures market worthy of the name, and this prevents such
a policy from being enacted. Also, even when futures markets do exist, a basis risk
remains due to the fact that the price of imported grain is only partially correlated with
prices on the futures markets (because of quality differences and transport costs). In
actual fact, until now, very few cases of governments or donors using B-instruments
have been reported. To the best of our knowledge, the only three cases consist of
the use of a call option on white maize by the government of Malawi (in 2005), the
taking out of weather risk insurance by the WFP to cover itself against the risk of a
poor harvest in Ethiopia (in 2006), and the purchase of maize futures on the Chicago
Board of Trade by the Mexican government (in 2010). The extent to which these were
successful and reproducible will be discussed later (see 2.2.).
Strategy B therefore has a valuable role to play in the price instability management
scheme (even though it no longer plays a leading part as was its case in the “optimal
strategy”). 
We have thus managed to come up with a price instability management scheme
that rests on six pillars. It mobilizes four strategies: strategy A that calls on pillars 1 to
3, and strategies C, D and B that are implemented by pillars 4, 5 and 6, respectively.
We will now further refine this scheme's design by discussing the conditions of its
implementation. 
1.5. Implementing price instability management schemes 
The efficiency of price instability management schemes is to a great extent dependent
upon the manner in which they are implemented. This is why we will now consider how
to choose the relevant scale (national and/or regional) for scheme implementation,
how to adapt it to country/region and product specificities, and how to define rules
that guarantee good governance. 
1.5.1. Choosing the scale of the intervention: 
are regional schemes better?
Price instability management schemes have nearly always been designed for and
implemented at a national scale .[ 55 ] Yet, the idea of a regional approach is increasingly
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attracting interest. This idea is based on the fact that thanks to regional trade, the food
markets in different countries belonging to a particular region (West Africa, East Africa,
etc.) are very often highly interconnected. However, the arguments are quite different
when considering market modernization (strategy A) or public interventions (strategies
C and D). 
For market modernization, the regional approach appears to be doubly relevant.
First, the larger the scale of the spatial arbitrage, the greater the price stabilizing
effect. Indeed, the further apart the production areas brought into connection, the
less correlated the natural hazards and the more different the harvest dates are likely
to be. This therefore further diversifies climatic risk and mitigates seasonality. Second,
economies of scale are made not only in infrastructure (such as roads), but also in
market institutions such as grading systems, warehouse receipt systems and com-
modity exchanges. Initiatives developed by the Eastern Africa Grain Council for white
maize are a good example of such a regional approach (see box 7). 
For public interventions, the main argument in favor of the regional scale is that the
borders between neighboring countries are porous, and this generates spillover effects.
Stabilization policies developed in one country run the risk of generating a price
differential between this country and its neighbors (particularly if the price instability
is correlated between these countries, as is the case for imported instability or large-
scale natural hazards). In this case a country's efforts to stabilize its prices may well be
cancelled out by a leakage of food products into neighboring countries, or conversely
by an inflow of products from these countries (in some cases through re-export trade,
as in the notorious case of rice re-export from Benin to Nigeria). The same problem
arises to some extent for interventions that target vulnerable households, with sub-
sidized products sometimes being re-sold in neighboring countries. Implementing
the schemes on a regional scale could possibly solve this problem. The basis of such
schemes is some cases already exists, such as the common external tariff of the
West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA). Some Regional Economic
Communities such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
and the group ASEAN + 3 have already signaled their intention to develop regional
policies to reduce grain price instability or mitigate its effects. The choice of regional
scale for implementing agricultural and food policies is also in tune with the approach
defended by the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD).
However, the regional scale also has disadvantages as it requires collective action and is
therefore prone to huge problems of governance. These problems are accentuated
if the various countries have diverging interests. But whatever the scale decided
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(national, regional or mixed) ,[ 56 ] the scheme always has to be adapted to the speci-
ficities of that area. 
1.5.2. Adapting the scheme to national or regional specificities 
The scheme must be adapted to take account of specificities stemming from the
product and the country/region. Firstly, the weight of the different causes of price
instability is not the same in different countries and thus, whereas an instrument
may be crucial in one country, it may be of negligible importance in another. Secondly,
certain countries are more exposed than others to “mixed" instability, i.e. instability
resulting from a combination of causes. And, as we shall see below, this kind of instability
generates specific problems, in particular it renders the stabilization more costly. Thirdly,
the consequences of price instability are also very different depending on a country's
current position along its development path. Some have already accomplished their
green revolution and exhausted potential productivity gains. For them, the stakes of
price stabilization are different. Finally, as certain instruments may be difficult or
costly to use, depending on country and product, only a subset of the instruments
theoretically available can in practice be mobilized in any given country. We will now
consider these four points.
Adapting the scheme in relation to exposure to different types of instability 
Certain countries are obviously more exposed to certain types of instability. For
example, natural instability is more pronounced in countries prone to drought
(because of highly unstable production), in landlocked countries and in countries
where the main grains produced and consumed are non-tradable and difficult to
substitute for tradable grains (because the parity price band is very broad). Some
countries are more exposed than others to speculation and panics (e.g. if there is
little or no competition in their grain market). This has implications for the scheme:
for instance, countries highly exposed to natural instability must lend far more
importance to modernizing their production and markets (pillars 1 and 2). 
Adapting the scheme in relation to exposure to mixed forms of instability 
These situations pose a specific problem: they render the instruments more expensive.
We have already seen that natural instability may feed the cobweb by causing price
fluctuations that in turn cause expectation instability. Therefore, countries subject
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to major natural hazards (e.g. drought areas) and whose production is very responsive
to prices (land and labor availability, access to intensification), are likely to experience
“mixed" instability of the “natural + cobweb” form. Production and price fluctuations in
these countries are substantial, and greatly increase the cost of stabilization (for example
public stocks have to be increased in size or large amounts of grain need to be imported
with subsidies). Happily, not many countries possess these two characteristics. 
Likewise, if a country suffers a poor harvest at the same time that the price soars on
the international market, the stabilization cost will be very high given that large
quantities will need to be imported (to make up for domestic production deficits)
while conceding very major tariff reductions or subsidies (to compensate for the
rise in the international price). An alternative solution would be to constitute major
public stocks sufficient to make up for production deficits without recourse to the
international market, but this solution again is very costly. From being “accidental" in
“small countries", a concomitant poor harvest and high international price becomes
fairly likely for “large countries" given that, for these countries, a poor harvest causes
imports to rise sufficiently to drive up the international price. 
Another situation where natural instability leads to imported instability occurs in
countries whose grain imports weigh significantly on their balance of payments. In
this case, a poor harvest leading to a rise in imports causes the exchange rate to fall
and ultimately results in an increased import parity price. Each poor harvest there-
fore causes a substantial increase in the cost of stabilization given that it causes a
simultaneous increase in volumes imported (to make up for production deficits)
and in the cost of each tonne imported (due to a fall in the exchange rate).
As the concomitant occurrence of several causes of instability increases the cost of
stabilization, it is wise for governments of countries exposed to mixed forms of
instability to supplement the scheme by hedging risk through weather insurance,
or by recourse to futures markets (pillar 6). Technical and financial support from the
international community is doubtless necessary to help the governments of these
countries use these instruments. But appropriate B-instruments are not always
available. For example, rice does not have a futures market worthy of the name. This
is why public compensations (through D-instruments) may also be envisaged on an
international scale to protect those developing countries facing mixed forms of
instability (see 1.6.1.). 
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Adapting the scheme in relation to a country's position along 
its development path
With a country's agricultural development then general development, the weight of
the different causes of instability changes. The modernization of agricultural pro-
duction together with urbanization, growth in market size (due to the decrease in
self-consumption), increased product processing and market modernization, all
mean that the weight of natural instability tends to decrease. By contrast, the fact
that production is increasingly able to respond to price incentives strengthens cobweb
dynamics. If, in addition, market modernization and the development of processing
make products more tradable or more substitutable with tradable products, this
may also increase imported instability.[ 57 ]
The development dynamics of countries also modifies the consequences of price
instability and therefore the relative weight that should be given to the different pillars.
For countries characterized by low productivity agriculture and where food products
account for a large share of household expenditures, food price instability impacts
greatly on both producers and consumers. In this situation (which is that facing the
huge majority of developing countries), efforts are necessary to stimulate investment in
agriculture by providing public goods and subsidies (pillars 1 and 2) and guaranteeing
a floor price (pillar 4). Efforts are also needed to protect consumers by holding the
price under a ceiling (pillar 4) and by transferring food, cash or assets to vulnerable
households both in times of crisis and in a structural manner to rebuild their capacities
and increase their resilience (pillar 5 ). Price instability has far less impact in countries
that have already completed their green revolution as massive investment is no longer
necessary, the simple renewal of worn-out or obsolete equipment being sufficient.
There is no longer any need to subsidize inputs or market tools: pillars 1 and 2 can now
be limited to the provision of public goods. The floor price can gradually be lowered
then abolished (lightening pillar 4) .[ 58 ] Farmers are then able to use crop insurance,
futures markets and other B-instruments (pillar 6). But a ceiling price and (emergency
and structural) transfers are still necessary to protect vulnerable consumers against
price surges. Finally, for countries that are sufficiently advanced in their development
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[ 57] For instance, in West Africa, growing urbanization will probably drive the processing of millet, sorghum 
and maize (to reduce their preparation time). This trend is likely to increase their substitutability with rice 
that is rapid to prepare, currently making it the ideal cereal for the midday meal. The connection with the 
international market would therefore be strengthened, with the price of millet, sorghum and maize being 
more linked to that of imported rice. The same trend may occur for roots and tubers (yam and cassava). 
[ 58 ] This reduction in the floor price must be gradual in order to adjust the flow of labor leaving agriculture to the 
rate at which non-agricultural activities are developing.
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trajectory, food accounts for only a small part of household expenditures. Here, food
price stabilization is not of any practical use and the ceiling price in its turn can be
abolished (pillar 4 removed). Targeted transfers are still necessary to protect vulnerable
households but only in their structural form: emergency aid is no longer required
because the country no longer suffers food crises, except in situations of major poli-
tical unrest (pillar 5 lightened). Note that pillar 3 (based on the provision of information
to improve expectations) is relevant for all stages of economic development.
Adapting the scheme in relation to instrument cost and effectiveness 
in a given context
Instrument cost and effectiveness depend on the context, and thus on the country
and the product. 
Product characteristics may make it difficult or even impossible to use certain instru-
ments. Product perishability will determine its capacity to be stored. Its "tradability" or
its substitutability with tradable goods will determine whether or not the international
market can be used to stabilize the product's price. 
Country characteristics are also crucial. Firstly, the resources available in the State
budget determine to what extent and for how long instruments can be used.
Secondly, the State's capacity to implement and enforce policies on the ground (for
instance, its capacity to collect taxes and control national borders despite corruption
and efforts by private operators to side-step these policies) determines the effective-
ness of public interventions (pillars 4 and 5). The country's international commitments
(membership of WTO, or of a customs union or a free-trade area) also play an impor-
tant role by restricting which instruments are permitted for purposes of regulating
imports and exports). Moreover, the country’s foreign exchange reserves may restrict
its import capacity. Finally, the degree to which a country is landlocked shapes its
capacity to use the international market to stabilize domestic prices. 
The characteristics of a given product in a given country also play a decisive role.
Producer access to production factors (land and labor) and to intensive production
techniques determines to what extent domestic production can respond to price
incentives. Whether the country is “small" or “large" determines its capacity to use
the international market to stabilize domestic prices (for if the country is “large" then
internal deficits correlate with rises on the international market). The fact that a country
is close to self-sufficiency, or is greatly in surplus or in deficit, determines its capacity
to protect itself from imported instability by disconnection from the international
market. Finally, the degree of competition in the domestic market (including the
import-export sector) determines market capacity to play a stabilizing role. 
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Therefore, the characteristics of the product and the country should be taken into
account when designing the price instability management scheme. In the short term,
as the constraints induced by the characteristics of the product and the country reduce
the effectiveness of certain instruments or increase their cost, they must be taken
into account as criteria in the choice of instruments to be used. In the medium term,
some of these constraints may disappear, or may be lifted by suitable policies. This
in particular is the case for product perishability (that may be reduced by processing
or recourse to specific storage techniques), for product tradability (that may be
improved by developing grading systems and warehouse receipt systems), product
substitutability (that may on occasion be enhanced by processing) and the country's
surplus or deficient nature (that can be changed by policies designed to stimulate
investment in agriculture). Finally, other constraints cannot be removed without
assistance from the international community, particularly WTO rules, import constraints
stemming from a shortage of a particular country's foreign exchange reserves, or
national budget constraints (see 1.6.).
However, the performance of a price instability management scheme does not depend
only on its adaptation to its environment. It is also greatly dependent upon the manner
in which it is managed.
1.5.3. Guaranteeing good governance 
The scheme we propose is based on all four instrument categories (A, B, C and D).
But the literature often pits C and D-instruments against A-instruments. The constant
threat of a public intervention that is likely to drive prices down leads private actors
to stock or import less. For example, public storage is thought to discourage private
storage (Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981). This “crowding out effect" could ultimately lead to
public interventions increasing (instead of decreasing) price instability. Situations of
this type have already arisen and have been reported and analyzed (for the specific
case of countries in East and Southern Africa, see Govereh et al., 2008, Chapoto and
Jayne, 2009 and box 15 in this book). The problem is not only that public interventions
run the risk of increasing price instability: they risk affecting producer and trader
investments in A-instruments, and may thus block efforts to modernize production
and markets. The development of warehouse receipt systems in certain countries
was in this way obstructed by inappropriate State interventions (Coulter, 2005). 
Should we conclude from this that the State must abstain from intervening so as not
to hinder market functioning? Should we forgo pillar 4? The answer is no, for several
reasons. Firstly because private instruments are ineffective when faced with imported
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and endogenous instability, and insufficient in the face of natural instability.
Secondly because a certain degree of stability is necessary to promote the moder-
nization of agriculture (which in turn is a necessary step in economic development)
and enhance food security. Finally because non-intervention is not a credible policy
(Poulton et al., 2006): economic actors know that if prices rise steeply, pressure from the
street will force the government to intervene. A State's commitment not to intervene
on the market therefore will neither reassure economic actors nor remove the crowding
out effect.
We are therefore encouraged to find ways to coordinate A-instruments with C- and
D-instruments in a manner that ensures we are maximizing the positive interactions
between them while minimizing negative interference.
The first key to this coordination is transparency and predictability. We have already
mentioned that public interventions must be predictable if the crowding out effect is
to be reduced. This has a range of implications. Firstly, interventions must be governed
by rules. Secondly, these rules must be known to all. Thirdly, these rules must specify
under what conditions the State will intervene. Fourthly, these conditions must
concern variables that can be objectively measured, ideally variables that are known
to all. When State interventions aim to stabilize prices (through C-instruments), the
simplest manner to fulfill these conditions is to establish a price band where public
interventions are triggered only if the price falls below a certain floor or rises above
a certain ceiling. These intervention prices must be known to all, making interventions
predictable. The source used as a reference for the prices should also be specified
(the best solution is often to adopt the prices given by MIS) .[ 59 ] For emergency inter-
ventions targeting vulnerable households (D-instruments), the solution is to select
objective indicators that can be used to trigger aid. In practice, these indicators are
provided by early warning systems and are built by crossing data such as harvest
forecasts, grain prices and the terms of trade between grain and assets that deficit
households can sell to buy grain, in particular small ruminants) .[ 60 ] Recommendations
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[ 59] Although intervention prices must be transparent, a more controversial question arises as to whether or not the 
resources devoted to the stabilization policy should also be transparent (i.e. stock volumes or budget). Some 
studies suggest that transparency on available resources increases the probability of speculative attacks against 
the stabilization policy (Salant, 1983). But transparency on resources may strengthen the policy's credibility (if 
these resources are substantial). Transparency may also avoid information asymmetries where certain actors 
close to the authorities have information not available to others. 
[ 60 ] The current indicators employed to trigger D-instrument-based interventions are little suited to urban food 
insecurity for they rely on the concept of “risk area". Also, as they are based on high magnitude shocks on 
production or prices, they are of limited effectiveness in situations where households are so decapitalized that 
small shocks are enough to push them into the red.
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for rule-based governance have long been made for public policies in general (Kydland
and Prescott, 1977) and for price stabilization policies in particular (McLaren, 1998).
They are supported both by empirical analyses (Nijhoff et al., 2002) and studies in
experimental economics (Abbink et al., 2011) that showed how unpredictable policies
may increase price instability. 
Concerning the coordination between A- and C-instruments, the second key is to
set the floor price and the ceiling price at appropriate levels. This is an art: a floor
price set too low is useless, whereas when set too high it is extremely expensive and
compromises the financial sustainability of the stabilization scheme. Likewise, a ceiling
price set too low will discourage private storage, whereas if set too high it will fail to
protect consumers from malnutrition and decapitalization. The intervention price
band must also be regularly updated in order to follow the long-term price trend. But
here again, the right balance must be struck: a band that is too flexible is no longer
of any benefit to market actors .[ 61 ] Overall, stabilization that is excessively ambitious
(too high floor price or too low ceiling price) or goes against the long-term market
trend is destined to fail. The quality of the coordination between A- and C-instruments
is therefore highly dependent upon the level of intervention prices and the way they
are updated. Within the limits permitted by these technical considerations, parity
prices depend on what prices are considered as “acceptable" in a given society both
for consumers and producers. In view of this, it may be useful to associate market
actors in the design of stabilization policies, namely in the setting of floor and ceiling
prices. This can be achieved by setting up “discussion platforms" that bring together
the State and representatives from the different market actor categories (producers,
traders, processors and consumers). Several countries have already implemented
this kind of forum (see box 16 on the case of Madagascar).
The third key to appropriate coordination between A-instruments and public
interventions (based on C- or D-instruments) is the credibility of the price instability
management scheme. Transparency will create predictability only if the policy
announced is believed by market actors, and if it is effectively applied. But policy-
makers may be tempted not to comply with the announced policy. For example, if
prices rise, they may be tempted to intervene before the price has reached the
announced ceiling. If market actors expect the government not to comply with
announced intervention prices, they will at all times fear that a public intervention is
[ ] ©AFD / Managing food price instability in developing countries / April 2013
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[ 61 ] On the international scale, the agreement on natural rubber illustrates the case of a band that was too broad 
and too flexible (Gilbert, 1996).
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about to take place and drive prices down. They will therefore reduce their stocks
(crowding out effect) and abstain from investing in the means required to modernize
production, processing , infrastructure and market institutions. How can intervention
policies be made credible? Credibility can only be built up over time, by the State
delivering on its commitments. But it can be strengthened by setting up an independent
agency charged with operating the price instability management scheme (following
the model of central banks independent of governments). In this case, the rules of the
stabilization policy (namely intervention prices) would be set by the State (preferably
after discussions with representatives of market actors), whereas the policy would
then be implemented (in compliance with the rules) by the price stabilization agency.
This means that the agency would have to be given control over the various intervention
instruments, namely public stocks and the tariff- or quota-based tools employed to
regulate imports and exports .[ 62 ]
Finally, the fourth key is control over collusion between State agents and private
operators. All public interventions are prone to collusion, whatever instrument is used.
For example, the buying or selling of public stocks may be allocated preferentially to
certain traders who are close to the authorities or have personal relationships with
State agents. The same applies to import or export quotas. Collusion generates rents
and distorts competition between market actors. The solution consists in allocating
contracts or quotas by open, competitive and transparent procedures (calls for tender,
auctions) as is already the case in certain countries. 
Beyond the question of coordinating A-instruments with C- and D-instruments, one
particular condition for the good governance of price instability management schemes
concerns the use of monitoring and evaluation systems. 
Monitoring is necessary to check that policies are actually implemented. In particular it
ensures that directives are applied on the ground by State agents (such as customs
officials) but also, in certain cases, by private actors. For example, reductions in import
tariffs agreed by the State will only have an effect on prices if traders pass them on to
the consumer. Hence the advantage of requiring tariff reductions to be conditioned
by importers signing a contract (by which they undertake to pass reductions on to
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[ 62 ] This model is a far cry from the current organization of price stabilization schemes. In most countries, the 
various instruments are in the hands of different bodies: ministry of trade for import and export tariffs and 
quotas, ministry of agriculture or marketing board for the management of public stocks. Also, government 
instructions to these bodies are usually discretionary: they do not concern the basic rules of interventions, 
but one-off interventions.
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their selling price),and the requirement to set up State-monitoring of a sample of
stores to check whether importers are complying with their commitments. 
Evaluation is necessary to ensure that the scheme is continually improved. This in
particular requires the centralization of information about all interventions (timetable,
instruments used and details on their implementation), the regular analysis of their
impact on prices (based on MIS data) and food security, and the production of an
annual report. This calls for the creation of a stabilization policy analysis unit (SPAU)
that must obviously be independent of the agency charged with implementing the
stabilization policy
In short, the success of food price stabilization efforts depends on the quality of the
governance of public interventions. Only interventions that are governed by rules
and are predictable can be harmoniously coordinated with A-instruments. Price
instability management schemes must also be accompanied by monitoring and
evaluation systems. 
Up to now we have focused on actions that may be taken by developing countries
or Regional Economic Communities to manage food price instability. But the inter-
national community also has a role to play.
1.6. What role does the international community 
have to play?
The international community can help developing countries by supporting their food
price instability management schemes (FPIMS), by reducing food price instability on
international markets and by revisiting WTO rules. Let us consider these one by one. 
1.6.1. Supporting developing countries’ food price instability 
management schemes (FPIMS) 
Food price instability poses an extremely serious problem for DCs. Firstly, it hits DC
consumers hard as they often devote a large proportion of their income to the purchase
of food. This generates serious food security problems (under-nutrition, malnutrition)
and sometimes political instability (soaring prices in 2008 sparked riots in cities across
some forty DCs). Producers are also affected. By making investment in agriculture a
very risky undertaking , price instability obstructs green revolutions. As these green
revolutions are a necessary step in economic development, this in turn is therefore
brought to a halt. Finally, for certain importing countries rendered vulnerable by their
[ ] ©AFD / Managing food price instability in developing countries / April 2013
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low foreign exchange reserves, price instability may also generate macroeconomic
problems (import rationing , decrease in exchange rate). 
The international community must therefore shoulder the major responsibility of
helping DCs manage food price instability. It can help them by supporting safety
nets and grain price stabilization policies, and by assisting DCs faced with difficulties
paying their food import bill. 
Supporting the development of multiannual safety nets that render 
vulnerable households in DCs more resilient
The 2005 crisis in the Sahel countries (and more particularly in Niger) showed that
emergency aid (activated only in times of crisis) is not enough to protect vulnerable
households from food insecurity. More structural aid is necessary to recapitalize
poor households and increase their resilience to price shocks. This leads to the idea
of setting up multiannual safety nets whereby every year assets are transferred to a
number of households over a determined period of time.
Programs of this type are already operational in some countries (see for example the
Social Cash Transfers program in Malawi and the Productive Safety Net Programme
in Ethiopia). But programs of this type are few and far between, and those that do
exist could advantageously be extended in terms of the number of households
covered and the sums transferred. These programs have proved to be effective but
their cost has prevented DCs from setting them up or giving them sufficient breadth.
Help from the international community in setting up such safety nets is therefore vital.
Helping DCs implement effective grain price stabilization policies 
Although multiannual safety nets and emergency aid are crucial to prevent or halt
food crises, they are not enough. They are of limited effectiveness when used alone:
targeting may prove costly and flawed (households requiring aid may not be covered).
The problem increases if a large number of people need aid, as is the case with major
price surges. Action must therefore be taken on prices to reduce the amplitude of
surges and thus render the safety nets more effective. Also, although safety nets
aim only to protect urban and rural consumers against price surges, producers should
also be protected against sharp falls in prices given that this is essential to stimulate
investment and thus promote the modernization of DC agriculture. Historically, for
England in the 18th century, North America, the European Union (CAP), and Asian coun-
tries, green revolutions have almost always taken place thanks to schemes designed to
stabilize grain prices on the domestic market (these policies – depending on the
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case – concerned maize, wheat or rice) .[ 63 ] The price of food staples must therefore
be stabilized on DC internal markets. 
The main obstacles to such policies in DCs are i) a lack of the technical skills required to
implement effective stabilization policies, ii) a lack of funding for these policies (except
for a few countries that possess mining resources, for example Zambia that was able
to finance its maize price stabilization scheme thanks to revenue from copper), and
iii) the weakness of governance structures for public policies. The first obstacle
results in ineffective policies and the second in undersized policies. The third results
in unpredictable public interventions that disturb markets and result in private
actors abstaining from storing or importing food for fear of a public intervention
that will cause prices to fall. 
The first obstacle may be overcome by providing technical assistance and by training
local experts. The second and third obstacles may be removed by creating a competitive
international fund to finance grain price stabilization policies in DCs. Such a fund
would ensure that grain price stabilization policies are no longer the preserve of a
few countries with revenue from mining or other sources. Conditionalities would
guarantee the good governance of these policies, particularly transparent intervention
prices and compliance therewith. The fund would be competitive: it would finance
only the best stabilization policy projects. The details of this mechanism remain to
be specified, including country eligibility conditions and project selection procedure.
The fund could start with a relatively small sum and initially finance a few pilot schemes
in order to render the mechanism credible and attractive both for donors and DC
governments. 
Helping vulnerable DCs faced with difficulties paying their food imports bill
International price instability leads to sudden increases in the food bill paid by impor-
ting countries. Production instability (due to climate hazards or cobweb dynamics)
may also increase the bill by causing sudden increases in import volumes. These
increases in the imports bill may have dire consequences for some “vulnerable"
countries, particularly those with very limited foreign exchange reserves or those
whose grain imports account for a significant proportion of their balance of payments.
In these cases a rise in the imports bill may cause the exchange rate to fall or result
in import rationing. 
[ ] ©AFD / Managing food price instability in developing countries / April 2013
1. Developing a strategy to manage food price instability
[ 63 ] See Timmer (1997a) on the Indonesian case and Dorin and Landy (2009) on the Indian case. 
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External aid must be provided in such situations. This may take the conventional form
of food aid. Or could constitute support for governments, helping them use risk
hedging instruments such as weather insurance, futures or options. This strategy,
however, does have certain limitations (no futures markets for certain products, basis
risk). It has not been much used in the past despite the recommendations of many
experts (Faruqee, 1997; Dana et al., 2006; Sarris et al., 2011). Malawi's experience in
2005 (often claimed to be a success) remains a very rare case. This country did not
repeat the experience that was imitated only by the WFP in 2006 and by the
Mexican government in December 2010 (see 2.2.). In any case, if efforts are to be
made to promote this strategy, external technical and financial aid will be needed.
External aid may also be provided through another B-instrument: credit facilities.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has already proposed such facil ities
(Compensatory Financing Facility and Exogenous Shocks Facility) but – according to
certain experts – these facilities are not enough and other mechanisms must be
envisaged (IMF, 2003; Sarris, 2009). Finally, an alternative solution could be to set up
a public scheme to stabilize food import expenditures. The mechanism (which could
be called the food import expenditures stabilization scheme [STABIMP]) would draw its
inspiration from experience gained with the export earnings stabilization scheme
(STABEX) developed by the European Economic Community to stabilize the agricul-
tural export earnings of African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. This scheme
could be reserved for low-income importing countries. STABEX and IMF payment
facilities have already been the subject of comparative analyses (see for example Brun
et al., 2001). Another solution would be to allow countries affected by price shocks
to temporarily suspend debt servicing payments (Gilbert and Tabova, 2005). A critical
assessment of these different instruments therefore appears to be necessary.
1.6.2. Reducing food price instability on international markets
The instability of food prices on international markets is a huge problem for many
DCs. Firstly, it causes imported instability (like in 2008 and 2010) that most DCs are
fairly ill equipped to manage. Secondly, it means that international markets can not
be easily used to counter internal sources of instability. 
International price instability must therefore be reduced. Two complementary policy
types can be used to achieve this. The first consists in implementing specific policies
to reduce each of the causes of the instability. The second consists in implementing
storage-based policies that are able to buffer the effects of all causes. We will now
consider these two. 
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These policies focus on the main causes to which international price instability is
attributed: lack of market transparency, excessive speculation on futures markets, the
boom in biofuels (that creates a connection between energy prices and food prices),
climate change (that enhances production instability), the cyclical nature of agricultural
investment and land purchases by certain countries to guarantee their food self-
sufficiency (this reduces available land in the country which sells or rents the land
and makes international markets narrower and therefore more unstable) .[ 64 ] These
different causes of instability can be managed by the following policies: 
Enhancing the transparency and predictability of international markets. This means
disseminating information about the current state and the dynamics of international
markets: harvest forecasts, stock estimates by country, content and expected effects of
policies that may impact international prices (policies implemented internationally, if
any, and by the main exporters and importers). The production and dissemination
of this information may be entrusted to international commodity organizations (e.g.
the IGC for grain) in collaboration with the FAO's Global Information and Early
Warning System [GIEWS]) that already provides information on policies enacted in
different countries (in addition to information on prices) .[ 65 ] This information could be
made more accessible to DC governments and private actors were it to be forwarded
by regional and national Market Information Systems [MIS]. In addition, these inter-
national organizations (IGC and GIEWS) could provide regional and national MIS with
the support necessary to produce the more specific information countries need. This
support could for example consist in supplementing international price data with data
on freight costs and exchange rates in order to estimate or forecast parity prices. 
Increasing the regulation of futures markets. The deregulation of futures markets (in
particular US futures markets) between 1990 and 2010 made speculative bubbles
more likely. The risk of speculative bubbles is intrinsic to futures markets (see 2.2.), but
this risk is accentuated by the increasing market share of “non-commercial" operators,
whose activities are booming thanks to deregulation of the futures markets. These
operators are not involved in physical transactions: their main motivation for buying
and selling futures and options based on agricultural commodities is to diversify
[ ] ©AFD / Managing food price instability in developing countries / April 2013
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[ 64 ] As export bans affect price instability both on international and domestic markets, they are presented in the 
next section (1.6.3).
[ 65 ] G20 just made a fairly similar recommendation by proposing the creation of the Agricultural Market 
Information System (AMIS) housed at FAO and cooperating with IGC (see G20, 2011).
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their portfolio. As they arbitrate between contracts based on agricultural commodities,
minerals, metals, energy and securities, they can cause a bubble in commodities by
shifting their positions if a crisis occurs in securities (according to some experts, this
is what happened in 2008 with the subprime crisis). The link between agricultural
and energy prices is further strengthened by the trade of indices based on baskets
of energy and agricultural commodities. More regulation of the futures markets
would appear to be the solution, though there is no consensus regarding the degree
of optimal regulation or the tools that could be used to reach it. For example, although
experts agree that position limits must be placed on non-commercial operators,
they diverge on where this ceiling should be located. The proposal to very slightly tax
transactions in order to discourage the very rapid buying and selling practiced by
speculators (Tobin-type tax) has so far not found a very favorable echo with policy-
makers. Last but not least, it should be noted that, given the interconnections between
the world's different futures markets, global norms are needed to harmonize their
regulation. 
Creating “virtual" stocks for intervention in the futures markets in the event of
speculative bubbles (Von Braun and Torero, 2008, 2009a and 2009b). This policy,
like that outlined above, is designed to tackle speculative bubbles on futures markets.
Its main advantage over regulation is that it does not restrict trade on the futures
markets and therefore does not reduce the liquidity required for these markets to
operate correctly. Its main disadvantages are: i) its cost (the authors recommend a
fund of 12 to 20 billion USD, corresponding to 30 to 50% of grain volumes “nor-
mally" sold) and ii ) the risk it entails (interventions based on virtual stocks could be
the target of attacks by speculators). However, according to the proposal's authors,
the scheme may not be excessively costly despite the large stock, as the mechanism
relies simply on country commitments and does not involve any actual payments if
it plays its expected dissuasive role. The scheme could nevertheless be subject to
speculative attacks and lose a considerable amount of money.[ 66 ] This scheme would
also have to face other challenges: establishing and updating the intervention price
band (for which the authors propose a novel mechanism, see 1.3.1.) and enforcing
country compliance with commitments (for which the authors propose use of the
WTO dispute settlement mechanism).
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[ 66 ] This in particular is the case if the speculative bubble also occurs on the physical market (stock retention). In 
such a situation the mechanism proposed by IFPRI's researchers (massive selling of futures) is very risky for 
greatly exposed to a cornering of the market: if the operators who are holding back their stocks massively 
buy the futures and demand product delivery, then the virtual stocks management scheme must buy the 
grain at a high price in order to fulfill its commitments. 
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Regulating national biofuel promotion policies. The development of biofuels has
an ambiguous impact on food price instability. Firstly, it makes the demand for food
products more elastic (more sensitive to food prices), which tends to have a stabi-
lizing effect. Secondly, it makes the demand for food products sensitive to energy
prices. A price rise in energy products is therefore liable to be passed on to food
products. According to certain specialists, this is precisely what occurred in 2007-2008
(Christiaensen, 2009). As the production of biofuels is supported by States (mandates
and subsidies), these can reduce their support in order to save part of the food pro-
ducts this industry uses. Some experts have suggested that this support should be
reduced when food prices soar (Wright, 2010). 
Bringing climate change talks to a successful conclusion. Greenhouse gas emissions are
contributing to global warming. This will generate more pronounced weather hazards
and more unstable agricultural production. If no international agreement is reached on
restrictions, countries will have little incentive to develop policies to reduce green-
house gas emissions.
Better coordinating agricultural cooperation policies. The aid received by the agri-
cultural sector in developing countries often increases during periods of crisis. This
aid then tapers off gradually until the next crisis occurs. This mechanism (which on
an international scale is equivalent to a conjunctural agricultural stimulus package)
may well cause “cycles" in agricultural investment (Timmer, 2010a). And this in turn may
well contribute to international price instability (cobweb dynamics). Better coordi-
nation between agricultural cooperation policies could reduce this problem.
Regulating land purchasing. Many countries, after the 2008 crisis, turned to a strategy
of food self-sufficiency. And to achieve this some countries purchased or rented land in
other countries. This has become a phenomenon of massive proportions (Von
Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 2009; Anseeuw et al., 2012; http://landportal.info/land-
matrix). In certain cases these operations can excessively reduce the amount of arable
land available in the host country, and this can generate food security problems.
More generally, these self-sufficiency strategies run the risk of rendering international
markets even more narrow [ 67 ] and therefore more unstable. International standards
are therefore required to regulate these land investments. 
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[ 67 ] Today, only 10% of all grain produced worldwide is traded internationally.
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Generic policies (based on stocks)
The main argument in favor of such policies lies in the fact that they may have a stabi-
lizing effect whatever the cause of the price instability (natural instability, speculative
bubbles, panics or the cobweb). This is a very positive point given the controversy
surrounding the actual causes of international price instability (see the debates that
arose out of the 2008 crisis). A number of stock-based policies can be envisaged, with
the most ambitious being the creation of international stocks to hold grain prices
within a predefined (evolving) band. But more modest storage policies are also possible.
Creating international stocks to hold wheat, maize and rice prices within predefined
bands. In the same manner as on the national scale, the intervention price band
would aim to render interventions predictable in order to avoid crowding out private
storage. Floor prices and ceiling prices would be set at realistic levels and be regularly
updated to follow long-term price trends (the easiest strategy here would be to index
intervention prices on the moving average price of previous years). The main argument
against this option lies in the experience gained with International Commodity
Agreements (ICAs): the schemes set up in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s to stabilize the
price of sugar, tin, coffee and cocoa were all abandoned in the 1980s (OECD, 2011) .[ 68 ]
At first sight, the failure of ICAs appears to support the idea that it is impossible to
stabilize international prices. But, when examined more closely, it can be seen that these
ICAs aimed more to support prices that stabilize them (Gilbert, 1996). Moreover, to a
large extent, it is this aim that explains why certain agreements ultimately generated
such surpluses that storage schemes found themselves on the verge of bankruptcy
(as was the case for cacao) while others were dropped due to the diverging interests
of producer and consumer countries (as was the case for coffee). The problem with
grain is very different: here the aim is to reduce price instability, not raise the average
price, and we cannot therefore deduce from the failure of ICAs that international
price stabilization is impossible. Even though such a policy would undeniably face
difficulties (cost of stocks, difficulties in fixing and updating the intervention price
band, governance problems inherent to this type of international collective action),
it nevertheless should be studied seriously.[ 69 ]
Reaching an international agreement to maintain global grain stocks above a minimum
level. This policy is less ambitious than that just covered: it does not aim to hold
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[ 68 ] Today, the only survivor is the scheme designed (in 1980) to stabilize the price of natural rubber. 
[ 69 ] A milder version of this policy consists not in building up an international stock but in coordinating the use of 
national or regional stocks over the crisis period.
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grain prices within a predefined band, but simply to reduce the magnitude and
frequency of price surges, which would already be quite an achievement. Its main
advantage is that it would be easier to implement and operate. 
This policy is based on two simple ideas confirmed both theoretically and empirically:
i) prices soar only when stocks are low and ii) private storage is suboptimal. The first
idea is based on the fact that it is only when stocks are too low to buffer shocks that
prices soar. This has been clearly demonstrated by storage models (Williams and
Wright, 1991). It has also been confirmed by changes on grain markets since 1960:
surges in the price of maize, wheat and rice on international markets have always
occurred when global stocks were at abnormally low levels (see OECD, 2011 and
figures 11 to 13). The second idea is based on another theoretical result: private storage
is optimal only i) if storers are risk-neutral or – which comes to the same thing – if they
are fully and freely covered for price-risk, and ii) if consumers are unaffected by the
price instability because the product in question accounts for only a small proportion
of their expenditures. These two hypotheses are far from being fulfilled in the case
of grain. Producer and trader possibilities in terms of cover against price-risk are i)
limited (rice does not have a futures market worthy of the name), ii) partial (for
maize and wheat, there is a “basis risk" due to the imperfect correlation between
prices on the futures markets and prices faced by market stakeholders in DCs
because of quality differences and transport costs) and iii) costly. And no further
demonstration is required of the weight of grain in the expenditures and the calorie
intake of consumers in developing countries. The private storage of grain may therefore
be said to be insufficient. As maintaining a minimum level of stocks would be enough
to avoid price surges, this prompts the idea that some kind of public intervention is
needed to increase the level of stocks. 
This was in actual fact the case for a number of years, but almost accidentally when
public grain stocks were generated as a by-product of agricultural policies. But these
policies have changed (especially in the USA, the European Union and China), which
is why global grain stocks have fallen sharply over the last few years (Mitchell and Le
Vallée, 2005). For many authors, the increased instability of international prices since
2005 can be explained primarily by the low level of stocks. Public incentives would
here be necessary to increase stock levels, but the problem is that each country, taken
individually, has every interest in letting others shoulder the cost of global grain stocks. 
An international agreement is therefore needed to share the storage burden between
countries. This would increase global stock levels and guarantee that these do not
fall below the minimum required to avoid overly frequent and substantial price surges.
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The aim would be to set a minimum global stocks target (in terms of months of
consumption). This minimum stock would need to be established for each grain (wheat,
maize and rice) by an expert committee on the basis of past movements in the markets
for these products. Country stock targets would then be set by spreading the effort
between countries in a redistributive manner: the effort requested would increase
with the country's income (it could be imagined that DCs would not be asked to
make an effort whereas emerging countries would be asked to make a moderate
effort and developed countries a greater effort). Countries would then be free to
choose the policy they consider most appropriate to reach the target [ 70 ] (subsidies
for private stocks, subsidies for hedging tools, expansion of public stocks, etc.). Such
a scheme would be much lighter than the international public stocks set up in the past
to stabilize the price of cacao and other products. However, this would nonetheless
be sufficient to reduce considerably the frequency and magnitude of price surges. 
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[ 70 ] Similar to the type of agreement used for greehouse gas emissions.
Sources: IMF for prices and USDA PSD for stocks.
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Sources: IMF for prices and USDA PSD for stocks.
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1.6.3. Revising WTO rules for a better balance between stabilization 
in DCs and on international markets 
Trade policies are the only effective means available for DCs seeking to protect
themselves from international price instability. For instance, importing countries
may levy an import tariff indexed on international prices to compensate for the
effects of turbulence on the international market. Likewise, exporting countries may
restrict exports as the only means to prevent an international price surge from causing
prices to soar on their domestic market. 
But at the same time, these trade policies may accentuate price instability on inter-
national markets. For example, levying variable tariffs on imports means that the
country’s demand on the international market is insensitive to variations in interna-
tional prices (and this tends to amplify these variations). But above all, if exports are
restricted in response to price surges on the international market, this reduces supplies
on this market, further increasing international prices (as happened in 2008: Headey
and Fan, 2008 ; Christiaensen, 2009; Headey, 2011). 
The role of the international community (through WTO rules) is therefore to balance
these partially contradictory goals: allow developing countries to protect themselves
from international price instability, without permitting them to overly accentuate
this instability. 
Unfortunately, current WTO rules are a long way from striking this balance. Sometimes
they are too strict in that recourse to variable tariffs on imports is highly restricted:
indexed tariffs are prohibited whereas ad hoc tariff variations are tolerated only on
condition either that they remain below the “consolidated level" determined in 1994, or
the country finds itself in the situation described by the “special safeguard clause" .[ 71]
But it should be underlined that, in order to be effective, tariffs must be indexed.
Ad hoc variations in tariff levels cause unpredictability and this discourages private
actors from importing and storing and ultimately results in increased price instability
(as illustrated by the experience of various Eastern and Southern African countries).
Indexed tariffs are also more readily accepted by populations as they guarantee a
certain reciprocity (producers will be less opposed to a decrease in import tariffs
–when international prices rise- if they know that these tariffs will be raised should
international prices fall). Moreover, the justification given for the prohibition on
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[ 71 ] See 2.3. for more details on this point.
ASavoir_N17_GB_BAT_2_(V2).qxp  12/04/13  8:37  Page 109
110
A SAVOIR
indexed tariffs (they are supposed to increase the instability of international prices
by rendering the demand of importing countries insensitive to variations in these
prices) is not always relevant. For small, grain-importing countries (like most coun-
tries in Sub-Saharan Africa), this destabilizing effect on international markets is
negligible whereas the stabilizing effect on consumer and producer prices in these
countries has a huge impact on food security and agricultural investment. On the
other hand, WTO rules may sometimes be too lax. They allow countries to restrict
food exports to any extent they wish, and this can cause or very greatly accentuate
international price surges. 
WTO rules therefore need to be re-balanced. The idea is therefore to lift the prohibi-
tion on indexed tariffs for grain imports by small developing countries .[ 72 ] At the
same time, the right of exporting countries to restrict their grain exports should be
limited to levels that ensure their domestic market is sufficiently supplied. In practical
terms, export bans would be prohibited but export quotas would be authorized,
with volumes based on estimates of a country's needs. Experience gained with food aid
(where volumes are often based on such estimates) has shown that such an approach is
possible though difficult (“grain balance sheets" give rise to heated discussions and
controversy, but at the end of the day the different parties always manage to come
to an agreement). 
1.6.4. Conclusions on the role of the international community
The different fields of action given above are complementary, not exclusive. A solution
must be found to food price instability in DCs, precisely where the consequences
are most serious for consumers (food insecurity) and producers (green revolutions
obstructed). Used in addition to emergency aid (necessary in certain cases), this solution
must be based on safety nets, price stabilization policies and instruments that come
to the assistance of vulnerable importing countries when these face difficulties
paying their food imports bill. But national and regional price stabilization policies
can prove difficult to implement if international prices are too unstable or if WTO
rules are too strict. That is why specific actions are necessary at the international scale
to prevent international price surges and allow countries to prevent international
price instability impacting on their domestic prices.
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[ 72 ] Here we use the term “small country" in its meaning given by the theory of international trade: a country 
whose import volumes are too small to affect the international price of the commodity considered.
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In chapter 1 we analyzed the different strategies that may be used to manage food
price instability in DCs. We first considered the possibility of “pure" (A, B, C and D)
strategies, then analyzed the two main mixed strategies: the “optimal strategy"
(combining B and D strategies) and the price stabil ization strategy (based on a
combination of A and C strategies). We concluded that the solution lies in a price
instability management scheme based on all four instrument categories (A, B, C and D).
It now remains for us to analyze in more detail the instruments to be employed to
implement this scheme. This is dealt with in the second part of this book.   
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2. Selecting the right 
instruments for strategy 
implementation
In the first part of this book, we demonstrated the need for a price instability ma-
nagement scheme based on all four instrument categories (A, B, C and D). We also
showed that the scheme needs to be adapted to the country or Regional Economic
Community where it is implemented. Our aim now is to help decision makers choose
the right instruments by describing the advantages, limitations, and perverse effects
of the different instruments, along with the complementarities and substitutabilities
between them. 
In chapter 1, we distinguished between the four instrument categories by examining
their goal (stabilize prices or reduce the effects of instability) and the means adopted to
reach this goal (market development or recourse to public interventions). This led us
to the “ABCD matrix" (see table 3):
3Table Different categories of instruments to manage 
food price instability 
Source: author.
A-instruments aim to stabilize prices by improving the performance of food mar-
kets, the term “market" being used here in its broad sense of a production and trade
system. In other words, A-instruments aim to modernize production and markets in
order to render them more responsive to price movements.
B-instruments aim to mitigate the effects of price instability on income (and there-
after on consumption and production). B-instruments concern credit and hedging
tools (crop insurance, futures markets).




Market development A-instruments  B-instruments 
Public interventions C-instruments D-instruments 
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C-instruments aim to stabilize prices through public interventions that regulate the
quantity available on the domestic market (mainly through public stocks or import
and export regulation). 
D-instruments aim to mitigate the effects of price instability on the income of vulne-
rable households. These involve the transfer to these households of cash or goods,
possibly with a matching contribution (generally work).
It should be noted here that the different instruments impact at different points
along the risk chain (see figure 14). 
2. Selecting the right instruments for strategy implementation
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Source: author.
DP : price instability      DInc : variability of household income
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Some instruments act directly on the root causes of domestic price instability: natural
hazards, instability in international prices, exchange rates or freight costs, or expecta-
tions instability. These instruments are few in number and are either A-instruments
or C-instruments used mainly on an international scale (e.g. climate talks and inter-
national price stabilization schemes). Little action is possible against the root causes
of instability on a national scale, except the provision of information to improve
expectations (e.g. harvest forecasts). 
Other instruments tackle the relationship between these causes and price instability.
For instance, the effect of climate hazards on prices is dependent upon production
sensitivity to these hazards and its capacity to respond to price incentives (price
elasticity of production). By promoting the modernization of production, A-instru-
ments reduce the effects of climate hazards on prices. The same may be said of the
A-instruments used to modernize markets. By strengthening spatial arbitrage, they
ensure that deficits in some areas are compensated by surpluses in others, and in
this way diversify the risk arising from natural hazards. Similarly, if improvements in
infrastructure and market institutions succeed in increasing private storage, then
they will reduce the amplitude of price fluctuations. Instability in international prices
can be prevented from being passed on to domestic prices, or its impact diminished,
by recourse to variable tariffs or subsidies on imports or exports. Finally, a number of
mechanisms can be used to reduce the effect of expectation instability on production,
purchases and sales. For example, placing position limits on non-commercial operators
is a means to prevent speculators operating on the futures markets from reacting
excessively to the slightest change in price by rapidly buying or selling huge quantities
of contracts, causing bubbles. 
Direct action may also be taken against price instability using C-instruments. Here,
the idea is to stabilize the quantity of product available on a country’s domestic
market in order to hold the price within a predefined band. This can be achieved by
using public stocks or by regulating imports and exports. 
Action may also be taken further downstream by preventing price instability from
causing income instability. This is the role of price risk hedging tools such as futures
and options.  
Interventions can also be implemented to act directly on income instability. This is
increasingly the role of D-instruments which are more and more based on transfers
of cash or productive assets. Emergency cash transfers (triggered only in periods of
crisis) aim to prevent the income and purchasing power of vulnerable households
2. Selecting the right instruments for strategy implementation
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from falling too low, and thus maintain their consumption and production capacity.
Structural transfers (cash or productive assets) aim to bolster household resilience,
i.e. their ability to maintain their income above the minimum level necessary to satisfy
their basic needs in terms of consumption and input supplies. 
Further downstream, credit-based B-instruments play an important role by mitigating
the effect of income instability on consumption and investment. 
Finally, when based on transfers in kind, D-instruments impact at the very end of the
risk chain: they aim to help vulnerable households maintain their food consumption or
production capacity when this is affected by a fall in their income or purchasing power.
In this case, transfers directly target consumption (free distribution or moderately
priced sales of food products or food vouchers; nutritional programs) or production
(e. g. free distribution of seeds). 
The line between the four instrument categories is sometimes rather fuzzy. For
example, public stocks are C-instruments if intended to stabilize prices, but are D-
instruments if used as emergency food reserves. Likewise, depending on how they
are used, input subsidy programs may be considered as A-instruments, C-instruments
or D-instruments. If these instruments are activated in a structural manner, aiming
to bring about a structural transformation of agriculture, they are A-instruments. If
they are activated only in response to a poor harvest, their aim is either to stabilize
production and prices (C-instruments), or ensure that vulnerable households are able
to maintain their production capacity (D-instruments). In this latter case, subsidies
are targeted (see table 4).
[ ] ©AFD / Managing food price instability in developing countries / April 2013
4Table Different types of input subsidy programs
Targeted Not targeted
C-instruments 






the production capacity of
vulnerable households)
Source: author.
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In this chapter, we will consider more in detail the manner in which these different
instruments function, by successively considering A-, B-, C- and D-instruments.
For each category, we will begin by describing the rationale of the instruments, i.e.
the manner in which they can contribute to managing price instability. We will then
describe the main instruments in each category and the characteristics that set them
apart one from the other. 
Then, we will discuss complementarity and substitutability relations between the ins-
truments in the category, and with instruments in other categories. There are several
types of complementarity. Instruments are said to be complementary if they deal
with distinct aspects of the price instability problem. For example because they concern
different households (for instance, D-instruments apply to insolvent households, unlike
A-instruments and B-instruments). Or because some instruments deal with rising
prices (call options) whereas others deal with falling prices (put options). A second
type of complementarity occurs when an instrument serves to tackle the perverse
effects of another instrument. For example, governments may use B-instruments as
a means to deal with the passing on of instability to State budgets (which is a perverse
effects of C-instruments). Finally, a third case arises in situations of interdependency
where one instrument needs other instruments to develop or function. For example,
road improvements will only promote long-distance trade if commitments (payments
and deliveries) can be enforced. There are also several types of substitutability . The
simplest applies to instruments that do approximately the same thing (more or less
well and at a more or less elevated cost). For example, imports may be slowed by
recourse to tariffs or quotas. The problem here is to select the instrument that is
most efficient (in a given context). Substitutability can also take more aggressive
forms when the development of one particular instrument leads to the atrophy of
another. This for example is the case if a (gratuitous) public instrument enters into
competition with a (costly) private instrument. This is also the case if the use of a
particular instrument increases the risk for users of other instruments. For example,
if public interventions are poorly managed, producers and traders may abstain from
building up stocks for fear that an intervention will drive prices down. This latter
example demonstrates how complementarity and substitutability relations between
instruments do not depend only on the nature of these instruments, but also on
their governance. 
We will  then look at the obstacles that hinder instrument development. Many
instruments that would in principle be most useful in fact never see the light of day.
Others are offered to market actors, but these in fact seldom use them. We will present
the different obstacles implicated and discuss possible means to overcome them. 
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The next step will  then consist in assessing instrument performance. This will  be
tackled in three steps: instrument advantages (that which only instruments in this
category are able to do or do better than others), their limitations (what they cannot
do) and their perverse effects (namely on price instability or the development of
other instruments). 
Finally, we will conclude by considering the attitude to adopt with regard to the
instruments category concerned (at a national-regional scale and the international
scale). This will lead us to discuss the choices to be made in matters of allocating
resources: should States and donors invest in instruments category x or y? Here we
will have to consider the positive (synergetic) and negative interactions between
different instrument categories. We will also consider the need to tackle all sources of
instability and their consequences, if necessary by using several instrument categories.
This last point will be considered in depth in the book's conclusion.  
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2.1. A-instruments: a potentially major stabilizing effect 
but very difficult to deploy in DCs
As we saw earlier, A-instruments play a crucial role when instability is of a natural origin,
as is the case for many DCs, particularly in Africa. And some experts, since the failure of
the optimal strategy (1.2.2.), have seen in them an alternative solution to B-instruments.
We will begin by describing the rationale of A-instruments then the main types of
A-instruments and the manner in which they can reduce price instability. We will
discuss the complementarity and substitutability relations between A-instruments
and between these instruments and those in other categories. We will then address
the question of the difficult emergence of A-instruments, i.e. the obstacles that make
production and market modernization so difficult. We will discuss possible solutions
to overcome these obstacles. We will then outline the advantages, limitations and
perverse effects of A-instruments and will conclude on the role that should be given
to A-instruments in food price instability management schemes.
2.1.1. The rationale of A-instruments 
The rationale of A-instruments is to render production, trade and storage more
responsive to price movements for if these variables are able to adjust very rapidly,
low magnitude price changes will be sufficient to restore equilibrium. The primary aim
is therefore to make economic actors more responsive to prices. To do this, A-ins-
truments aim to facilitate arbitrage in time (when to buy and sell), in space (where
to buy and sell), between products (producer land allocation decisions, consumer
purchasing decisions) and between (more or less intensive) production techniques.
They also aim to reduce the random component of production by making it less
sensitive to the weather, to attacks by pests and to diseases. This means modernizing
both production and markets. 
A-instruments have a very high stabilizing potential, as illustrated by the effect of
introducing cell phones on the price of sardines in the Kerala state of southern India
(Jensen 2007). Once the fishermen began to use their cell phones to decide on
which market to go to in order to sell their fish, this had a spectacular effect on price
instability (see figure 15). Before the cell phones were introduced, prices were very
unstable and sometimes even fell to zero when the fishermen found it impossible to
sell, for a lack of buyers. The introduction of cell phones resulted in prices moving in
phase on the different markets. Prices were also far less unstable, and never fell to
zero. It should nevertheless be underlined that this spectacular effect was due to
the very unfavorable initial situation: the fishermen at sea had no means of knowing
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what prices were being practiced on the various coastal markets. As a result, they
chose at random the market on which to sell their fish. On top of this, given that the
markets were of a very short duration (from 5 am to 8 am), the fishermen did not
have the time to visit several markets, and since fish is a perishable good, they had
to sell their fish on the market initially selected, whatever the price.  
2. Selecting the right instruments for strategy implementation
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5Table Types of A-instruments









A1. Research and extension 
services 
A3. Production infrastructure 
(e.g. irrigation systems)
A5. Processing infrastructure 
(e.g. mills)




A2. Land property rights
A4. Subsidies on inputs  
A6. Production credit
A8. Weights and measures 
system   
A10. Grading systems 
A12. Market information  
system 
A13. Storage credit 
A14. Warehouse receipt 
systems 





2.1.2. The different A-instruments 
Production systems and markets may be modernized by developing infrastructures for
production, transport, storage, processing and communication, but also by developing
institutions, i.e. rules that shape production and trading activities (see table 5). 
Most of these instruments are well known and do not call for any particular comment.
It should simply be specified that grading systems serve to classify products into lots
of homogeneous quality. This facilitates price comparisons and therefore arbitrages
in time and space. Warehouse receipt systems are based on a very simple idea: the
outsourcing of storage. A producer or trader entrusts his bags to a warehouse manager
who in return gives him a receipt specifying the quantity deposited for each grade of
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the product. This system has several advantages. It allows the products of different
owners to be bulked (inside a given grade), which may sometimes lead to considerable
savings on transport or storage costs (this is the main reason why this system was
developed in Chicago in the 19th century, ultimately giving rise to history's first futures
markets, see box 5). The warehouse receipt may also serve as collateral to obtain
credit from a bank. Finally, the receipt may be traded, and this can be a way to reduce
transaction costs. The dispute settlement system serves to enforce seller delivery
commitments and buyer payment commitments. Such systems may for example
take the form of arbitrators or clearing houses. These systems allow transactions to
take place between market actors who do not know one another. Finally, commodity
exchanges centralize offers and bids which in principle improves arbitrages, resource
allocation and discovery of the equilibrium price. 
2.1.3. Complementarity and substitutability relations between 
A-instruments
A-instruments are characterized by their very strong complementarity. Firstly, the
services they offer to market actors are different. Secondly, the use made of these
services by producers, processors, traders and consumers depends on their access
to other services. More than a simple complementarity, here we are witnessing a
veritable interdependence as we shall see by considering successively the case of
production modernization and market modernization.
Modernizing production requires recourse to multiple A-instruments 
Modernization aims to promote production that is both more intensive and less
sensitive to natural hazards. These two aims may on occasion be contradictory, as
for instance is the case with certain varieties that are more productive but less
drought-resistant. We propose to qualify as “productive" all inputs that boost yields
and as “stabilizers" all inputs that reduce production sensitivity to natural hazards.
Many inputs fit into both categories.
In both cases, the aim is to stimulate producer investments, even if the inputs
concerned are not the same. This first and foremost means developing the necessary
infrastructure. This infrastructure involves research and extension services which
aim to develop and disseminate varieties or technological packages that increase
production or make it less sensitive to natural hazards. Agricultural research and
extension can in part be provided by the private sector, but when this is deficient (as is
often the case in DCs), the State must step in. Production infrastructure is obviously
vital. The State must therefore take part in building infrastructure that may be consi-
dered to be a public good (as is the case for irrigation systems). Finally, the processing of
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food products also plays a decisive role, particularly by rendering perishable goods
suitable for storage. This in particular is the case for cassava that can only be stored
once processed into flour. Processing may also have an effect on substitutability
between products. For example, in West Africa, the processing of millet, sorghum, maize,
yam or cassava may render these products more substitutable with rice (whose
principal characteristic is that it is rapid to prepare). Consumer arbitrages therefore
have a stabilizing effect insofar that when the price of rice rises, they switch to millet
(and vice versa ). 
But infrastructure is not enough. Investment can only be stimulated in an enabling
institutional environment. Firstly, the rights of producers on the investments they
make need to be secured, which means that land rights must be secured (for instance
through land titles). Moreover, many producers do not have the means to buy inputs
(and even less so the means to invest in costly equipment). Also, they find it difficult to
obtain credit. Instruments that facilitate production credit are therefore indispensable.
Experience gained with successful green revolutions has shown that input subsidies
are also necessary. These subsidies must be gradually reduced then phased out as
the green revolution progresses, as a market for inputs develops, and as producer
incomes rise. 
Modernizing markets requires recourse to multiple A-instruments
Markets aim primarily to ensure product allocation in space (through trading) and time
(through storage). Modernizing markets therefore means intensifying spatial and tem-
poral arbitrage. Let us now look how the various A-instruments can contribute to this. 
Strengthening spatial arbitrage
Short-distance trade is generally fairly easy to develop but is of little help in stabilizing
prices which requires the connection of regions that are sufficiently far apart for
natural hazards not to be correlated. But long-distance trade is far more difficult
than local trade. Firstly, the cost of transferring products from one region to another
may be prohibitive. Even if this is not the case, traders must be informed of the
opportunities for arbitrage. Finally, when the buyer and seller do not know each
other, a problem of enforcement arises: will the other stick to his commitment to
deliver or pay?  
Infrastructure and institutions need to be developed to overcome these problems.
The first move here is to reduce transport costs by building roads, rural tracks and
bridges, and combat the corruption that often takes the form of State employees
charging “informal taxes". Fuel subsidies may also be envisaged. Producers and traders
[ ] ©AFD / Managing food price instability in developing countries / April 2013
2. Selecting the right instruments for strategy implementation
ASavoir_N17_GB_BAT_2_(V2).qxp  12/04/13  8:37  Page 124
125
must also be provided with information about large-scale arbitrage opportunities
(differences in price and transport costs). This means developing communications
infrastructure (particularly cell phone networks and, to a certain extent, the Internet).
This may also involve the setting up of Market Information Systems (MIS) (see box 1). 
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Market Information Systems (MIS) collect, process and disseminate information on
the state and dynamics of agricultural markets. They aim to improve both policies (by
providing policy-makers with market information) and markets (by increasing their
transparency for a more efficient and fair allocation of resources). In the 1980s and 90s
(when agricultural markets were liberalized), an unprecedented number of MIS were
created in DCs (Galtier and Egg, 2003). All these MIS had a fairly similar configuration,
described in the inventory drawn up by FAO (Shepherd, 1997): i) each was centered on a
country and a group of products (grain, cattle etc); ii) information was almost exclusively
about prices; iii) this information was disseminated free of charge via radio, the press
or boards at markets, and; iv) MIS were managed in a centralized manner by public
bodies (ministries of agriculture, marketing boards), and were mainly financed by donors.
In the 2000s many of the MIS underwent major changes and new MIS emerged. These
second generation MIS (or MIS2G) rely heavily on information and communication
technologies (ICT) (Internet and cell phones) to transfer information between enume-
rators and MIS management units. This has reduced transfer timelines and the risk of
data entry errors. These technologies are also used to disseminate information to
market actors (producers, traders and consumers). Apart from shortening dissemination
timelines, this provides the opportunity i) to diversify the information supply (users have
access to a wide range of information and select the information they are interested in),
ii) to obtain feedback on the information used (number of requests, number of down-
loads) and iii) to sell information (which has stimulated the development of private MIS).
MIS2Gs have also been the source of many organizational innovations (sometimes
facilitated by ICT-based innovations) at various levels: 
MIS institutional positioning. MIS1G generally used to be integrated within public bodies
(ministries of agriculture, marketing boards). Today, many MIS2G are part of professional
bodies (chamber of agriculture, chamber of commerce, value chain organizations, pro-
ducer organizations) or are private companies.
MIS linkage with multi-stakeholder forums. Some MIS have become veritable sup-
pliers of analyses for multi-stakeholder forums involved in the governance of markets
and supply chains (see the cases of potato in Guinea, vegetables in Vietnam, rice in
Madagascar and onion in Senegal). 
MIS, from the first generation to the second 1Box
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MIS decentralization. Here decentralization means not only that the information
disseminated is selected specifically for each region in the country, but also that the
information to be collected and disseminated is decided locally (the Observatoire du
Marché Agricole [OMA] in Mali has in particular adopted this approach by developing
local collection and dissemination units).
User-paid information. If cell phones are chosen as a means to disseminate information,
then users can be charged. Some have even been tempted to develop private MIS
that are supposed to be entirely self-financing through the sale of information. But in
practice, these MIS are still mainly financed by donors. 
Certain MIS are adopting commodity exchange models. The information provided by
MIS1G focuses mainly or exclusively on average prices by product and locality. Some
MIS2G provide data on individual “take it or leave it" prices (e.g. ZNFU4455 in Zambia)
or offers and bids as for the Kenya Agricultural Commodity Exchange (KACE) in Kenya.
This “individualization" of the information disseminated may be accompanied by
mechanisms that bring buyers and sellers into contact (as is the case with the Market
Resource Centers in Kenya), or even transaction facilitation services (brokering).
User support (training). Some MIS are betting on user training (SIEL in Madagascar, Esoko
in Ghana), usually by working with non-governmental organizations (NGO).
Are these innovations able to increase the impact of MIS on market transparency
and efficiency? The interactivity permitted by technical innovations (information
disseminated by cell phones or the Internet) or by MIS decentralization will considerably
increase the volume of information supplied by MIS and ensure that it better matches
the needs of market actors (it is now possible to offer a wide range of information
from which actors can “take their pick"). This means that more diversified information
can be provided without overwhelming the user with data he does not need (increase
in the number of products, markets, variables monitored). This also means that the
information most often used can be tracked back (through the number of requests,
the number of downloads). MIS can therefore constantly adjust their service to match
the informational needs of market actors (producers, traders, processors, consumers,
bankers, insurers, etc.). Private MIS (selling information) or MIS that are part of organiza-
tions controlled by market actors (producer organizations, chamber of agriculture, etc.)
are also being urged to meet user needs. Information accessibility problems may never-
theless arise. The innovations implemented may increase inequalities by enhancing
information asymmetries to the detriment i) of the poor (who do not have the means
to purchase information or acquire cell phones), ii) of those who live in areas not covered
by cell phone operator networks, or iii) of the less well educated (at a loss in the face
of tool complexity: micro-exchanges, SMS, websites, etc.).
F. Galtier, H. David-Benz, J. Egg 
Source: www.sim2g.org
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However, if prices or offers and bids are to be rendered comparable in different
areas, then other market institutions are required, namely the harmonization and
control of weights and measures and the implementation of grading systems. There
is also a problem of trust. Offers and bids may not match actual stocks, and this
underlines the importance of warehouse receipt systems that certify stocks both in
terms of quantity and quality. But even this is not enough as there is always the danger
that the trading partner will fail to meet his delivery or payment commitments. This
problem may be resolved by setting up information systems on trader reliability or
dispute settlement mechanisms. Agricultural commodity exchanges may also be set up,
and these have two advantages. First, they boost competitiveness as each offer is
brought into connection with each bid. Second, the problem of enforcing commitments
no longer arises as each commodity exchange includes a clearing house. It is therefore
clear that if spatial arbitrage is to be intensified, this usually requires a large number
of A-instruments. 
Connection to the international market constitutes a special case of spatial arbitrage
(that poses specific problems). We have already seen, in the first chapter of this book,
that strengthening the connection with the international market (to reduce the
parity price band) is an effective means of reducing natural and endogenous insta-
bilities. But certain goods are not the subject of international trade (they are said to
be “non tradable"). This in particular is the case for much of the grain and many of
the tubers produced in Africa: millet, sorghum, yam and cassava .[ 73 ] This does not
mean that there is no demand for these goods from other countries. It simply means
that the way international trade functions requires the constitution of lots that are
sufficiently large (enough to fill a container) and relatively homogeneous in quality.
But, because of the manner in which markets are organized in producer countries,
these conditions cannot always be met. However, specific action may be taken to
render these goods more “tradable". The key here is to standardize product quality (in
order to constitute homogeneous lots) and centralize stocks (so that large volumes may
rapidly be mobilized). Warehouse receipt systems can play a major role in both these
actions. Efforts may also be made to render non-tradable goods more substitutable
with tradable goods. For example, in West Africa, were millet to be processed in
such a manner that it is rendered simple and rapid to prepare, this would enhance
its substitutability with rice. The parity price band for rice would in this case play a
more substantial stabilizing role on millet prices.
[ 73 ] To a certain extent, this is also the case for maize, as the maize produced in Africa is little substitutable with 
the maize traded on international markets (because of differences in quality).
ASavoir_N17_GB_BAT_2_(V2).qxp  12/04/13  8:37  Page 127
128
A SAVOIR
[ ] ©AFD / Managing food price instability in developing countries / April 2013
Strengthening temporal arbitrage 
In the same manner as for arbitrage in space, if arbitrage in time is to be intensified,
this requires a large number of A-instruments. Arbitrage in time is mainly reliant
upon storage. For producers, it consists in storing and waiting for the right moment
to sell. For traders, it consists in buying at the right time, then storing , and selling
later in the hope of making a profit. For consumers, it consists in buying when prices are
at their lowest. In all cases, temporal arbitrage is based on storage. The main difficulty
facing storage is the risk of a drop in prices. This risk discourages storage and com-
plicates access to credit (banks are reluctant to lend if the risk of non reimbursement
is high). Moreover, many economic actors have insufficient access to credit because
they have no collateral to offer banks or microfinance institutions. But without credit,
many economic actors are unable to store.  
A solution to this credit problem is therefore to use the stocks themselves as collateral.
This is the idea on which the warehouse receipt system is based (see box 2) as the
warehouse receipts serve as collateral when obtaining credit from the bank. If this is
to work, then warehouse receipts must be credible, and means must be available to
control and certify that the receipts issued by warehouses correspond to real stocks, in
quantity and quality. This in turn requires a legal framework and a body of accredited
certifiers. Also, banks will only be willing to lend if they have the means to assign a value
to the stocks (which requires the existence of grades and MIS disseminating price
information for the different grades). A bank's willingness to lend may be even further
increased if it can readily sell the warehouse receipt should the borrower fail to meet
loan repayments, and this is greatly facilitated by the existence of commodity exchanges. 
The risk problem must also be tackled, as excessively unstable prices compromise
access to credit and discourage storage (even when producers have access to credit).
A solution can sometimes be found in price risk hedging instruments (see 2.2.). But,
given that DC producers and traders find it difficult to access these B-instruments,
it may be necessary to use a public mechanism to prevent prices from reaching
excessively low values (see 2.3.).
2. Selecting the right instruments for strategy implementation
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A warehouse receipt system (Zambia Agricultural Commodity Agency [ZACA]) was
introduced into Zambia for grains under a project funded by the Common Fund for
Commodity (CFC) and implemented by the Natural Resources Institute (NRI). Other
donors subsequently provided co-funding, and continued to support when CFC and
NRI ceased their involvement in 2004. 
In 2001, the project helped key stakeholder groups (notably farmers, bankers and food
processors) establish a non-government regulatory institution charged to certified
companies to act as warehouse operators, take deposits from the public and issue
transferable warehouse receipts against them. The first substantial deposits (6,000
tonnes of maize) occurred in the 2003/04 season, but its most successful year was
2004/05. The situation at that time was as follows: i) five warehouse operators were
certified for a total capacity of 105,000 tonnes, ii) 65,900 tonnes of grain were depo-
sited (including at least 3,764 tonnes by smallholder groups). ZACA was deriving its
income from user fees paid by the warehouse operators, and was well on the path to
breaking even. 
There were no deposits in 2005 (a deficit year) and it is not very clear what happened
in 2006, since by this time ZACA was getting into serious management difficulties.
Available figures indicate nine warehouses were certified and 19,879 tonnes of maize
were deposited, of which 12,300 tonnes by smallholders. In 2007 ZACA was wound
up and some of its staff and assets were transferred to the new Zambia Agricultural
Commodity Exchange (ZAMACE).  
The demise of ZACA can be attributed to a combination of mismanagement, disabling
policies (heavy government intervention crowding out private storage activity), lack
of progress with supportive legislation, lack of consistent demand for the instrument,
lack of commitment of some key stakeholder groups involved in ZACA, and poorly
focused donor support (too heavily targeted at smallholder farmers in the short run). 
Despite its demise, this initiative has demonstrated that such a system, properly struc-
tured and supported, is potentially viable, and moreover that smallholders can use it
to trade with large processors and to obtain finance from leading international banks.
Warehouse receipt systems: ZACA's experience in Zambia2Box
G. Onumah and J. Coulter
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These considerations on the means to develop spatial and temporal arbitrage show
that the different A-instruments are both complementary (offering services that
meet different needs) and highly interdependent (in the sense that each needs
the others in order to function). This considerably complicates the development of
A-instruments, as we shall see in section 2.1.5. For the moment, we will consider the
complementarity and substitutability relations between A-instruments and the
instruments in other categories. 
2.1.4. Complementarity and substitutability relations between 
A-instruments and B-, C- and D-instruments
A-instruments alone are not enough to tackle the food price instability problem in
DCs. Other instruments must be used to make up for their limitations, the most
obvious of which concerns households that do not have the means to produce or
purchase the food they need to survive. If they are to be helped, then A-instruments
must be supplemented by D-instruments. The aim here is not only for D-instruments
to meet insolvent demand while A-instruments deal with solvent demand, but also
for D-instruments, if correctly used, to render insolvent demand solvent, thereby
enabling vulnerable households to obtain supplies on the market, which in turn
strengthens A-instruments. This in particular is the case when D-instruments take
the form of transfers of cash or food vouchers.  
A second limitation is the risk run by producers, processors and traders. Although
A-instruments can often reduce this risk (by stabilizing prices or harvest volumes),
they cannot do away with it altogether. They may even increase the risk, as occurs
when a boom in long-distance trade destroys the natural insurance that covered
producers by nullifying the negative correlation between harvest volume and price
level (Newbery and Stiglitz, 1984). If the risk run by market actors is maintained at an
elevated level, or is increased, this has a negative effect on investments in production,
processing and storage infrastructures, i.e. on the development of A-instruments.
Only B-instruments (that are often ill-suited to the needs of DC market actors) or
C-instruments can break this vicious circle.    
But other category instruments may sometimes go too far. Instead of merely providing
the additional assistance required to ensure that A-instruments function correctly,
they may crowd them out. This in particular is the case for C-instruments and
D-instruments when poorly managed. The fear that a public intervention will drive
prices down discourages private storage. But this crowding out of A-instruments by
C-instruments or D-instruments can be avoided if these instruments are correctly
governed (1.5.3). 
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Likewise, if A-instruments are supported by public subsidies, they may develop to
the detriment of C-instruments or D-instruments. Important arbitrages must there-
fore be made concerning the use of public funds. 
2.1.5. The difficult emergence of A-instruments
Efforts to modernize production and markets in DCs have met with little success
(particularly in Africa and Latin America), and many attempts may be said to have
failed. We will first consider the main obstacles blocking the growth of A-instruments,
before presenting what can be done to facilitate their development.
Main obstacles to the emergence of A-instruments
Our review of the literature identified the following obstacles:
1. The scale of the implementation of A-instruments is often inadequate. Spatial
arbitrage will only reduce natural instability if it connects production areas that are
far apart and therefore subject to non correlated natural hazards. Instruments deve-
loped on a regional rather than a national scale should therefore be preferred (e.g.
across West Africa). In certain cases this will also reduce instrument costs through
economies of scale. 
2. The public goods that A-instruments need in order to function are often lacking.
For example, warehouse receipt systems require a legal framework and a body of
accredited certifiers, and these are often lacking.
3. A market actor's incentive to use an instrument often depends on the extent to
which this instrument is used by other actors. For instance, a grading system used
to classify different qualities of grain is only meaningful if it is used by a sufficient
proportion of buyers and sellers. If use does not reach this critical threshold, the
instrument will be dropped.
4. A-instruments are highly interdependent, which generates circularity problems.
If instrument x requires instrument y in order to develop, but y requires x, it is highly
likely that neither x nor y will develop without external assistance. These circularities
prevent the development of A-instruments. This is clearly illustrated by the example
of warehouse receipt systems (see box 3). The problem is even more acute for the
most sophisticated instruments as they need others to already be in place. This in
particular is the case for agricultural commodity exchanges and doubtless explains
why their development is still very limited (particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, see
box 4). These exchanges need grading systems and warehouse receipt systems,
but these are often lacking in developing countries. 
2. Selecting the right instruments for strategy implementation
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The difficult emergence of market instruments 
due to inter-instrument circularity problems: 
the case of warehouse receipt systems
If they are to function properly, warehouse receipt systems need other market insti-
tutions. In particular, their development is greatly stimulated if warehouse receipts
can be used as collateral to obtain bank credit. But banks are only willing to lend if
they have the means to give stocks a value (which requires the existence of grading
systems and MIS disseminating price information for the different grades). Moreover,
their willingness to lend may be greatly increased if they can readily sell the warehouse
receipt should the borrower fail to meet loan repayments, and this is greatly facilitated
by the existence of commodity exchanges. But warehouse receipt systems are them-
selves the main incentive for developing grading systems. And are often a prerequisite
for the emergence of commodity exchanges. These market institutions therefore do
not yet exist when attempts are made to set up warehouse receipt systems, and this
handicaps their development. 
3Box
F. Galtier
2. Selecting the right instruments for strategy implementation
African commodity exchanges still show little 
development for grains
Africa does not possess many grain exchanges. If we exclude the Abuja Securities &
Commodity Exchange and the grain micro-exchanges promoted by Afrique Verte
NGO in West Africa, these commodity exchanges are almost all located in the coun-
tries of eastern and southern Africa. 
Other than the emblematic case of the South Africa Futures Exchange (SAFEX) (see
box 8), the main African grain exchange was the Zimbabwe Agricultural Commodity
Exchange [ZIMACE]. This was opened in 1994 but was subsequently ordered to close
by the government. It may nevertheless be considered a ‘success story' given the large
volumes it traded: in 2001, ZIMACE negotiated contracts worth approximately 500 million
USD. Its members-shareholders were mainly producer organizations, millers, major
grain traders and the state-owned Grain Marketing Board (GMB). It was financed by
member subscription fees and commissions on transactions. Maize, wheat and soybean
were the main commodities traded. Members appointed brokers who participated in
daily trading sessions, using the system of open outcry. Trading contracts specify
quantity of the commodity, quality or grade, price and terms of payment, type of 
4Box
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transport for delivery, place and date of delivery, packaging, time when property title
passes to the buyer and an arbitration clause, providing for rapid and low-cost resolution
of disputes. As ZIMACE developed, it found it needed to register warehouses where
commodities could be delivered against contracts (it started with warehouses belonging
to the parastatal Grain Marketing Board). ZIMACE appointed inspection companies,
notably ITS Socotec, to inspect warehouses and commodities, and issued standard
ZIMACE warehouse receipts as a basis for trading on the exchange.  
The other exchanges have so far developed very limited volumes of business in food
crops, and remain overwhelmingly dependent on donor and government support.
Some have developed other lines of business.  
The story behind the Kenya Agricultural Commodity Exchange (KACE) is rather unusual.
The system began as a typical exchange in the form of a trading floor based in Nairobi,
before being decentralized. Market Resource Centers (MRCs) were set up in different
parts of the country. They disseminate information about prices, offers and bids (by
means of notice boards), and also play the role of micro-exchanges serving to match
offers and bids (even if the volumes traded are extremely small). Today KACE functions
mainly as a market information system (MIS): it collects information about prices and
disseminates this through different channels (national and local radios, MRCs, SMS). 
The Ugandan Commodity Exchange (UCE) hardly operates as a trading floor, but is
Government’s agent in licensing warehouses under the Warehouse Receipts System
Act of 2006. This activity may eventually render UCE’s exchange function viable,
since the leading constraint on the development of this exchange (and other incipient
exchanges) has been the lack of a “delivery mechanism”, i.e. warehouses where stocks
offered can be graded and kept secure until required for delivery.  
The Zambia Agricultural Commodity Exchange (ZAMACE) has developed from the
now-defunct warehouse certification agency (ZACA) (see box 2). Conceptually
speaking , it drew its inspiration from the ZIMACE model and the Agricultural
Commodities Exchange (ACE) established in neighboring Malawi. The latter provided
technical assistance and software. Leading Zambian-based trading companies make
up the initial membership, but it subsequently opened up to new players, notably
brokers without trading interest in the commodities handled. A USAID project is sup-
porting the project, as is WFP-Zambia, which has opted to do all its local procurement
through ZAMACE. Between October 2007 (when operations began) and October
2010, ZAMACE traded more than 62,000 tonnes of commodities (including more
than 54,000 tonnes of grain) worth more than 20 million USD.[ 74 ] It also “registered" 
[ 74 ] Readers may update these figures at:
http://www.zamace.com/info/index.php?option=com_contentetetetview=articleetetetid=20etetetItemid=23
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120,000 tonnes of other transactions by its members. ZAMACE has a number of
factors working in its favour: large-scale players on the farming and processing side
and the commitment of a large public sector buyer (WFP-Zambia). Starting in 2010,
ZAMACE trained and certified a number of warehouse keepers who would be linked to
the exchange and take deposits of maize from smallholder farmers. However it turned
out that Government procurement at very high prices completely crowded out the
initiative and there were practically no deposits. Notwithstanding significant progress,
ZAMACE has a long way to go before it becomes financially sustainable without
external support. 
The Ethiopian Commodity Exchange (ECX) was launched in 2007, and is now by far
the largest operation outside of the Republic of South Africa (see box 8). It is owned
by the Government of Ethiopia, which funded the initial capitalisation of about
US$20 million, and substantial donor contributions. It also has a paid-up membership,
exchange actors trading on their own account and for the account of others.The
exchange is run by a board consisting of 11 members, of whom six including the
chairperson are Government-appointed, and five elected by members. The original
objective was to trade in food grains, but in practice the facility was little used, though
WFP has made some use of it for procurement. The situation changed radically in late
2008, when Government mandated all coffee, the leading export crop, to be traded
through ECX, following up with sesame and pea beans, the key ingredient used in
making canned “baked beans”. The volume traded has grown very fast reaching, 509
thousand tonnes in 2010/11. ECX has 17 warehouse locations all of which it runs
directly itself. However standard ECX contracts are quoted as “arrived Addis Ababa”
and a locational differential (discount or premium) is applied, based on transport
tariffs from Addis to the actual delivery location. ECX regularly updates the transport
differentials and makes this information known in advance of a trading session. Clearing
and settlement are handled by partner settlement banks and the contracts are for
immediate delivery of the physical commodities.
Since 1990, the NGO Afrique Verte has been active in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger,
helping farmer organizations (FO) sell grain, and buy grain in deficit areas. Its key feature
is to set up “micro-exchanges”, which are annual events that bring together different
players (FOs and traders) in deficit areas with those in surplus areas. In 2005, Afrique
Verte's shift to autonomy led to the creation of three associations in Mali (AMASSA),
Burkina Faso (APROSSA) and Niger (AcSSA) that remained in possession of all its
knowledge and expertise in the Sahel. For Mali alone, more than 77,429 tonnes of
grain (millet, sorghum, maize, processed products) were sold between 2001 and 2008
through Afrique Verte's exchanges (Haïdara, 2010). 
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Apart from these individual country initiatives, there have been various attempts to
establish a regional exchange, including attempts by the Malawian-based Agricultural
Commodity Exchange (ACE), the Pan African Commodity Derivatives Exchange (PACDEX)
and Bourse Africa. In West Africa, the EU supported ECOWAS to fund a feasibility study
for a regional exchange. Apart from some trading in Malawi, we have no evidence that
these initiatives have so far produced results. The difficulties in establishing a national
exchange are compounded in a regional initiative which has to cope with a variety of
laws, regulations, currencies and grading systems, and as we have noted elsewhere,
food commodities are susceptible to bans on trade between neighbouring countries.
Bourse Africa, owned by the MCX Group of Mumbai India (now the World’s leading
exchange in terms of numbers of contracts traded) appears better placed than other
players to establish a regional exchange. It is currently seeking to establish a ‘hub-and-
spokes’ system with existing exchanges. 
J. Coulter and G. Onumah 
5. Public interventions may discourage private investment and storage. This is because
public interventions (based on C-instruments but also to a certain extent on
D-instruments) may cause prices to fall sharply and thus lead to considerable
losses for producers or traders who have stored or made investments. If private
actors expect such public interventions to take place, they may well no longer invest
or store. However, this crowding out effect occurs mainly when public interventions
are unpredictable (Chapoto and Jayne, 2009; Tschirley and Jayne, 2010). 
6. Vicious circle between price instability and the development of A-instruments.
Given that producers and traders are risk-averse, price instability may discourage
investment in and even the use of A-instruments (which often involve storage).
But the under-development of A-instruments itself maintains high levels of price
instability. This vicious circle can only be broken by using C-instruments to stabilize
prices. 
7. Vicious circle between price instability and market size. When prices are unstable,
households develop self-consumption strategies that narrow markets. This in turn
keeps prices unstable as narrow markets are more sensitive to natural instability.
In addition, producers and traders are reluctant to invest if the market is too narrow.
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8. Paucity of benefits from market modernization (at the individual level). Although
A-instruments generate benefits for market actors, they come at a cost. Producers
and traders must therefore consider the cost and the benefits that stem from
using A-instruments. It is this cost-benefit ratio that marks the limit of the market
modernization process once obstacles 1 to 7 have been removed. In the past,
market modernization was possible in Chicago because it resulted in a huge saving on
costs (see box 5). Likewise, the special configuration of the maize market in Zambia
gave this country's MIS a potentially greater usefulness than that of equivalent
MIS in other countries (see box 6). It should also be noted that even if all these
obstacles are removed, the development of A-instruments may remain suboptimal
because of positive externalities. For instance, if an MIS is used by a sufficient
number of actors, markets function better and this ultimately benefits those who
are not direct users of MIS information. The collective advantage of an MIS being
used therefore exceeds the individual advantage of the producers, traders and
consumers using the MIS. 
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A success story: Chicago 5Box
Cronon (1991) showed how a succession of profitable innovations in Chicago in the
middle of the 19th century allowed warehouse receipt systems to emerge followed by
the first futures markets in history. At that time, most grain was shipped by river boat.
Grain was shipped and stored in bags, generating high stevedoring costs. Change was
kick-started by the development of railroads that reached Chicago in 1848. Trains signi-
ficantly reduced the cost of grain transport. This allowed new production areas to be
developed and resulted in Chicago overshadowing Saint-Louis and New Orleans,
becoming the main platform for grain trade in the USA by 1854. 
This innovation led to another. New technology had been invented a few years earlier
for grain storage: elevators. These in fact are “mechanized" warehouses: grain is
elevated to the top of the tower then directed into different compartments where it
is stored. These steam-driven elevators at the time were not in widespread use, mainly
because of technical problems (changes in the level of the Mississippi river meant that
warehouses had to be located some distance from its banks). It was the development
of rail transport that led to their massive deployment, namely in Chicago as they
constituted an ideal solution to the problem of railroad congestion induced by the
manual unloading of trains. But the use of elevators led to a new problem: grain needed
to be stored in bulk rather than in bags. This meant that warehouse space was lost as
many of the compartments used to store the grain belonging to different owners
were rarely full. This problem could only be resolved by mixing grain owned by different
people, which was difficult given the great range of different qualities. 
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This led to a third innovation: the setting up of a grading system. This system was
brought into use in 1856 by the Chicago Board of Trade (founded in March 1848 to
promote grain trade, lobby the government and arbitrate in disputes between mem-
bers). This grading system (that was too subjective and subject to fraud) functioned
poorly at the beginning: it led to a sharp decline in the quality and reputation of
Chicago wheat (following the well known adverse selection mechanism discovered by
Akerlof in 1970). This problem led to the development in 1860 of a body of certifiers
employed by the Chicago Board of Trade, but this was undermined by problems of
corruption. The problem was solved only in the next decade with the development
of a legal framework (Article 13 of the Constitution of the State of Illinois in 1870 and
the Warehouse Act in 1871) establishing (among other things) State control over grain
inspections. 
The standardization of grain quality paved the way for another major innovation: the
trading of warehouse receipts. Each farmer or trader depositing grain in an elevator
was given a receipt specifying the quality and quantity of grain held. As qualities were
standardized, so were the warehouse receipts. It was therefore possible to buy grain
even without seeing it, simply by acquiring warehouse receipts corresponding to specific
grades. Stocks of wheat or maize could thus be the subject of dozens of successive
transactions without moving an inch. 
The arrival of the first telegraph wires in Chicago in 1848 gave rise to another innovation:
the development of forward contracts. In this type of contract, two parties agree to
buy or sell an asset several weeks or months hence at a price agreed today. This is a
means they employ to hedge the price risk. This type of contract had been around for
a long time but its use was greatly boosted by the telegraph that allowed information
on prices practiced at other locations to be disseminated in real time. 
The flourishing market in warehouse receipts allowed actors to sell forward contracts
even if not in possession of any stocks (given that on the contract delivery date they
could buy warehouse receipts to fulfill their commitments). These speculators seek to
make a profit (if the price falls, they buy warehouse receipts at a lower price than they
sell them for). The Chicago Board of Trade followed this trend from 1865 by regulating
forward contracts, namely by standardizing delivery dates. The first futures markets
in history were born. 
F. Galtier
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How can the development of A-instruments be facilitated
The key is to proceed step by step. For example, no attempts should be made to set up
commodity exchanges until warehouse receipt systems are sufficiently developed.
The general idea is to attempt to remove obstacles 1 to 7 described in the previous
section and determine where the market modernization process is brought to a halt. In
theory, this point is reached once the cost of using the instruments exceeds their
benefits for market actors .[ 75 ] Therefore, there is no certainty that the process will
ultimately lead to the emergence of sophisticated instruments such as commodity
exchanges. Certain A-instruments (such as MIS and warehouse receipt systems) will
doubtless be used by a proportion of producers and traders, with this proportion
varying with country and context. 
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How the ZNFU4455 MIS managed to reduce trading
costs for certain maize producers in Zambia 
The organization of the maize market in Zambia is somewhat unusual. Whereas
grain markets almost everywhere in Africa are driven by wholesalers who vary prices
according to the time and the customer, the dominant actors in Zambia are major
processors (millers, brewers, cattle feed producers). And they buy at prices that are
decided every Monday then remain stable for the rest of the week. This means it is
possible to collect and disseminate information on the price practiced by each of
these processors (of which there are about 230 in all). The ZNFU 4455 MIS, which was
launched in October 2006 and is managed by the very powerful Zambia National
Farmers’ Union (ZNFU), does exactly this. Actors who make the request are sent the
10 best prices (with the names and contact details of the relevant processors) by SMS.
Some empirical evidences suggests that ZNFU 4455 has allowed certain producers to
sell directly to processors. Traditionally, producers sold to small traders located in the
production areas. Thanks to ZNFU 4455 it has now become profitable for certain
producers to bulk their products together then travel to Lusaka or other large cities
to sell them directly to those processors who pay higher prices. However, as the ZNFU
4455 MIS has only a small number of users, its impact is rather limited. 
6Box
P. Mulozi and F. Galtier
[ 75 ] It can be a little more complicated if A-instruments generate positive externalities. In this case, the spontaneous
development of these instruments will be sub-optimal. This justifies public subsidies for A-instruments. 
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If the obstacles in the path of A-instruments are to be removed, then States (backed
by donors) must provide the necessary support. This support first and foremost
takes the form of the public goods necessary for A-instruments to function. For
example, warehouse receipt systems will only develop if i) a legal framework is set
up, and ii) a body of accredited certifiers are able to check that warehouse receipts
match actual stocks (in quantity and quality). Public support may also be technical.
Finally, subsidies are doubtless necessary for a certain period such that the instruments
may reach a sufficient volume of usage to attract economic actors (the incentive to
use an instrument often depends on the extent to which it is used by other actors) .[ 76 ]
Circularity problems between instruments can be overcome by adopting an integrated
approach, i.e. by supporting the development of different A-instruments simultaneously
(e.g. grading systems, MIS and warehouse receipt systems). Finally, A-instruments should
be developed if possible at a regional scale as this stimulates trade on a larger scale
and thus has a greater stabilizing effect on prices. The Eastern Africa Grain Council has
developed such a regional, integrated approach, namely for white maize (see box 7). 
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EAGC’s experience on market modernization: 
a regional and comprehensive approach 
The Eastern Africa Grain Council (EAGC)
EAGC was established in 2006 at the request, and through the efforts of, key stake-
holders in all three sections of the grain value chain; producers, traders and processors
with the aim that it would prepare, disseminate and promote the exchange of infor-
mation on matters affecting the regional grain industry and also be the representative
body on behalf of the membership to regional authorities. The concept and formation
of EAGC – although predominately private sector owned – fits well with the African
Union (AU) and New Partnership for Africa Development (NEPAD)’s Comprehensive
Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) framework which recognizes
agriculture as central for the alleviation of poverty and hunger and hence for reaching
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
7Box
[ 76 ] Another more radical option consists in making the use of a given instrument mandatory. This was the option 
chosen for export products by different African commodity exchanges, for instance the Ethiopian Commodity 
Exchange (ECX). This solves the problem stemming from the fact that the usefulness of an instrument depends 
on a certain critical mass of users being reached. But this approach is difficult to apply to internal trade (which 
would mean controlling transactions within the country). Above all, it creates the risk of constraining economic 
actors to use an instrument that does not fit their needs. 
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The mandate of EAGC is to develop, promote, and influence structured grain trading
system in the eastern Africa region with defined rules and regulations. Its core func-
tion is to improve the policy and trading environment in the Eastern Africa regional
grain trade, strengthen market linkages and reduce the constraints along the grain
value chain. To achieve this, the Council works closely and in partnership with govern-
ments in the region. EAGC continues to push for a market-led trading place away
from the earlier position influenced by governments through grain marketing boards.
The current focus is on nine countries in the larger Eastern Africa Region-Kenya,
Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Zambia, Malawi and Ethiopia and South Sudan.
In order to get off its feet and deliver its mandate, EAGC has benefitted immensely
from key donors including SIDA, USAID, Financial Sector Deepening and AGRA with
the vision to become self sustaining.
EAGC’s approach of market modernization is regional and comprehensive. It encom-
passes market institutions, policy environment and stakeholders’ capacity building. 
1. Establishing and strengthening grain market institutions
Warehouse Receipts System (WRS). In 2007, EAGC successfully piloted a warehouse
receipts system (WRS) and partnered with financial institutions whose support is
crucial to the implementation of the system. Subsequently though, poor seasons due
to changing climatic conditions have been a challenge to the replication of the earlier
success. However the Kenya government’s interest in the system’s potential as a
foundation for a commodity exchange has since led to the formation of a private
sector led process that now seeks to anchor the same in legislation and EAGC is
spearheading current multi-sectoral public private sector efforts. The potential benefits
include reduced post-harvest losses (currently estimated at over 30% in Kenya);
better storage; reduced transaction costs; increased market efficiency; market price
discovery mechanisms; market risk management; increased liquidity in commodity
markets; improving product consolidation and quality among others. There has been
consensus from EAGC members (mainly from private sector) and the public sector to
develop an integrated system where WRS and Commodity Exchange can be regulated
by a single unit. Over the past three years, the Council has certified three warehouses
with a capacity of over 50,000 (fifty thousand metric tons). More capacity is expected
to come under use as the system gains acceptability among small scale producers.
Towards an EAC integrated process, EAGC is currently collaborating with the Tanzania
Warehousing and Licensing Board (TWLB) and the Uganda Commodity Exchange
(UCE). These are government supported systems in Tanzania and Uganda respecti-
vely and EAGC’s partnership is to introduce private sector influence that is hoped to
attract more confidence especially from financial partners. EAGC through the EAC 
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Secretariat is seeking to facilitate a regional coordinating mechanism on Warehousing
Receipting that is hoped will eventually lead to a regional Commodity Exchange.
Already a GIS integrated network of Warehouses has been established as part of the
preliminary steps. Ongoing efforts seek to link this to the price and other real-time
market intelligence and applications that will feed the system on current stock levels
held by participating farmers. 
Regional Agricultural Trade Intelligence Network (RATIN). The scope covers access
to the market information regarding sources and outlets of grain, prevailing market
prices, trade flows and other dynamics, the lack of which had been identified as contri-
buting to the sub-optimal performance of the sector. RATIN is an up to date portal
disseminating market price and other data on a daily basis from across forty wholesale
markets in the EAC-Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya and covering information on
the region’s main staples (maize, beans, sorghum, rice, wheat and millet). Price informa-
tion and other market intelligence through the website (www.ratin.net) are open to
members and other users. Information is also disseminated through an SMS facility,
quarterly newsletters and weekly market reports. 2010 usage stands at twenty five
thousand. 
Electronic grain trading platform. The Council has also developed an electronic trading
platform www.egtAfrica.com that seeks to link sellers of agricultural produce with
potential buyers. Sellers communicate with EAGC officers about available stocks,
location and asking prices and this information is then posted to the platform for bids
by potential buyers. The Council is integrating this platform into the overall market
information system to promote structured trading. 
The biennial African Grain summit continues to be an important melting pot and
a crucial networking forum for traders, producers and policy makers that always
generates critical discourse towards improving agricultural commodity trade. 
Annual Agribusiness Fairs in EAC countries (Kenya, Uganda Tanzania).
Development and dissemination of regional (EAC & COMESA) Staple Foods
Standards. EAGC has partnered with regional blocs to disseminate in the COMESA
region staple food standards developed by the EAC. So far a ToT has been carried out
and in which eighty trainers from the COMESA region participated. Currently, twenty
three more food commodity standards are in the validation process supported by
EAGC across the EAC region before another round of ToT is done. 
Arbitration. In 2009, EAGC facilitated the training of nine internationally accredited
arbitrators as an alternative mechanism of trade dispute resolution. 
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2. Contributing to promote an enabling policy environment 
The Council contributes to the promotion of an enabling policy environment through
collaboration with regional governments and Regional Economic Communities parti-
cularly COMESA and EAC to tackle key barriers limiting regional commodity trade.
The development process for a Regional Food Balance Sheet currently being pursued
by the Council is part of the evidence-based advocacy at both government and regional
economic bloc levels by the Council towards food security through trade. The Council
has also been on the forefront of identifying tariffs and other non tariff barriers that
stifle trade and lobbied for their removal. Progress has been made with regard to
reduction of road blocks that were a major conduit for corruption. The reduction of
import duty on wheat from thirty five to ten per cent in line with the EAC Common
Market Protocol is part of the work done by EAGC and its partners. 
3. Contributing to increase the capacity of grain market stakeholders
Capacity building for different stakeholders along the value chain (traders and farmer
organizations, exporters, financial institutions and distributors). Training encompasses
regionally applicable rules of grain trade (standard grain contracts, rules and the process
of arbitration). In the past two years, over seven thousand participants have undergone
training through the Council’s facilitation in the EAC and other countries including
Malawi and Zambia.
Perspectives
Alongside the ongoing public private partnership process on the warehousing receipting
regulatory framework, the Council is in the process of harnessing its market information
systems in collaboration with a local financial institution to integrate warehouses and
develop an over the counter electronic trading platform for Warehousing Receipting
that will incorporate consolidation of warehouse receipts on sale, matching of offers to
sell and bids to buy, settlement through mobile money transfer to small-scale holders.
It is envisaged this will reduce transaction costs by up to twenty per cent and thus
increase farmers’ incomes. 
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Efforts must also be made to render public interventions predictable, for the fear
that public interventions will  drive prices down has the effect of discouraging
private actor investment in A-instruments .[ 77 ] These rules mean that the State may
intervene only when prices move outside a previously defined band. If the ceiling
price is set sufficiently high it will reassure private actors for they know the State will
not intervene while the price has not reached this level. Also, the floor price protects
producers and traders from a sharp fall in price. It is possible, and often desirable, to
associate private actors in the process used to set and update the price band (or
more generally in policy-making). This can be achieved through multi-stakeholder
platforms (see the example of Madagascar, box 16). Predictable public interventions
in this case can stimulate the investments necessary to modernize production and
markets. They may also increase market size insofar that when prices are less unstable,
households are less tempted to fall back on self-consumption strategies. 
State support is required to stimulate the development of A-instruments. This support
must be gradually reduced and must disappear altogether (with subsidies halted) once
the instruments have reached a critical size. The system then settles into an equilibrium:
the market modernization process stops when the additional benefit induced by
a further development of A-instruments no longer exceeds the additional cost it
generates. Given that producers and traders in Sub-Saharan Africa find it difficult to
access credit, warehouse receipt systems are likely to show strong growth on condition
that obstacles are removed. The development of exchanges is less likely. 
It is also possible that the process of market development will lead to instruments
being adapted to match local contexts. A particularly interesting case of this concerns
the development of grain micro-exchanges in West Africa (by the NGO Afrique Verte)
and in Kenya (“market resources centers” developed by the Kenya Agricultural Com-
modity Exchange). 
2.1.6. The advantages, limitations and perverse effects of A-instruments
With the failure of the optimal strategy (based on B- and D-instruments), some experts
saw production and market modernization as an alternative solution to the problem
of food price instability (Byerlee et al., 2005 Chapoto and Jayne, 2009; Tschirley and
Jayne, 2010). This meant placing A-instruments center stage in the food price instability
[ 77 ] It should be recalled that non-intervention is not a solution that will reassure producers and traders, or stimulate
their investments. Indeed, a State's commitment not to intervene lacks credibility: everyone knows that pressure 
from the street will force the State to intervene if the price rise is too great. 
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management scheme. Is this solution relevant? Are A-instruments enough in situations
of natural instability? Can A-instruments tackle the problem in situations of imported
and endogenous instability? 
The advantages of A-instruments
It is in situations of natural instability that A-instruments come into their own. We
can even say that they are indispensable for countering this type of instability since only
production and market modernization can sustainably reduce food price instability
stemming from natural hazards. For example, trade between regions that are sufficiently
far apart for natural hazards not to be correlated will diversify risks (regions that are
far apart are unlikely to experience drought or attacks by locusts at the same time). 
A-instruments play a far more minor role in situations of imported instability. Their
only (small) effect is that private stocks may delay and slightly mitigate the passing
on of international price instability to domestic prices (as occurred in 2008). 
Some A-instruments may have a beneficial effect on endogenous instability. MIS may
in principle reduce expectation instability on condition that they are forecast-orientated
(which is rarely the case). Warehouse receipt systems increase stock visibility which
may slightly discourage speculative bubbles and panics. But it is above all against
the cobweb effect that A-instruments have a role to play. The cobweb effect may in
theory be lessened by multiannual private storage (for here the price is no longer
dependent upon the current year's production). It may be restricted by interna-
tional trade (for the parity price band bounds price fluctuations, see figure 7). Finally,
production credit may sometimes reduce cobweb effects by preventing excessive
drops in production in response to falling prices (credit allows producers to maintain
their production capacity). 
The limitations of A-instruments
The main limitation of A-instruments is simply that they are very difficult to develop.
For example, in Africa, the development of long-distance trade would require both
major investment to improve roads and substantial action to reduce informal taxation
by State employees. Other factors may also limit the stabilizing effect of A-instruments,
namely a lack of competition on certain markets (dominated by a few major traders). 
Also, even successfully developed A-instruments may have only limited effects on price
instability. Prices may be very unstable even on highly efficient and competitive markets.
Even in situations of natural instability, A-instruments are not enough: price surges
may occur even in perfect markets with risk-neutral storers (Williams and Wright, 1991).
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Such surges for grains may have very harmful consequences for consumers in DCs.
The problem becomes even more acute if we introduce the fact that very little private
multiannual storage is actually practiced because producers and traders are risk-averse.
Therefore, private storage can only effectively tackle the problem of seasonal price
instability (Galtier et al., 2010). A-instruments are mainly ineffective in the face of
imported instability even though private stocks may slightly lessen the passing on of
international instability. A-instruments are also of little use in the face of endogenous
instability. Although they may help to a certain degree in reducing the cobweb effect,
they are relatively ineffective in the face of speculative bubbles and panics (in this case,
we cannot count on private storage as speculative bubbles and panics are precisely
due to stock hoarding practices). 
The perverse effects of A-instruments
A-instruments may generate unwanted effects. In situations of natural instability
these effects are fairly minor, being mainly limited to the fact that the development
of long-distance trade reduces producer "natural insurance" (the negative correlation
between price and production) and may therefore accentuate their income instability
(Newbery and Stiglitz, 1984). This may discourage agricultural investment .[ 78 ]
More substantial perverse effects are seen in situations of imported instability when
the development of spatial arbitrage and market integration can mean that variations
in international prices are more readily passed on to the domestic market. In particular,
all the measures taken with the intention of rendering goods more tradable (or substi-
tutable with tradable goods) enhance a country's exposure to imported instability.
But it is above all in situations of endogenous instability that A-instruments may have a
harmful effect on price instability. If A-instruments function too well, this may generate
endogenous instability. To understand why, we have to consider the general mechanism
of endogenous instability: expectation instability leads to unstable farming or trading
behaviors that in turn generate price instability and feed the instability of expectations.
It is this mechanism than comes into play in the cobweb, in speculative bubbles and
in panics (1.3.2). As A-instruments make behaviors more sensitive to price movements,
they can increase endogenous instability. If price elasticity of production increases,
the cobweb effect may also increase. And as for market modernization, it tends to in-
crease the probability of speculative bubbles and panics. In addition, it has an ambiguous
April 2013 / Managing food price instability in developing countries /©AFD [ ]
[ 78 ] But the magnitude of this effect is not particularly great, for as we have seen, natural insurance in practice 
only plays a minor role (1.2.3.). 
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effect on the cobweb. Storage tends to mitigate the cobweb but trade has more
complex effects. Firstly, market modernization may result in cobweb dynamics on
sales behaviors (see footnote 8). Secondly, international trade may bound national
cobweb dynamics as the price is constrained to remain within a band defined by the
parity price. But it may thus synchronize these dynamics (Boussard et al., 2006).
This does not mean that we should cease using A-instruments to modernize produc-
tion and markets. Quite the contrary, as this modernization is necessary to reduce
natural instability. But this does mean that the perverse effects induced by production
and market “fluidity" must be countered using other instruments. In particular,
behavioral sensitivity to price movements must be reduced in certain very precise
situations. For example, it may prove judicious to make futures markets a little less
fluid by taxing the transactions made on these markets (Tobin type tax) or by placing
position limits on non-commercial operators. 
2.1.7. What can we achieve with A-instruments? 
A-instruments are an indispensable part of any price instability management scheme.
Although they are relatively ineffective when faced with imported and endogenous
instability, they are indispensable for tackling natural instability. Without them it is
impossible to combat sustainably and effectively the instability induced by natural
hazards. They also play a major role in rendering the price instability of perishable
and non-tradable products more manageable given that the price of these products
is very difficult to stabilize by market instruments (storage and long-distance trade
are both impossible) or by public interventions (neither public storage nor border
controls can be used). But a major proportion of the caloric intake in some parts of
Africa is provided by this type of product (cassava, plantain). A-instruments may provide
a solution in the medium term by rendering these products more storable, tradable
or substitutable with tradable goods. 
But such instruments do not develop spontaneously. An environment conducive to
their development must therefore be created. This environment rests on a multifaceted
base: i) provision of the public goods necessary for A-instruments to function correctly
(including a legal framework), ii) training and technical support, and finally iii) tem-
porary subsidies to help the instruments reach the critical size to be attractive to
producers and traders. This public support for A-instruments is best developed at a
regional scale and in an integrated manner (i.e. by simultaneously supporting several
complementary market institutions such as MIS, grading systems and warehouse receipt
systems). Finally, investment in A-instruments should also be promoted by reducing
[ ] ©AFD / Managing food price instability in developing countries / April 2013
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the uncertainty facing economic actors through predictable public interventions
that aim to prevent prices from reaching extreme values (C-instruments). Here it
should be underlined that once the development of A-instruments is sufficiently
advanced (successful green revolutions, modern infrastructure and market institutions
in place and operating correctly), this public support should be gradually reduced then
withdrawn (namely subsidies and floor prices).
Finally, it should be noted that A-instruments alone are not enough to manage
food price instability in DCs. In particular they are relatively ineffective when faced
with imported and endogenous instability. Even in situations of natural instability,
A-instruments alone are not enough. The scheme must therefore be supplemented
through recourse to instruments of other categories. 
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2.2. B-instruments: a secondary role in DCs
B-instruments offered a great deal of hope in the 1980s and 1990s, following the
liberalization of DC agriculture. Many thought, and still think, that the properties of
these instruments (symmetry, flexibility and predictability) make them ideal candidates
to solve the price instability problem. And it is true that these instruments allow
economic actors to choose the combination (protection level, cost) they deem optimal
for them. And this without affecting prices, and therefore without causing distortions
in the economy. 
B-instruments also have another virtue in that they are supposed to help stabilize
prices and thereby be beneficial to a wider public than solely their users. When produ-
cers and traders use B-instruments, they reduce the risk that weighs upon them and
this stimulates their investment in production, market infrastructure and storage.
This ultimately may have a stabilizing effect on prices which is beneficial for all. This
is what we called the (potential) multiplier effect of B-instruments.
We will begin by presenting the rationale of B-instruments. We will then examine the
main types of B-instrument and the manner in which they can reduce the impact of
price instability on incomes. We will then discuss the complementarity and substitu-
tability relations between B-instruments and between these instruments and those
in other categories. We will then address the question of the difficult emergence of
B-instruments. We will then outline the advantages, limitations and perverse effects
of B-instruments before drawing conclusions on the role they should be given in the
food price instability management scheme.
2.2.1. The rationale of B-instruments 
B-instruments aim to protect market actors (farmers, traders, processors and consu-
mers) from price risk and, in the case of farmers, from production risks due to natural
hazards .[ 79 ] These instruments may also be used by States to protect themselves
from balance of payment or budget imbalances caused by price instability or measures
taken to counter price instability.
These instruments do not aim to reduce price and production instability, but simply
to mitigate their impact on the income, investment and consumption of economic
[ ] ©AFD / Managing food price instability in developing countries / April 2013
[ 79 ] Instruments to hedge against harvest-related risk are included in the analysis because sometimes this risk 
correlates with the price risk (when harvests are good the price falls, and vice versa). Another reason is that 
harvest risk management may – in theory – have a stabilizing effect on prices (see 2.2.4., section on the “multi-
plier effect" of B-instruments).
2. Selecting the right instruments for strategy implementation
ASavoir_N17_GB_BAT_2_(V2).qxp  12/04/13  8:37  Page 148
149
actors. Most B-instruments act ex ante, i.e. before shocks occur. They aim to mitigate
the impact of price or production instability on income. Other instruments (based
on credit) act ex post by mitigating the impact of income instability on consumption
and investment.
Two ex ante mechanisms can be used to mitigate the impact of price or production
instability on income:
l compensation. Economic actors protect themselves by acquiring contracts that
provide cover with regard to a particular variable that can be price (futures, call
options, put options), harvest (crop insurance), climatic conditions (weather-indexed
insurance) or revenue (revenue insurance). If the variable covered in the contract
exceeds a certain upper or lower threshold depending on the case, the contract
holder is granted financial compensation.
l risk pooling. Different economic actors agree to pool their risks. For example, a
number of producers entrust a cooperative with the sale of their maize. This sells
the maize at different times and at different prices but pays each of its members
the average price obtained (for the grade they provided). 
These two mechanisms ultimately rely on diversifying the risks by pooling them.
This pooling can be made directly by market actors (as in the case of the cooperative)
or through operators such as an insurance company, a bank or a futures market. In the
latter case, market actors pay to transfer their risks to these operators (who accept
to buy them because they are able to diversify these risks by pooling them) .[ 80 ]
Ex post, if producer and consumer incomes fall, they are provided with credit such
that they may continue to consume and invest in production. The same applies for
countries with the credit facilities provided by the IMF. 
2.2.2. The different B-instruments 
First, it should not be forgotten that there are many “informal" B-instruments. For
example, risk pooling systems are used at a village community or social network
scale (Fafchamps, 1992). If incomes fall, urban and rural households can often obtain
credit from family or friends. “Informal" B-instruments play a vital role in developing
countries, but are hampered by major limitations. Firstly, if losses are heavy, solidarity
networks may not be able to compensate. Secondly, given that solidarity networks
April 2013 / Managing food price instability in developing countries /©AFD [ ]
[ 80 ] Another reason why economic actors trade risks is their different risk aversions. Here, hedging instruments 
allow risks to be transferred to actors who are the least risk-averse (and this improves risk allocation).
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often consist of households living in the same region and sharing the same activities,
a large number of the network's households may be affected at the same time by a
price drop or a poor harvest. Thirdly, households may find it very difficult to continue
asking their social networks for help if they have already been unable to pay back
previous credit (or respond to aid received by counter-gifts). In other words, their
social capital may be exhausted by repeated crises. “Formal" B-instruments are there-
fore needed to complement "informal" B-instruments. 
Formal B-instruments may be divided into three categories depending on whether
they act ex ante or ex post and, for ex ante instruments, whether they protect from
price risk or production risk. It should also be noted that “mixed" instruments can be
used to protect both against price risk and production risk. This is in particular the
case for revenue insurance. But this instrument is particularly complicated to imple-
ment in developing countries given the information it requires about farm accounts.
For this reason, it is not included in the table below. 
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6Table Types of B-instruments 






B1. Forward contracts 
B2. Futures
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Forward and futures contracts are contracts by which actors undertake to sell a
defined quantity of a given product at a future date. Most of the time these contracts
do not lead to any actual deliveries, they simply allow buyers and sellers to hedge
price risk. It is of course possible for a supplier and his customer to agree a price
today for a transaction that will take place several months hence. This guarantees the
sale price for one actor and the purchase price for the other. The difficulty lies in
bringing together business partners who have compatible expectations. A buyer
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who expects prices to rise must find a seller i) who possesses the desired quality and
quantity of product ii) who expects prices to fall sufficiently to be willing to agree
with the buyer a future price that is acceptable to both parties. This difficulty is of
the same nature as that in barter transactions where he who wishes to sell A to buy B
must find a business partner with symmetrical needs. Like for bartering , the solution
lies in disconnecting the two transactions. 
This is precisely the role of forward contracts and futures. Let us take the example
of maize producers looking to hedge price risk. In t0, they sell futures contracts by
which they undertake to deliver a given quantity of maize on a given date. These
contracts virtually never result in a delivery as producers prefer to deliver their maize to
their regular customers. At term, the producers clear their position by buying similar
futures contracts. If the price has indeed fallen, then the producers receive from the
futures market the difference between the price of the futures contracts at t0 and
that at term. This payment thus offsets the loss they suffer on the physical market
due to the price drop. If on the other hand the price has increased, it is the producers
who must pay the difference to the futures market. This offsets the gain they make
on the physical market.
Two types of contract are used: over-the-counter (OTC) contracts or forward contracts,
and futures contracts traded on organized markets. There are two main differences
between them. Firstly, the negotiation is bilateral for forward contracts, whereas it is
multilateral for futures (on futures markets, all offers and bids are brought into
connection). Secondly, futures, unlike forward contracts, are standardized: all contracts
concern the same volume of goods (e.g. 100 tonnes for maize on the SAFEX), and
the possible terms (generally five per year) are fixed. Forward contracts correspond
more closely to the interests of both parties (the advantage of being “tailor-made").
Futures on the other hand have two advantages over forward contracts. First, they
allow actors to more easily clear their position prior to term because the fact that
the contracts are standardized makes it far easier to find a counterpart. Second, the
risk of defaulting on futures is virtually nil as the futures markets are accompanied
by clearing houses. A (rapidly growing) intermediary category is also used: standardized
OTC contracts. Like conventional OTC contracts, they result from a bilateral nego-
tiation, but, like futures, they use the standards in force on organized markets. The main
advantage in this standardization is the capacity to use the clearing houses that come
with organized markets.
Forward contracts and futures are therefore means for producers to hedge against
price drops. The same mechanism is used, but in the other direction, for buyers who
April 2013 / Managing food price instability in developing countries /©AFD [ ]
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SAFEX: an African success story 
The South African Futures Exchange (SAFEX) was founded in 1988 at the initiative of
31 banks and financial institutions. It initially dealt only in currency and financial products.
SAFEX's agricultural division was set up in 1995. The first futures contracts for white
and yellow maize were introduced in 1997, and options on futures were subsequently
introduced. Large numbers of storage locations were registered for the purpose of
delivering commodities, using “SAFEX silo certificates” (i.e. warehouse receipts). Call and
put options for agricultural products date back to March 2008. The main commodities
traded by SAFEX are maize (white and yellow), wheat, sunflower seeds and soybeans.
The standard lot sizes per contracts are 100 tonnes of maize, and 50 tonnes of wheat
and sunflower seeds and 25 tonnes of soybeans. In 2008, SAFEX traded futures and
options contracts representing about 216 million tonnes of commodities, i.e. about 18
times South Africa’s typical annual production of the relevant crops. Only a small and
continually declining portion of these contracts end with physical delivery. 
Can the success of this South-African experience be repeated elsewhere in Africa? Not
easily. South Africa is a very specific case as its grain production is dominated by about
30,000 large-scale, cash-crop farmers, and about 70% of the storage capacity is provided
by two large silo operators. Other African exchanges have so far only developed spot
contracts.
8Box
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are looking to hedge against price rises (they buy futures). The disadvantage that
comes with this instrument is that although it protects producers (or buyers) from
price decreases (or increases), it also prevents them from benefiting from increases
(or decreases). This is why call and put options were developed. 
Call and put options are instruments that provide the right, but not the obligation,
to undertake a transaction in the future at a price set in advance. For example, a put
option gives its holder the right to sell a certain volume at price p* established in
advance. Let us consider the case of a maize producer. He hedges by buying a put
option. If the price falls below p*, the producer exercises the option and sells at p*.
Otherwise, he sells at the market price. The put option therefore allows sellers to
guarantee themselves a floor price. Likewise, the call option allows buyers to guarantee
themselves a ceiling price. 
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An example of agricultural insurance in Africa: 
the Nigerian Agricultural Insurance Corporation (NAIC)
The Nigerian Agricultural Insurance Corporation (NAIC) is fully owned by the Federal
Government of Nigeria. It was established in 1987 to provide cover to Nigeria's farmers
for production risk stemming from natural hazards. It ensures a prompt payment of
appropriate indemnity (compensation) sufficient to keep the farmer in business after
suffering a loss. This initiative was taken in response to the unwillingness of conven-
tional insurers to accept agricultural risks, which they considered too high.
The scheme began with the underwriting of two crops (rice and maize) and two live-
stock commodities (cattle and poultry). It gradually broadened its scope to cover
most crops and animals, including export products such as cacao, tea, coffee and
rubber. The corporation provides up to 50% subsidy on the premiums, from grants by
the State. The insurance of other agricultural activities (e.g. fisheries, horticulture) is
currently being proposed as a pilot project. NAIC is also diversifying its portfolio by
offering other types of insurance (fire, car, etc.). The corporation has, since inception,
issued almost a million policies with the volume of risk amounting to about 100 billion
naira (more than €486 million), thereby earning the corporate a premium sum of
about 2 billion naira (€9.7 million). 
9Box
Gerdien Meijerink and Kees Burger
Source: NAIC 2009, http://nigerianagricinsurance.com
Another way to hedge price risk is through pooling. Here, different economic actors
get together in order to pool their risks. As we already mentioned above, a typical
example of pooling is collective commercialization through a cooperative, with the
cooperative paying each of its members the average price obtained. 
Two instruments may be used against production risk (induced by natural hazards):
conventional crop insurance and index-based insurance (that is often “weather index-
based" insurance). 
Crop insurance serves to protect producers from the variability of yields caused by
the effects of natural hazards. Payments (and premiums) are calculated on the basis
of individual yields in the past. In practice, for reasons that will be explained below,
private insurance companies are reluctant to offer crop insurance. Therefore, any
development of this tool requires either subsidies (see the example of the USA), or
implementation by the State (see the example of Nigeria, box 9).
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Weather insurance aims to overcome the obstacles that block the development of
conventional crop insurance. This is made possible by the fact that weather insurance,
for reasons that will become apparent later, is less risky for insurance companies than
crop insurance. If covered by a weather insurance policy, farmers receive payments
if a given climatic index (generally rainfall-related) falls below or climbs above a pre-
defined threshold. Weather insurance belongs to the “indexed insurance" group of
policies. The reference index may concern non-climatic variables such as vegetation
indices (estimated using satellite pictures) or average yield for a given crop in the
region where the insured producer operates (Halcrow, 1949). But in actual practice,
all attempts made to develop indexed insurance almost exclusively concern weather
insurance. Weather insurance is only in its infancy in developing countries. Simulation
studies have for example been conducted for loans indexed on monsoons in India,
for cattle insurance in Mongolia and for insurance indexed on rainfall in Morocco.
Pilot projects based on drought indices have also been developed in Ethiopia, Malawi,
Tanzania and Kenya (Banks, 2002; Chambers and Quiggin, 2002; Hess, 2003; Hess
and Syroka, 2005; Skees et al., 2001; Skees and Enkh-Amgalan, 2002; Osgood et al.,
2007; AFD-GRET, 2011).
Credit can be a very effective instrument for ex post income smoothing , i.e. when a
shock occurs (Anderson, 2003; Devereux, 2001; IFAD, 2003). Credit firstly acts directly:
agricultural households can borrow money to buy food when their income falls. It
also acts more indirectly: agricultural households often use credit to buy the inputs
they need for the activities that provide them with (part of) their income.
Here it should be underlined that these B-instruments may be used not only at a
household scale but also for entire countries. For instance, instability may create
balance of payments problems for certain vulnerable importing countries if soaring
international prices or a poor domestic harvest cause the import bill to rise suddenly.
The governments of these countries can use B-instruments to reduce this risk: if the
country has protected itself from a poor harvest by weather insurance or from soaring
international prices by a call option, it will receive financial compensation (in foreign
currency) that maintains its balance of payments. The same applies if the country is
granted credit facilities in “crisis" situations (the IMF procures such credit facilities).
[ ] ©AFD / Managing food price instability in developing countries / April 2013
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2.2.3. Complementarity and substitutability relations between 
B-instruments 
B-instruments, considered together, form a coherent set of tools and offer many possi-
bilities to capitalize on their complementarities and substitutabilities. 
The instruments that hedge different types of risk (price risk and production risk
stemming from natural hazards) are complementary. Those that hedge against price
rises (e.g. call options) are complementary to those that hedge against price falls (e.g.
put options). Another form of complementarity involves instruments that act at
different scales. For instance, a company that provides crop insurance or microcredit
on a national or regional scale can in turn obtain cover from a company that operates
on a larger scale, and thus hedges risks that are correlated at a local scale. 
By contrast, B-instruments that hedge the same risk are substitutable. Their perfor-
mance can be compared to determine which is the most effective in a given situation.
For instance, different simulations have compared the effectiveness of futures and
options (Faruqee et al., 1997; Dana et al., 2006; Sarris et al., 2011). Various levels of
protection may sometimes be offered. Risk-averse actors can therefore opt for the
most protective (but more expensive) insurance policies or for put options that
guarantee a higher floor price (or for call options that guarantee a lower ceiling price).
To a certain extent, B-instruments that exert effects at different points in the risk
chain are often in part substitutable. For example, in situations of natural instability,
instruments that procure financial compensation for climatic hazards (DCl) are in
part substitutable with those that hedge against production variability (DQ), price
instability (DP) and revenue instability (that involves DQ, DP and the correlation
between the two). Some degree of substitutability is also noted between these ex ante
hedging instruments and credit that acts ex post to prevent revenue variability (DR)
from affecting the level and variability of investment (I and DI) and consumption (C
and DC) (see figure 16). However, its should be noted that credit also has comple-
mentarity relations with ex ante hedging instruments as access to credit is facilitated by
their use (banks are more willing to lend money to farmers who have crop insurance). 
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Source: author.
DCl : climatic hazards
DQ : production variability (at the household level)
DP : price instability
Corr (P ; Q) : (negative) correlation between price level and harvest volume (at the household level)
DR : household revenue instability
C : household consumption level
DC : variability of household consumption 
I : household investment level
DI : variability of household  investment
Interactions between production risk, 
price risk and revenue risk, 
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These complementarity and substitutability relations lend B-instruments very inter-
esting properties and the full set of B-instruments therefore allows actors to hedge
both production and price risk, and against price rises and price falls (symmetry). In
theory, B-instruments allow economic actors to choose the combination (protection
level, cost) they deem optimal for them, i.e. they provide flexibility. Finally, these ins-
truments provide a certain degree of predictability to the extent that actors know in
advance how much compensation they will receive if a certain crisis arises, and this
without causing distortions given that, in principle, B-instruments do not affect prices. 
On paper, these symmetry, flexibility and predictability properties make B-instruments
highly effective. But in practice, things are far more complicated: many B-instruments
are lacking or are inaccessible to DC market actors, or offer only partial protection from
risk (2.2.5). This prevents DC producers, processors and traders from capitalizing on
the complementarity and substitutability relations between B-instruments and removes
a large number of their advantages. 
2.2.4. Complementarity and substitutability relations between 
B-instruments and A-, C- and D-instruments
B-instruments have complementarity relations with all the other categories of instru-
ments by completing them or – in theory – boosting their development.
Complementarity with D-instruments in risk hedging
We have already mentioned the complementarity between B-instruments and
D-instruments (1.2.1) as these two instrument categories are intended for different
actors. B-instruments are more aimed at producers, processors and traders whereas
D-instruments are primarily for consumers. Also, B-instruments are aimed at actors who
are able to pay for risk hedging , whereas D-instruments are in principle reserved for
poor, vulnerable households. Some experts have also argued that these two instrument
categories are intended for different types of risks, with “wild" (high and non probabi-
lizable) risk requiring recourse to D-instruments (Cordier and Debar, 2004). 
The same remarks could be made on a country scale. Private risk hedging instruments
appear to be quite pertinent in emerging countries and maybe in the more wealthy
DCs. The other DCs will require either assistance from the international community
to enhance their access to B-instruments (see IMF payment facilities), or D-instru-
ments to help vulnerable importing countries stabilize their food imports bill (1.6.1.).
It can also be imagined that the range of countries with access to such public support
(D-instruments or subsidies for B-instruments) could be broadened in the event of
a particularly severe shock.
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Complementarity with A-instruments 
B-instruments in theory have the capacity to harmoniously complete A-instruments.
Firstly, they in principle compensate for one of the negative effects of developing
A-instruments: loss of the natural insurance that protects farmers. They also, in theory,
have the potential to boost the development of A-instruments by stimulating pro-
ducer, processor and trader investment, or by making the market more transparent.
Compensating for the loss of natural insurance caused by the development 
of A-instruments
The development of A-instruments in principle strengthens spatial arbitrage and
this ultimately leads to a tighter connection between the different production and
consumption areas on a national, regional or international scale. This is generally a good
thing as long-distance trade ensures that deficits in some areas are compensated by
surpluses in others, and thus avoids localized price rises and falls. However, this price
stabilizing effect does not always stabilize producer revenues for in the absence of
long-distance trade, the price in a production area correlates negatively with harvest
volume. If the harvest is poor, prices rise, whereas if they are low, this means the
harvest was good. Producers are therefore protected by a sort of natural insurance
with the price risk and the production risk compensating one for the other. Growth
in long-distance trade means that prices are harmonized on a large scale and pro-
duction drops in a given area are no longer compensated by higher prices. Loss of this
natural insurance may exacerbate the instability of producer revenues (Newbery
and Stiglitz, 1984) and their recourse to price risk and harvest risk hedging instruments
is therefore more useful. Growth in A-instruments may therefore increase the use-
fulness of B-instruments.
The “multiplier effects” of B-instruments 
B-instruments can in principle be used by market actors to protect themselves from
income drops caused by harvest variability and price instability. This theoretically will
stimulate investment in production and storage, and in infrastructure and market
institutions. If enough producers and traders use B-instruments, this will have a
stabilizing effect on prices, from which everyone would benefit (see figure 16: I and
DI have a stabilizing effect on DQ and DP). But this multiplier effect depends on a
certain critical mass being reached in terms of the development and use of B-instru-
ments, and this mass is virtually never reached in DCs. Looking back into the past,
not one single example can be found of a green revolution being stimulated by the
massive use of B-instruments. History tends to show that it is only once a country
has accomplished a structural transformation of its agriculture that its producers
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can use B-instruments. The practical scope of this multiplier effect is in actual fact
extremely limited, even though the mechanism remains theoretically possible. 
B-instruments may have a stabilizing effect on prices through another channel: by
providing information. Here, futures markets generate information inasmuch that the
price of futures is an aggregate indicator of expectations for the price in the future.
This works as follows. Those who expect prices to fall sell the futures contracts that
committed them to delivering a given quantity on a given date (they are said to be
“short"). At the same time, those who expect prices to rise buy the futures contracts
(they are “long"). As the market establishes an equilibrium between supply and demand
for futures, the equilibrium price is an aggregate indicator of all expectations for the
price in the future. Economic actors use this indicator as a guide, particularly for
temporal arbitrage (choosing the right moment to buy and sell, and taking decisions
about storage). This “price discovery" function of futures markets helps make markets
more transparent, and therefore more stable .[ 81 ]
Complementarity with C-instruments and D-instruments: 
reducing the passing on of instability to the State budget 
State policies implemented in the face of price instability may affect its budget, and this
applies regardless of whether these policies are stabilizing (C-instruments) or protective
(D-instruments). For example, when the State lowers import tariffs in response to soaring
international prices, this reduces its revenue. The instability has thus been passed from
prices to the State budget. The State can use B-instruments to handle this problem, with
the cost of some public interventions being then partially compensated by the money
received from insurance companies or futures markets. 
However, very little experience has been acquired in this field and to the best of our
knowledge is currently restricted to three examples: the purchase and use of a call
option for maize by the Malawi government in 2005 (see box 10), the use by the WFP
of weather insurance in Ethiopia in 2006, and the Mexican government's purchase of
maize futures in December 2010. 
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[ 81 ] Even if, as we shall see later, this “price discovery" function runs the risk of creating speculative bubbles.
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Use of B-instruments by governments:
Malawi's experience (2005-2006)
In response to the 2005-2006 deficit, the Malawi government purchased a call option
from a South-African bank. The option gave it the right, but not the obligation, to buy
a maximum of 60,000 tonnes of maize deliverable to Malawi at a price fixed at 283
USD per tonne. The premium was 9%. The bank protected itself by hedging maize price
risk on SAFEX. The operation proved to be most profitable as local prices rose to 50
to 90 USD above the option exercise price (against a premium of only 25.50 USD per
tonne). At the same time, Zambia had to import at far higher prices. This success
story shows that the Malawi Government could advantageously use this financial
instrument even though it could only partially hedge the risk (as the price of maize on
the domestic market in Malawi is only partially correlated with its price on the SAFEX).
The question nevertheless arises as to whether this experience can be repeated. Since
2005, no government has attempted to imitate Malawi. And Malawi itself has not
repeated the experience! Perhaps it should not be forgotten that in 2005 the operation
received considerable technical support from the World Bank and that the cost of the
option was covered by the UK Department for International Development (DfID).
10Box
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Sources: Dana et al. (2006); Dana et al. (2007); CRMG (2008).
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2.2.5. The difficult emergence of B-instruments
Despite their potential benefits, B-instruments are very seldom used in developing
countries. For example, the only futures market in Africa for agricultural products is
that located in South Africa (the SAFEX). Agricultural insurance is virtually unknown,
except at the State's initiative (as in Nigeria with the NAIC, see box 9). Several pilot
projects of a limited scope are nevertheless ongoing with support from the World
Bank or other donors. Also, when such instruments do exist, they are often seldom
used. A typical example is the contract set up for rice on the Agricultural Futures
Exchange of Thailand (AFET White Rice 5%) that often has no price quotes because
of a lack of trade. This failure to develop and use B-instruments contrasts strikingly with
the immense hope that was placed in these instruments following the liberalization
of DC agricultures (see box 11). We will now describe the obstacles that hinder the
development and use of B-instruments, and solutions that could be used to overcome
these obstacles.
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The paradox of “collars"
In the 1990s, a few years after international commodity agreements (ICAs) had been
abandoned, some experts were predicting that price-risk management instruments
(futures, options) were about to undergo spectacular growth . One particular instru-
ment appeared to have a very promising future: collars (Plaisance, 1995). A collar is a
combination of a put option and a call option. In theory, this instrument is able to
provide market actors with flexible and almost free protection against price instability
since the floor price (the put option strike price) and the ceiling price (call option strike
price) can be fixed in such a manner that the collar costs virtually nothing (intuitively,
in order to benefit from a floor price, the producer accepts to put up with a ceiling
price). It is also possible to offer several collars of different amplitudes in order to best
satisfy different actors (the most risk-averse producers can choose “tight" collars that
offer the highest floor prices, but lower ceiling prices). Collars therefore appeared
to be able to provide what public stocks had promised (a band within which price
fluctuations could be confined) without the inconvenience of these public schemes
(their sometimes elevated cost and their rigidity, the floor price and ceiling price being
the same for all market actors). More than 20 years later, it must be recognized that
this miraculous tool has not seen the spectacular development that was expected. 
11Box
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Main obstacles to the emergence and use of B-instruments
The failure to develop agricultural insurance can mainly be explained by the high risk
involved for insurance companies. These companies calculate probabilities when
estimating the risks they run. To do this, they need to know what probability there is of
natural hazards leading to poor harvests. But the information necessary to calculate
these probabilities is not always available in DCs. Also, three factors tend to heighten
this risk: adverse selection, moral hazard, and the systemic nature of the risks run by
producers. Adverse selection is the expression of the fact that those producers who
run the greatest risks are more likely to seek insurance. The risk run by the insurance
company is therefore increased. Moral hazard means that insured producers may
make less effort to protect their harvest from bad weather, pests or disease, for if
problems arise, their losses will be compensated by the insurance company. Risk may
be said to be systemic when producers in a given area suffer poor harvests at the
same time because all are affected by the same natural hazards (drought, attacks by
locusts, etc.). In these situations of correlated risks, it is very difficult for insurance
companies to diversify risks.
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The failure to develop futures markets can be explained by the fact that, to operate,
these instruments require fairly sophisticated and already functioning market insti-
tutions such as grading systems, warehouse receipt systems and commodity exchanges
for spot contracts. But, as previously mentioned, the emergence of these A-instruments
also runs into many obstacles (2.1.5).
In addition, even when B-instruments are in place, they are sometimes seldom used.
For instance, DC producers and traders very seldom use current futures markets
such as the Chicago Board of Trade (for wheat and maize), the South African SAFEX
(for maize) or the AFET in Thailand (for rice). This is partly due to the cost and technical
complexity of B-instruments (futures, options). Another factor involved is basis risk.
Because of differences in quality and geographic situation, the prices in force in a given
country only partially correlate with those on the futures markets (Larson et al., 2005;
Byerlee et al., 2006), and this reduces the protection afforded by futures and options.
The effectiveness of risk pooling systems is reduced if the risks run are correlated in
time or space. Also, their advantages are sometimes reduced by the administrative
costs of collective commercialization (Anderson, 2003). Sometimes B-instruments
are in place but many economic actors are denied access to them. This in particular
is the case for credit, for which many producers are unable to provide the required
collateral.
Facilitating the development of B-instruments
Solutions reside in i) adapting B-instruments to match the needs of DC economic
actors, ii) creating new, more efficient instruments or iii) capitalizing on the comple-
mentarities between instruments (particularly through reinsurance).
B-instruments can be adapted by their downscaling. For instance, microcredit is better
suited to the needs of DC producers, traders and consumers than is conventional
bank credit. In the same manner, efforts may be made to develop systems of micro-
insurance. 
New B-instruments could be created to overcome the limits of the old. This for instance
is the case for weather-indexed insurance that reduces the adverse selection problems
posed by conventional agricultural insurance (Miranda, 1991; Skees et al., 1997). Also,
as producers cannot influence the factor that results in indemnification payments
(e.g. rainfall), the problem of moral hazard no longer arises. In addition, this type of
system is subject to few administrative costs (it does not require the inspection of
individual farms). However, weather insurance has its own limitations. Firstly, it only
partially hedges risk since harvest volume for a given producer only partially correlates
[ ] ©AFD / Managing food price instability in developing countries / April 2013
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with the weather index: this is the correlation risk (Sarris, 2008). Another limitation
stems from how the index is constructed: it needs a great deal of historical data that
are not always available in DCs. The index must also be measured objectively and
precisely, and must be available in real time. 
Complementarities between B-instruments offer the opportunity to employ certain
B-instruments to boost the development or use of other B-instruments. For example,
agricultural insurance may facilitate producer access to credit. But it is above all through
reinsurance that complementarities come into their own. Reinsurance means that
suppliers of B-instruments can themselves use B-instruments to protect themselves.
This is for instance the case when an insurance company or a microfinance institution
that operates locally seeks protection by recourse to weather insurance. It is thus
able to manage the systemic risk of a natural hazard affecting all the producers in
the area where it operates (Bielza et al., 2006). This obviously needs the presence of
insurance companies operating on a far larger scale such that they can diversify the
weather risk. In a similar vein, a trader who offers producers contracts that fix prices
several months in advance can seek protection on the futures markets. The same
reasoning can be extended to States. These provide producers and consumers with
protection (through C-instruments and D-instruments) but run the risk of endangering
their budget. They may thus manage this risk by recourse to B-instruments (see the
example of Malawi, box 10). 
In all cases, some public support is required if B-instruments are to be promoted. This
support may take the form of technical assistance or even subsidies (see the example
of pilot projects supported by the World Bank's Commodity Risk Management
Group, CRMG, 2008). The question then arises of how to allocate public funds between
B-instruments and the other instrument categories. 
2.2.6. The advantages, limitations and perverse effects 
of B-instruments
The advantages of B-instruments
The main advantage of B-instruments lies in their complementarity with other instru-
ment categories. We have already seen that B- and D-instruments are complementary
in terms of type of user and type of risk, with B-instruments being more suited to
major economic players and moderate, probabilizable risk, whereas D-instruments are
more appropriate for small actors, consumers and "wild" risk (1.2.1). B-instruments
are also complementary with A-instruments since B-instruments may promote their
development through two “multiplier effects”: by stimulating producer and trader
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investments in production and market infrastructure and institutions and by increasing
market transparency (thanks to the price discovery function of futures markets).
Finally, B-instruments are complementary with C-instruments and D-instruments
insofar that government use of B-instruments may prevent public interventions
from generating instabilities in State revenue and expenditures.
The limitations of B-instruments
B-instruments have many limitations. They are difficult to introduce, and when they do
exist only big producers and traders have access to them, not consumers or small actors.
Moreover, use of these instruments is hobbled by their technical complexity and cost.
Their use may nevertheless expand in the future given that the emergence of new
instruments (such as weather insurance) and the reinsurance possibilities they offer
could boost the use of other B-instruments. Caution is nonetheless required: B-instru-
ments will at best be used only by a small proportion of producers and traders. The
critical mass required to generate a multiplier effect will in all likelihood not be reached. 
The perverse effects of B-instruments
B-instruments may also generate perverse effects that can increase price instability. 
For instance, crop insurance may encourage producers to opt for higher risk produc-
tion techniques (e.g. varieties more sensitive to weather hazards). Other B-instruments
may to a certain extent pose the same type of problem (for the case of futures markets,
see Newbery, 1987). In these cases, the development of B-instruments can exacerbate
price instability.
Futures markets, on the other hand, are liable to create speculative bubbles. We have
already seen that the price of futures is an aggregate indicator of all expectations for
the price in the future. This indicator is in principle a good thing in that it serves as
a guide for economic actors, but it can also lead to the emergence of speculative
bubbles. If the price of futures rises, market participants may be tempted to revise
their own expectations upward (thus following the dominant market opinion), and
therefore buy futures, which drives the price up. Price rises therefore tend to engender
additional rises, which can lead to speculative bubbles. The risk of speculative bubbles
is therefore intrinsic to futures markets: this is the price to pay for the advantages these
markets offer (hedging price risk, price discovery). 
The risk of speculative bubbles is accentuated by the arbitrage of “non-commercial"
operators, i.e. those not involved in physical transactions. These practice arbitrage
between agricultural products (“ags"), energy products and securities. The strategy
of these operators is to diversify risk by managing a portfolio of futures for different
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products whose prices are uncorrelated. But their arbitrage leads to bubbles spreading
from one product to another. For example, in times of crisis on the securities markets,
operators may be tempted to switch to “ags". But their buying causes prices to rise
on agricultural commodity futures markets and this may lead to the formation of
speculative bubbles. The trading of indices based on baskets of energy and agricultural
commodities may also encourage the spread of bubbles from energy markets to
agricultural commodity markets .[ 82 ] The risk of speculative bubbles may be reduced
by making futures market operators less responsive to price movements. This can be
achieved by quantitative limits (position limits on non-commercial operators) or taxes
(Tobin type taxes on futures transactions). 
Here it should also be specified that price variations on futures markets are in general
automatically passed on to physical transactions since prices on the futures markets
are generally used as a reference in international trade: what importers and exporters
negotiate is a (positive or negative) differential with regard to the price on the futures
market. Speculative bubbles developing on the futures markets thus cause price insta-
bility for agricultural commodities traded on international markets. 
2.2.7.  What can we achieve with B-instruments? 
In conclusion, what must States and donors do with B-instruments? The considerations
given above lead us to make three recommendations:
1. B-instruments should be pushed to their limits, i.e. their development and use should
be promoted. The development of B-instruments often requires public support
and may involve direct management (see box 9 for the example of the NAIC in
Nigeria), either by subsidies or simply by providing the necessary public goods (e.g.
development of a climate index). But the approach adopted must be realistic
and consists, for example, in encouraging the development of micro B-instruments
(reinsured by B-instruments operating on a larger scale). With regard to futures mar-
kets, this consists in advancing step by step: futures markets can only emerge after a
long process of market modernization (they can only be envisaged when preceded
by grading systems, warehouse receipt systems and commodity exchanges for spot
contracts, cf. 2.1.5). The use of B-instruments can be supported by training (often
required given the complexity of these instruments) and subsidies. But the opportu-
nity cost of the public money invested to support the development or use of
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[ 82 ] This in particular is the case of the Standard & Poors - Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (S&P-GSCI) and 
Dow Jones – AIG Commodity Index (DJ-AIG). Agricultural commodities account for a small percentage of 
the value of these indexes. Changes in the prices of these indexes are therefore due primarily to changes in 
energy prices, but these changes affect the value of the agricultural commodity futures.
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B-instruments should also be considered. The stabilizing effect on producer or con-
sumer income could doubtless be greater were this money to be invested in the
three other instrument categories.
2. B-instruments should be used to counter the public expenditures instability that
springs from price instability management policies based on C- and D-instruments.
This State use of B-instruments often requires external technical support, as illustrat-
ed by the case of Malawi (see box 10). Given that little experience has been acquired
in such matters, this approach should first be tested through pilot projects before
large-scale implementation is envisaged. 
3. The perverse effects of B-instruments should be reduced. This consists in particular
of encouraging weather insurance rather than crop insurance which may have the
effect of leading producers to be less careful when protecting their crops, thus
increasing price instability. Futures markets also need to be regulated to decrease
the probability of speculative bubbles. This regulation could take various forms, e.g.
by imposing position limits on non commercial operators or by taxing transactions
(through a Tobin type tax). These efforts to regulate the world's different agricultural
commodities futures markets could be facilitated by international coordination
(see 1.6.). 
Altogether, B-instruments should be encouraged, but their potential should not
be over-estimated, i.e. they should not be a key part of the scheme. B-instruments
should account for only a small proportion of the money invested in managing price
instability. Contrary to the recommendations of the “optimal strategy" (see 1.2.1.),
B-instruments should play only a secondary role, serving to complement the other
instrument categories. 
[ ] ©AFD / Managing food price instability in developing countries / April 2013
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2.3. C-instruments: necessary to guarantee food security 
and stimulate green revolutions 
Back in the time when the “optimal strategy" was shaping all thinking on how food
price instability should be managed, C-instruments were simply taboo. But since the
2008 crisis, they have at least in part been rehabilitated. The idea that public inter-
ventions should be implemented to stabilize prices has been considered as absurd
ever since the 1980s. Did not Newbery and Stiglitz (1981) demonstrate that price
stabilization runs the risk of reducing social welfare? Did not the lapse or collapse of
the International Commodity Agreements (dropped in the 1980s) confirm that it is
impossible to stabilize prices in the long term, at least at an international level? Some
experts nevertheless continued to defend stabilization either for food prices on DC
domestic markets (P. Timmer), or for agricultural markets in general (J.-M. Boussard).
And, since the 2008 crisis, the virtual consensus against C-instruments has been
seriously shaken. Testimony to this is the fact that mainstream economists working
for international organizations have suggested that C-instruments should be used to
reduce the instability of international grain prices (Von Braun and Torero, 2008, 2009a
and 2009b; Lin, 2008; Von Braun, Lin and Torero, 2009). The topic today is once again
open to debate. But C-instruments are still controversial, with some economists
underlining how the perverse effects of public interventions can in certain cases
increase price instability (Chapoto and Jayne, 2009). 
We will first look at the rationale of C-instruments. We will then describe C-instruments
in detail and the characteristics that set them apart one from the other. We will then
devote the next two sections to complementarity and substitutability relations, firstly
between C-instruments, then with the instruments in the other categories. We will then
address the question of the obstacles hindering the use of C-instruments. Finally, we
will outline the advantages, limitations and perverse effects of C-instruments before
drawing conclusions on the role they should be given in the food price instability
management scheme.
2.3.1. The rationale of C-instruments
What can public authorities do to stabilize prices? One approach is to fix prices in
an authoritarian manner (administered prices, price control). This is not a good solution
as measures such as these often cause disequilibria (excess supply, or even worse,
deficient supply). 
Another approach is to render the demand for food staples more sensitive to price
movements. Let us consider the case where there is a deficit in supply. If demand
April 2013 / Managing food price instability in developing countries /©AFD [ ]
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falls sharply when prices rise, then a moderate price rise will suffice to restore the
equilibrium between supply and demand. But, given that we are talking here about
food staples in DCs, this is neither possible nor desirable. One of the aims of price
stabilization is precisely to prevent any contraction of household demand for food.
It is only when these goods are employed for other usages than human food that
more elastic demand may be desirable. This is the case when food products are
used for biofuels or, to a certain extent, to feed animals. However, the question of
biofuels does not yet often arise in developing countries .[ 83 ]
The third, last and only pertinent approach consists in regulating supply by compen-
sating for deficits or absorbing surpluses. This is precisely the rationale of C-instruments.
2.3.2. The different C-instruments 
C-instruments therefore aim to stabilize prices by regulating the supply. This can be
done through action on the different components of the supply: i) production, ii)
private stocks, iii) public stocks iv) trade with other countries (imports and exports). For
each of these components, action can be taken through measures affecting prices
(taxes or subsidies) or quantities. C-instruments may thus be classified as follows:
[ ] ©AFD / Managing food price instability in developing countries / April 2013
7Table Types of C-instruments









C1. Variable taxes 
and subsidies on inputs 
or production
C3. Variable taxes and   
subsidies  on consumption
C5. Use of public stocks: purchases, sales, free distribution 
C6. Fixed or variable taxes 
and subsidies on imports 
and exports 
Source: author.
C2. Variable quotas 
on inputs or production 
C4. Requisitions
C7. Fixed or variable 
quantitative restrictions 
on imports and exports 
(bans, quotas, licenses)
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[ 83 ] The main food products used to produce biofuels are maize (almost exclusively in the USA), rapeseed (above all 
in the European Union) and sugar (mainly in Brazil). The use of food for biofuels production could be regulated 
in these countries by playing on mandates and subsidies (Wright, 2010). 
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2.3.3. Complementarity and substitutability relations between 
C-instruments
Table 7 can be used to analyze the complementarity and substitutability relations
between C-instruments. A column analysis can be used to compare instruments that
act through prices with those that act through quantities, whereas a line analysis
compares instruments based on the supply component they affect. Let us consider
these one after another. 
Acting through prices and/or through quantities (column analysis)
At first sight, it would appear that the instruments acting through prices and those
acting through quantities are substitutable. For example, imports may be reduced either
by using tariffs or quotas. The question then arises as to the comparative performance
of the two types of instruments. 
Generally speaking , instruments that act through prices should be preferred as they
have the advantage of being more transparent: they are often triggered in response
to price changes (if prices reach a floor or a ceiling), whereas quantitative measures
tend to be based on estimations of needs and availabilities. But prices are generally
public information whereas estimations of quantities require statistical data that are
unavailable to private actors and may be of doubtful quality. Such information may
also be manipulated as illustrated by the controversy surrounding grain balance
sheets in Sahel countries. Public interventions are therefore more predictable if they
are triggered by price changes. Furthermore, the effect of quantitative measures on
prices is more difficult to predict than that of subsidies or taxes. This has consequences
for policy-makers (who may less accurately anticipate the consequences of their
action), and also for private actors. Quantitative measures are therefore more likely
to depress private stocks (crowding out effect). 
Another advantage of using instruments that act through prices is their symmetry:
they are able to combat both price rises and price falls. When a reduction in taxes
proves insufficient, subsidies can always be brought into play. By contrast, the effec-
tiveness of quotas is limited by the fact that once all quotas have been removed, it is
impossible to further increase quantities. 
The main argument in favor of quotas lies in their practical feasibility. Experience has
shown that quantitative measures are less difficult to enforce than tax-based measures:
it is easier to monitor trucks and boats than the payment of a tax. An example of this is
provided by India which in October 2007 attempted to establish minimum export
April 2013 / Managing food price instability in developing countries /©AFD [ ]
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prices. As these prices were higher than those in force at the time on the international
market, this should in theory have stopped all exports. In actual fact, exporters were
able to get round the measure, and this so comprehensively that India in April 2008
announced that it was banning exports, which proved effective (Timmer, 2010a).
Another reason that could justify recourse to quotas lies in the symbolic reach of these
measures: the message sent by an export ban is very different from that conveyed
by a tax on exports. A ban sends the message that the State is looking to protect its
population from famine, whereas taxes on the other hand suggest that it is taking
advantage of a difficult situation to increase its tax revenues. 
However, it should here be specified that C-instruments which act through prices
and those which act through quantities may to some extent be complementary. For
example, subsidies may be introduced that are limited to a certain quantity. 
Acting on production, stocks and/or on foreign trade (line analysis)
Instruments that impact production, stocks and foreign trade are seemingly substitutable.
But, as we shall shortly see, they are also to a great extent complementary. We will
kick off by discussing the advantages and disadvantages of each of the different variable
targets for C-instruments (in terms of effectiveness, timeline, cost and perverse effects),
before returning to a discussion of their substitutability and complementarity. 
Some C-instruments aim to stimulate production when prices rise. This in particular is
the case for conjunctural input subsidy programs (activated only when prices soar) .[ 84 ]
It is doubtful that such programs are effective. Firstly, they are set up in an emergency
and may face logistic problems that compromise their effectiveness (see the stimulus
packages for rice production used by many West African countries in 2008). This pro-
blem may be resolved by setting up a structural scheme to subsidize inputs where
subsidies are increased in times of crisis (see Indian and Chinese schemes: OECD, 2009;
Dawe, 2010). Also, even when logistic problems are overcome, these programs may
not have the expected benefits: producers may resell the inputs or not use them in the
right manner. Or the weather may be unfavorable. Finally, even if these programs do
have the expected effect on production, this will only occur several months later.[ 85 ]
[ ] ©AFD / Managing food price instability in developing countries / April 2013
[ 84 ] We are dealing here with non-targeted and conjunctural input subsidy programs. As already mentioned 
above, targeted input subsidy programs are D-instruments (their aim is to maintain the production capacity 
of vulnerable households), whereas structural programs are A-instruments (their aim is to facilitate production
modernization). 
[ 85 ] This timeline can sometimes be reduced by expectations: if economic actors expect the coming year to provide
a bumper harvest, this encourages them to sell their stocks. This helps drive prices down before the new harvest 
hits the markets. 
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These conjunctural input subsidy programs also have another drawback: by ampli-
fying the supply response to price rises they may cause a cobweb effect .[ 86 ]
Altogether, it seems preferable to make input subsidies a structural instrument for the
promotion of agricultural modernization (A-instrument), rather than a conjunctural
tool to boost production in periods of deficit (C-instrument). Production therefore
does not appear to be an appropriate target for price stabilization policies.
The State may act by encouraging or discouraging the sale of private stocks. For
example, private stocks may be requisitioned but the mere possibility of such a measure
is likely to greatly discourage private storage (crowding out effect). The State must
therefore abstain from requisitioning stock, or only in extreme situations (major huma-
nitarian disasters). The State may also influence the selling price of private stocks by
manipulating taxes or subsidies on consumption. For instance, a temporary reduction
in VAT should in principle lead traders to decrease their selling prices (if the market
is competitive). But the measures necessary to counter price surges (VAT reductions,
subsidies) are very costly as they apply to all volumes consumed .[ 87 ] Also, their effects
are uncertain if there is no guarantee that traders will pass on the reduction to
consumers. Finally, private stocks cannot be relied upon to counter speculative bubbles
or panics as these situations are precisely characterized by private actors retaining
stocks. Private storage is not therefore an appropriate target for price stabilization
policies.
Interventions based on public stocks always have an effect on quantities, either by
reducing the quantity available on the domestic market (through purchases) or by
increasing it (through sales or free distributions). If, in addition, interventions take place
at a price that is different from that in force on the market, the action through quantities
is accompanied by an action through prices (e.g. free distributions, moderately priced
sales, etc.). 
A distinction here should be made between buffer stocks and emergency reserves.
Whereas the former aim to stabilize prices (C-instruments), the latter are used for
public interventions targeting vulnerable populations (D-instruments). This distinction
may in practice be difficult to make as certain countries build up buffer stocks (stig-
matized by the international community, at least until 2008) by passing them off as
emergency reserves. The two stock types serve very different purposes. Emergency
April 2013 / Managing food price instability in developing countries /©AFD [ ]
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[ 86 ] The same problem arises if, instead of providing conjunctural input subsidies, land reserves are built up that are 
only cropped when prices soar (following the proposal put forward by A. Sarris to stabilize international prices).
[ 87 ] It should be specified that should VAT be levied only on imports (as is the case for grain in certain West 
African countries), then changing VAT levels is equivalent to changing customs duties.
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reserves are in principle activated when early warning systems signal the risk of a
food crisis for a given region or social group. Early warning indicators are often built
by crossing data on food production, food prices, the price of assets that deficit
households can sell to buy food (e.g. small ruminants) and sometimes health data
(dispensary attendance levels). Sales or free distributions target vulnerable households
or regions. By contrast, buffer-stock interventions are untargeted and mainly guided
by changes in prices. The difference between these two public stock types is illustrated
by the example of Mali (see box 12). 
Public stocks also differ with regard to other parameters. Firstly, the scale on which
they are managed. This may be international, regional, national or local (see the case
of the cereal banks in Mali, box 12). Public stocks (particularly emergency reserves)
may be co-managed with donors through the dual signature principle (see box 21
for the example of the Programme de Restructuration du Marché Céréalier [PRMC –
Grain market restructuring program] in Mali). Another very important parameter is
the availability of sufficient working capital for rapid buying. Finally, the choice of which
products are used to make up the stock can prove crucial given that the different
grains may be imperfectly substitutable. For instance, in Sahel countries, stocks made
up of rice or millet will not have the same effect on the price of these grains: stabilizing
interventions will therefore concern different producers and consumers. Finally, the
size of stocks is obviously vital in their capacity to stabilize prices. However, in practice,
these may be very different from one country to another. Public stocks account for less
than 2% of grain production in Mali but have reached 30% some years in Zambia. 
[ ] ©AFD / Managing food price instability in developing countries / April 2013
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Public stocks offer two enormous advantages for price stabilization. First, they are
very effective: if large volumes are bought or sold, the effect on prices is certain.
Second, their effect on prices is immediate: it occurs as soon as grain is bought or
sold, sometimes before (simply announcing a purchase or sale is sufficient to affect
prices through market actor expectations).
The main drawback of public stocks is their cost. This stems from storage logistics
(warehouses or silos, security, phytosanitary treatments, risk of losses or deterioration)
to which should be added the financial cost of keeping a resource unused for several
months. For large stocks, the cost may be very high. But large stocks are precisely need-
ed in order: i) to mop up surpluses or make up for production deficits (in order to
deal with natural instability or the cobweb), ii) to disconnect the country temporarily
from the international market (in order to tackle imported instability) or iii) to control
speculative bubbles and panics. In addition, when grain is purchased or sold at the
same price across the territory (without considering transport costs), this may gene-
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The different types of public stocks: the case of Mali 
Mali has three types of public stocks. They differ in terms of purpose, time constituted,
governance, size and type of grain they contain (rice and/or millet-sorghum). The
oldest is the Stock National de Sécurité (SNS). Its purpose is not to regulate markets
but to serve solely for targeted interventions in high-risk areas. These interventions
take place only if recommended by the Early Warning System (EWS) and if agreed by
donors (dual signature). However as, for technical reasons, a third of the stock must
be renewed every year, this means that about 10,000 tonnes of millet-sorghum are
sold every year (during the lean period) and bought back (during the post-harvest
period). These “technical rotations” may have a stabilizing effect on prices. The two
other stocks (Stock d’Intervention de l’État [SIE] and cereal banks [CBs]) were set up in
the aftermath of the “locusts crisis" of 2005. Unlike the SNS, they are made up of
both millet-sorghum and rice and have the explicit aim of stabilizing prices. The SIE
can be used at the discretion of the Malian government and is about 30,000 tonnes in
size. Unlike the SNS, it does not have any working capital and must therefore obtain bank
credit before buying grains. This means that timelines between purchasing decisions
and effective implementation may be fairly long, often resulting in late purchases
(when prices have already risen). GBs are managed locally in the 703 municipalities
that make up the country. Decisions concerning the use of the 15,000 tonnes of grain
stored in all the GBs are therefore highly decentralized. Altogether, the SNS, SIE and
GBs account for less than 2% of the grain produced or consumed in the country.
12Box
F. Galtier 
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rate substantial distortions, prevent markets from functioning correctly and lead to
ineffective resource allocation. 
Public interventions may also take the form of the regulation of import or export flows
through taxes-subsidies or quantitative restrictions (licenses, quotas, prohibitions).
All these measures may be stable over time or variable. If stable, restrictions on
international trade make the country more sensitive to internal causes of instability
(natural hazards affecting production, cobweb, speculative bubbles on the domestic
market) but protect it from external sources of instability. Their combined effect on
price instability is therefore ambiguous and depends on the relative weights of internal
and external causes. 
In order to have a stabilizing effect under all circumstances, border measures should
be variable, and under such conditions can be very effective in stabilizing domestic
prices. This is obviously the case when the instability is imported: a variable tariff on
imports may for instance fully compensate for fluctuations in international prices
if indexed to the CAF price converted into local currency.[ 88 ] The same result may
to a certain extent be obtained by varying trade quotas. The effectiveness of such
measures is clearly illustrated by the fact that wheat prices in China and India have
been very stable over the last few years despite major fluctuations in international
prices (see figure 8). But variable measures on a country's borders may also be very
effective in controlling instability of internal origin, for example if national production
fluctuates because of weather hazards or cobweb dynamics. In fact, by regulating import
and export volumes, variable border measures can stabilize internal availabilities (1.3.2).
These measures are also a means to rapidly increase internal availabilities in order to
counter speculative bubbles and panics.
Here it should be specified that there is a world of difference between ad hoc changes
in tax levels or quantitative restrictions, and the use of indexed measures. The former
evolve in a discretionary manner whereas the latter evolve automatically by following
changes in a predefined indicator (generally the international price or the domestic
price). Indexed measures should therefore be preferred since ad hoc measures have
two drawbacks. First, they are unpredictable and may therefore generate a crowding
out effect: for example, the “threat" of lifting import tariffs may lead private actors
to store less, and this in turn may increase price instability. Second, ad hoc measures are
more difficult to “sell" politically. For instance, the decision to lift tariffs on imports may
[ ] ©AFD / Managing food price instability in developing countries / April 2013
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[ 88 ] Full compensation nevertheless requires the tariff to become negative (i.e. switches into a subsidy) if interna-
tional prices reach high levels.
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run into opposition from the producers' lobby. By contrast, an indexed tariff is more
balanced: producers may more readily accept a tariff reduction when international
prices rise if they are guaranteed that the tariff will be increased if international prices fall.
Altogether, we see that production and private stocks are not appropriate targets for
C-instruments, and that the most effective C-instruments are public stocks and variable
measures taken on borders to regulate import and export flows. 
Broadly speaking , these two instrument types may be considered as being substitu-
table, and this is further supported by the controversy surrounding their comparative
performance. Border measures are equivalent to using the international market as a
stock, and this lends such measures two valuable advantages. First, for “small" countries
(whose imports and exports account for only a small proportion of international
trade), the international market constitutes an almost limitless stock. Second, border
measures are less costly than public stocks since public stocks generate costs every year
(logistic costs and financial costs) whereas tariff exemptions or import subsidies only
have a cost when brought into use. 
But border measures in many situations may prove impossible, ineffective or costly.
This in particular is the case: i) if the good is non tradable and poorly substitutable
with tradable goods), ii) if the State finds it difficult to control its borders, iii) if the food
products import-export sector is not competitive (the risk here is that tariff reductions
or subsidies will not be passed on) ,[ 89 ] iv) if the country's import capacity is restricted
because of the low level of its foreign exchange reserves, v) if the country looking to
stabilize prices is “large" in the sense of the theory of international trade, [ 90 ] or vi) if
the country is landlocked. The respective advantages and costs of public stocks and
border controls are therefore very different depending on countries and products. In
addition, it should be underlined that border measures generate negative externalities
to the extent that they export instability onto the international market (we will return
to this point later, see 2.3.6).
It should also be underlined that public stocks and border measures may also prove
to be very complementary instruments and may thus be advantageously combined.
Public stocks present the advantage of having a direct and instantaneous effect
on prices. On the other hand, border measures are effective only if importers and
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[ 89 ] This problem arises in many African countries when the import of rice and maize is in the hands of a very 
small number of private actors.
[ 90 ] If this country's imports or exports account for a large proportion of international trade, the international market
no longer constitutes a limitless stock from which the country can draw what it lacks, or into which it can pour 
all its surpluses. The country is no longer a price-taker. Its imports, for example, drive up the international price. 
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exporters pass on tariff reductions or subsidies to their purchase or sale price. Their
effects may only be felt after a few weeks or a few months (the time necessary for
importers to obtain supplies and sell previously bought stocks). Public stocks may
therefore harmoniously complete a stabilization scheme that is mainly based on border
measures. In this case, public stocks are useful i) to prevent importers from capturing
rents by not passing on tariff reductions or subsidies and ii) to manage the problems
stemming from import timelines. Also, as public stocks are never enough to control
imported instability (1.3.2.), all stabilization schemes, even those primarily based on
public stocks, must include border measures.  
2.3.4. Complementarity and substitutability relations between 
C-instruments and A-, B- and D-instruments
Here in this section we will consider the complementarity and substitutability relations
between C-instruments and A-, B- and D-instruments.
C-instruments and A-instruments: good complementarity 
but a high risk of crowding out 
The effect of C-instruments on A-instruments is the subject of much controversy.
Some experts believe that C-instruments stimulate the development of A-instruments
whereas others consider that they supplant them. Both hypotheses are based on
theoretical arguments and empirical evidences. As we shall see, and despite appea-
rances, the two hypotheses are not incompatible.
Let us consider the first hypothesis. The central idea here is that by preventing the price
from falling too low, C-instruments pave the way to the development of A-instruments
since the creation and use of A-instruments relies on producers and traders making
investments. But, both are risk averse: if the price risk is too high, they will forgo any
investment. Also, even if they wanted to invest, the banks would be reluctant to give
them loans. Using C-instruments to guarantee a floor price removes these two
obstacles. As now more secure, producers and traders are more ready to invest and
build up stocks. And as now reassured, the banks are more willing to lend. A certain
degree of price stability is therefore a prerequisite to production and market moder-
nization. This hypothesis is supported by solid empirical evidences: no green revolution
in the past has ever taken place against a background of unstable prices. The green
revolutions in Europe, North America and Asia that resulted in increased grain yields
were nearly in all cases accompanied by schemes that held prices above a minimum
level. A judicious policy to keep domestic prices stable is therefore likely to stimulate
green revolutions and thus trigger a virtuous circle of economic development (Timmer,
1988; Timmer, 2009a). Indonesia is a good illustration of this (see box 13). 
[ ] ©AFD / Managing food price instability in developing countries / April 2013
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Price stabilization, self-sufficiency and food security:
some lessons from the Indonesian experience
Box
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[ 91 ] The revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011 are only the latest examples. See Kaplan (1984) for a fascinating 
historical account of the relationship between urban masses and their rulers with respect to provision of basic 
foodstuffs.
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Food security as a political concept requires an operational definition. In most Asian
countries this has taken the form of domestic price stability relative to world prices,
thus requiring state control over trade flows in rice. In order to minimize the need to
resort to trade at all, and to avoid the uncertainties in the international price of rice,
self-sufficiency has also become a popular objective, the more so as countries become
rich enough to afford the protection implied by measures needed to implement policies
that achieve greater degrees of self-sufficiency. 
A further impetus toward greater domestic rice production has been the fear of food
shortages in urban areas, which evoke a universal and visceral reaction. Governments
are held accountable for provisioning cities at reasonable costs, and citizens have
repeatedly demonstrated their capacity to bring down governments that fail in this
obligation. [ 91 ] It is acute food shortages — not the average level of food prices — that
induce anti-government panics, however. Food shortages are simply the mirror image
of sharp price rises.  
Indonesia provides a particularly vivid case study of policy initiatives designed specifi-
cally to stabilize the domestic price of rice — using imports or domestic production to
avoid food shortages – with a careful analytical debate paralleling the policy actions.
The role of trade versus domestic production as the basis for food security has been
analyzed and discussed in a surprisingly open and articulate manner since the beginning
of the Suharto government in 1967. 
The proximate definition of food security in Indonesia has always revolved around
price stability, especially for the price of rice, the country’s primary food staple. The
analysis that underpinned this approach never focused only on the static and partial
equilibrium consequences of changes in rice prices. Instead, an effort was made, even
well before computable general equilibrium models became a standard tool of policy
analysis, to consider dynamic and economy-wide ramifications of price policy, the
distributional consequences for farmers and consumers, and the role of other com-
modities in the rice stabilization program.
Looking for food security and self sufficiency in rice
Self-sufficiency in rice and other foodstuffs such as sugar and soybeans has been a
consistent (if often rhetorical) objective of Indonesian agricultural policy since the 
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beginning of the New Order regime in 1967. Both historical and production cost data
based on farm surveys confirm that self-sufficiency in rice is less costly (on average and
over the long run) than rice imports from the world market, partly the result of a highly
successful Green Revolution in rice production technology. Because of fluctuations due
to weather (especially el Nino events), diseases, and pests, however, rice production in
Indonesia is unstable and in any particular year can be above or below the normal level
of rice consumption. 
In order to stabilize the rice economy from production instability, as well as from sharp
fluctuations in world prices for rice, BULOG, the Indonesian Food Logistics Agency, was
charged to operate a floor and ceiling price policy using domestic buffer stocks as the
balance wheel to smooth out year-to-year fluctuations in production and consumption.
The goal was to keep rice consumption on a smooth trend despite unstable rice produc-
tion. The primary policy instrument for stabilizing rice consumption is the stabilization
of rice prices, which has been BULOG’s most important task.[ 92 ]
Successful stabilization of rice prices between a policy-determined floor and ceiling
price requires an active and on-going analytical capacity — to determine the appropriate
levels for the floor and ceiling price each year – that is directly linked to the political
(and budgetary) decision-making process. Indonesia developed this capacity gradually
through the early 1970s and 1980s, relying initially on foreign experts and eventually
on local analysts, many of whom had returned from foreign academic training. Much
of this analytical effort is now in the public record .[ 93 ]
From the late 1960s until the early 1980s, imports of rice were used routinely by
BULOG, as the balance wheel between supply and demand in its defense of a floor
price and ceiling price for rice. The world food crisis in 1972-73 stimulated serious
efforts to increase rice production, and the long-sought goal of rice self-sufficiency
was achieved in the mid-1980s. Thus the balancing role of international trade
was superseded by the problems of managing domestic buffer stocks as the sole
mechanism for balancing seasonal and annual differences between production
and consumption. [ 94 ]
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[ 92 ] This approach works well when incomes are reasonably stable, but fails when there is an economy-wide collapse, 
as in 1998.
[ 93 ] See Timmer (2004a) for a summary and Timmer (2010a) for an evaluation of how Indonesian price policy 
changed between the food crisis in 1972/73 and that in 2007/08.
[ 94 ] It was President Suharto’s determination to avoid rice imports that took international trade as a balancing 
mechanism off the policy agenda. Indeed, Indonesia was supposed to be “self sufficient” in rice — after all, 
FAO had given him a gold medal in 1985 for that achievement. By the early 1990s the President’s economic 
advisors had convinced him that “self-sufficiency on trend” was a more appropriate policy objective, and limited
imports again become operationally feasible.
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For the ten years of the fourth and fifth five-year development plans (REPELITA IV
and V), 1983/84 to 1993/94, Indonesia was almost exactly self-sufficient in rice on
average, and per capita availability (consumption) increased smoothly in all years but
two. In none of the individual years, however, was domestic production exactly equal
to consumption. In some years, for example 1984, 1989, and 1992, production was
larger than consumption, and BULOG stocks increased. In other years, for example
1985 and 1993, production also exceeded consumption but, with BULOG warehouses
full, exports were used to handle the surplus. In 1986, 1987, 1990, and 1991, consumption
was slightly larger than production, and BULOG stocks were drawn down. In 1988,
1992, and 1994, production was again less than the desired consumption level and,
with low BULOG stocks, external supplies were called upon to provide stability to
Indonesia’s rice markets.
The overall picture is one of stable growth in per capita rice consumption, relative
stability in Indonesia’s rice market, and perhaps most importantly from a political
perspective, the achievement for the first time of self-sufficiency in rice (on average)
for two consecutive five-year plan periods. 
Main Lessons from Indonesian Experience
It must be stressed that increasing rice production was only part of the story of self-
sufficiency and rising rice consumption. The role of prices and price stability was also
important in allowing consumers to maintain a smooth trend in rice consumption
even though production varied considerably from year to year.
A key element of government involvement in reaching self-sufficiency is through the
level of rice prices maintained in the domestic economy. Other things equal, a higher
level of rice prices will increase rice production, decrease rice consumption and make
self-sufficiency easier to achieve. It has often been said that Indonesia can always be
self-sufficient in rice at some price; the issue is whether consumers can maintain
satisfactory levels of rice consumption as well. But domestic rice prices do not exist in
a vacuum. In particular, their level relative to the trend of prices in the world market
and relative to the costs of inputs to farmers (especially fertilizer prices) strongly
influences the efficiency with which consumers and producers allocate the scarce
economic resources of the society.
Stabilization itself is also an element in domestic production and its contribution to
food security. The short-run policy issue is the level of BULOG stocks considered
appropriate for maintaining stable rice prices. With infinite stocks, prices can be kept
completely stable, but both economic theory and experience dictate that a finite
stock level cannot defend price stability under all circumstances. [ 95 ] Accordingly, an 
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[ 95 ] See Williams and Wright (1991) for a sophisticated analysis of the limits to price stabilization with finite stocks.
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important trade-off exists. Larger buffer stocks permit a longer period of stable prices,
but at costs that rise exponentially with the size of the buffer stock. Smaller stocks
require that prices fluctuate more, but with substantial cost savings. The only escape
from this apparent dilemma is to add a degree of freedom to the system by permitting
supplies to move into or out of the country as an additional balance wheel, once
stocks are drawn down or warehouses filled up. As noted, a rigid definition of “self-
sufficiency” removed the operational role for imports for a number of years.
Three elements of government policy interact to create the economic environment for
self-sufficiency in rice, and its subsequent role in food security: (1) public investments in
rice production to maintain it on the trend of rice consumption — mostly in rice research
and extension, irrigation facilities and rural roads; (2) the establishment of a domestic
level of rice (and fertilizer) prices that reflects their long-run opportunity costs in
world markets — a substantial, market-wide fertilizer subsidy in the mid-1980s was
a major factor in boosting rice production to self-sufficiency and the debate over
fertilizer subsidies continues even today; and (3) stabilization of domestic rice prices
through market interventions using buffer stocks as a balance wheel — and imports
when politically feasible. Each of these elements has powerful efficiency effects
individually, as well as direct impact on the state budget, and these effects make
each component a separate, important policy issue. But the interconnections among
the three elements make it impossible to set policy for one without having a subs-
tantial impact on the others. Consistency among all three elements is essential in
the long run if substantial resources are not to be wasted. Achieving this consistency is
clearly the most difficult aspect of designing a policy to assure food security at the
macro level.
The New Policy Debate: Price Stability at what Price?
Price stabilization has remained an important policy objective during surpluses and
deficits, but the financial costs, [ 96 ] feasible levels of prices, and general policy thrust
with respect to the agricultural sector are sharply different when the rice economy is
in surplus and the main political problem is maintaining the floor price for rice farmers,
and when it is in deficit and urban prices are rising. Because of the high costs of storing
rice in the tropics, the finite size of stocks, and the sharply limited role for imports for
political reasons, wider margins between the floor price and ceiling price have become
a de facto balance wheel as well, but these wider margins call in question the implicit
assumption that food security and price stability are synonymous. 
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[ 96 ] Relatively little is known publically about the financial costs of BULOG’s activities to stabilize rice prices. The best 
estimate is for 1991, a year when BULOG was actively managing the price stabilization effort solely on the basis 
of its domestic buffer stock. For that year, the full financial costs of BULOG’s rice activities were $233 million, 
which amounted to 0.11 percent of total GDP, and about 1.2 percent of the National Budget. See Pearson (1993) 
for more details.
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A policy approach that favors greater flexibility in the agricultural economy, and greater
price fluctuations to encourage farmers and consumers to be more flexible, would seem
to be an appropriate response to such widely divergent environments. But carried very
far, such flexibility is not compatible with continued emphasis on price stabilization.
Consequently, the policy debate since the mid-1990s over food security and price
stability has required a broad perspective, one that encompasses the contribution of
agriculture to the development process and analysis of the price policies appropriate
to stimulating that contribution.
Indeed, with Indonesia now a member of the G-20 and chair of ASEAN in 2011, the
domestic policy debate has broadened to consider the role of regional cooperation in
managing rice price volatility. A more stable and reliable world rice market would
almost certainly allow Indonesia to use rice imports much more extensively to help
BULOG stabilize the domestic rice economy more effectively, and save significant
resources at the same time.
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Can Asian successes with green revolutions be transposed to sub-Saharan Africa?
This is today's big question. The few examples we have in this region of the world
(particularly Malawi and Zambia) are too recent and too ambiguous for us to determine
whether they are really successful or not (see box 14 on Zambia). But, whatever the
specific experience of these two countries, in Africa like elsewhere, price stabilization is
a necessary condition for stimulating investment in agriculture and paving the way
to green revolutions. 
C. Peter Timmer 
Communication based on Timmer (1995c).
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The price of maize is a sensitive topic that has guided Zambian agricultural and food
policies since the early 20th century. [ 97 ] This price has been regulated through border
and trade measures, even during the so-called “liberalization" period. These policies
have recently been intensified: firstly in 2003 when the inputs subsidy program was
expanded; then from 2005 with a tightening of border controls (import and export
license, and customs tariffs) and reconversion of emergency reserves into buffer stock
(accompanied by a jump in volumes purchased). Today, the government provides some
400,000 producers with subsidized inputs, and purchases nearly one third of all maize
produced in the country (through 620 purchasing centers), and this at a higher price
than in force on the market (Govereh et al., 2008; Chapoto and Jayne, 2009; Chapoto
and Weber, 2009; Dorosh et al., 2009; Tembo et al., 2009; Tschirley and Jayne, 2010).
Since 2005, price volatility has greatly decreased: the coefficient of variation for the price
of wholesale maize fell from 35% in the period between 1991 and 2004 to 24% in the
period between 2005 and 2009. 
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[ 97 ] The results presented in this box stem from a study on the price stabilization policies of 14 countries (Gérard 
et al., 2012). This work was financed by the Groupe interministériel sur la sécurité alimentaire (France) and was 
entrusted to the Groupe de recherche et d’échange sur la régulation des marchés agricoles (GREMA). Special 
thanks go to Thom Jayne for providing data on the Zambian case and for devoting time to discussions on our 
interpretations. He of course is not responsible for the views we express. 
Stabilizing the price of maize and green revolution: 
ambiguities of the Zambian “miracle" 
14Box












































Wholesale real prices for maize in Lusaka (in ZMK/kg)
Figure 17
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Even more spectacularly, domestic maize production rocketed to the point of gene-
rating a surplus of more than 1,000,000 tonnes in 2010 (ZNFU, 2010). Average annual
growth in maize production increased from 2% between 1994 and 2004 to 26%












































Maize production in Zambia (in tonnes)
Figure 18
Should this decrease in price instability and the massive increase in production be viewed
as stemming from the intensification of interventionist policies since 2005? If so, then
Zambia is one of the first countries in sub-Saharan Africa that has managed to reproduce
successfully the model implemented a few decades ago in Asia. It is too early to say. Other
factors have also had an impact, including particularly favorable climatic conditions in
recent years. 
Also, has this growth in production benefited all 1.5 million maize producers? Or is it
due above all to the 1400 largest? In Zambia, only a quarter of all maize producers are
net sellers, and 2% of producers supply more than half the surplus sold (Weber, 2010). 
Finally, questions also arise regarding the sustainability of the policies implemented
since 2005 to stabilize maize prices as they alone absorb 8% of the nation's budget
and 50 to 60% of its agricultural budget. 
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Let us now consider the second hypothesis. Some experts believe that C-instruments
are in actual fact an obstacle to the development of A-instruments. The conventional
version of this hypothesis considers that public stocks generate a crowding out effect
on private stocks. The idea is that when efforts are made to build up public stocks,
private actors reduce their stocks. The reason given is that if prices rise, the State will sell
part of its stock and producers and traders will find it difficult to sell large quantities.
They therefore decide to stock less. Overall, public stocks simply crowd out private
stocks (Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981). This hypothesis assumes implicitly that private
storage and public storage have a similar effect on prices. But this is not the case.
Private stocks are gradually brought to market as prices rise. Conversely, public stocks
(if well managed) are brought to market only when the price exceeds a certain ceiling.
This means that private stocks depress prices whereas public stocks do not (as long
as the price remains below the ceiling). In certain situations, the difference between
private storage and public storage is even more marked. This is particularly the case
when speculative bubbles or panics occur. In these situations, private actors hoard
their stocks, which can cause famines (Sen, 1977; Ravallion, 1987). These stocks are
thus of no utility whereas public stocks can be used to bring prices back to acceptable
levels. This clearly demonstrates that there is no equivalence between public and
private stocks. Building up public stocks is therefore fully justified. And also, if the ceiling
price is set sufficiently high, the crowding out effect on private stocks will be weak. 
There is also another version of the crowding out effect that is both broader and
more subtle. Broader because it considers that the crowding out effect does not arise
only from public stocks but potentially from all C-instruments, and even D-instru-
ments. Broader also because it considers that the crowding out effect does not
affect only private stocks but a large number of A-instruments. Finally, broader
because it considers not only short-term crowding out effects (such as reductions in
private stocks) but also long-term effects on the development of A-instruments
(such as impeding the development of warehouse receipt systems). This version is
also more subtle as it considers that the crowding out effect does not stem so much
from the nature of C-instruments as from their governance. According to this approach,
it is when public interventions are unpredictable that they give rise to an additional
source of uncertainty for market actors and a crowding out effect on private storage
and private imports (Jayne and Jones, 1997; Jayne et al., 2006; Jayne et al., 2008;
Chapoto and Jayne, 2009; Tschirley and Jayne, 2010; Abbink et al. 2011). This is what
has happened in a number of eastern and southern African countries over the last
15 years (see box 15). 
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Are maize prices more stable in countries 
with stabilization policies?  
Evidence from eastern and southern Africa 
15Box
There is continuing debate in Africa about the appropriate roles of the state and the
private sector in staple food markets. At the center of this debate is the perception
that food prices have become more unstable in countries that have liberalized their
staple food markets, thereby exacerbating the plight of poor consumers and farmers.
Unfortunately, there remains a dearth of empirical evidence comparing the degree
of price stability and predictability achieved through the implementation of state
marketing and trade policies vs. a relatively liberalized and open borders policy. Ass-
essments of this issue are complicated by the fact that neither state-led nor liberalized
food policies are monolithic in their design or implementation. Impacts of policies on
price instability may depend on variations in both design and implementation. Never-
theless, it would be useful to compare the magnitude of food price instability in
countries that have embraced relatively comprehensive staple food market reform
policies over time versus those in which the state continues to influence and stabilize
food prices through the operations of marketing boards and controls on trade. 
Our study examines the amplitude of price instability and unpredictability between
countries in eastern and southern Africa using trade barriers and marketing board
operations to stabilize prices versus countries with relatively open trade policies.
Instability is defined as the unconditional variance in food prices over time, whereas
unpredictability is defined as the unanticipated component of price instability, i.e., the
conditional variance from a price forecasting model. Our analysis covers a period in
which data was consistently available across all countries, January 1994 to December
2008. 
Two groupings of countries in the region are defined according to their maize marketing
and trade policies. The first group of countries (Category A) is comprised of those
having adopted staple food market liberalization in a relatively comprehensive and
sustained manner, with the role of government being limited mostly to regulating the
playing field, investing in physical infrastructure, encouraging diversification of food
consumption patterns, improving rural financial markets to improve traders’ capacity
to absorb surplus production, and relying primarily on private trade to stabilize maize
prices. The second group of countries (Category B) includes those having implement-
ed a more partial liberalization process, in which the private sector is encouraged to
operate but where governments also continue to operate extensively in food markets,
mainly through marketing board activities and discretionary trade policy tools such as
export bans, changes in import tariff rates, and direct government importation and 
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stock release. Mozambique and Uganda best fit the first category (A), whilst Zambia,
Malawi, Ethiopia, and Tanzania fit the second category (B). Kenya’s position has shifted
over time, being a Category B country until January 2005, when it harmonized its im-
port tariff rates with neighboring east African countries (from as high as 50% down
to 2.75%). This rate has not fluctuated from that time until late 2008 and over this 45-
month period Kenya essentially embraced an open borders policy with respect to
regional trade. 
These contrasting approaches to food price stabilization in the two groups of coun-
tries can provide useful information for policy makers and development planners to
improve the performance of staple food markets. Our focus is on the class of discre-
tionary and, therefore, not easily anticipated trade policy interventions as commonly
implemented in many countries of eastern and southern Africa. We hypothesize that
an unpredictable trade and marketing policy environment will depress trader activity
that could otherwise stabilize prices through spatial and temporal arbitrage. 
The selection of countries included in this study is mainly based on the availability of
country time series data for carrying out the analysis. Because there is great hetero-
geneity within both country categories that could influence price instability apart
from differences in marketing policy environment, our analysis controls to the extent
possible for other exogenous influences. 
The study highlights several findings as follows: 
First, with the exception of Malawi, none of the other Category B countries pursuing
food price stabilization policies and food security objectives through direct state
operations over the study period has been able to match production growth for Sub-
Saharan Africa as a whole. By contrast, Mozambique and Uganda, countries that have
maintained relatively stable maize marketing and trade policies have experienced more
than a 100% increase in maize production over the past two decades. However, in the
past two years since 2008, the end year of our analysis, Zambia has achieved a major
increase in maize production, due to a combination of unusually favorable weather,
high maize price supports for farmers of roughly $275 per ton, and large-scale input
subsidy programs in 2009 and 2010. 
Second, Malawi and Zambia have the highest degree of price volatility and price
uncertainty compared to all the other countries. The measures of price uncertainty
control for other factors affecting prices such as rainfall, seasonal effects, and exchange
rate movements. This finding suggests that the highly discretionary trade and mar-
keting policies in these two countries have had a destabilizing effect on prices and
market predictability over the 1994-2008 sample period, although the counterfactual
of little or no government intervention in food markets is not known because there is 
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no period of time when these countries pursued such policies. In the past two years
since 2008, a combination of factors have contributed to price stability in both Zambia
and Malawi, and it would be useful to update our analysis to estimate the role of state
policies in contributing to the relatively stable prices in 2009 and 2010. 
Third, Mozambique, a country that has pursued a relatively open trade and marketing
policy in southern Africa, has the lowest price variability in the capital city of Maputo,
but the other markets for which data was available, Nampula and Beira, have price
volatility and market uncertainty closer to that of Malawi. Other evidence cited in the
report demonstrates that markets in the northern part of Mozambique are somewhat
integrated by trade with markets in Malawi; hence policy instability in Malawi is likely
to be transmitted into these markets.
Fourth, historical unconditional and conditional Coefficient of Variations (CVs) have
declined greatly in Kenya since Kenya’s entry into the East African Commission trading
agreement in January 2005. The more stable trade policy environment between 2005
and 2008 appears to have contributed to the decline of both price volatility and market
uncertainty.
Fifth, there is no apparent difference between coastal and landlocked countries in
terms of the magnitude of price instability and unpredictability measures.
Sixth, in well functioning markets, there is a regular seasonal price pattern in which
prices are lowest directly after the harvest, and rise gradually over the season reflecting
the costs of storage until they reach their peak in the months prior to the next harvest.
This pattern is seen most clearly in Randfontein, South Africa. In other countries, devia-
tions from the normal seasonal pattern of maize prices are particularly pronounced in
years of discretionary government involvement in trade and stock releases.
These findings indicate that many governments’ well-meaning attempts to stabilize
prices may actually destabilize them. Future food prices appear to be more difficult to
predict in an environment in which the extent and composition of marketing board
operations are frequently changing and where cross-border trade policies also change
in ways that are difficult to anticipate. There is increasing evidence of strategic inter-
action between the public and private sectors in food markets. Private trade and
investment develops more slowly and more tentatively in countries where government
policy is particularly unpredictable. While private trading systems will always result in
price variation – potentially very wide price swings in landlocked countries with poor
transport infrastructure – they tend not to cause the frequent food crises due to
policy mistakes and inaction that are commonly seen in the region. However, these
findings do not suggest that governments have no role to play in maize markets. The
findings rather indicate that the price instability and unpredictability could be mitigated 
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more effectively by making the state’s role more predictable. Predictability can be
enhanced by adopting a rules-based and transparent approach to state operations in
markets so that the private sector understands the specific market conditions that will
trigger government interventions. Other positive roles of government to manage price
instability includes: regulating the playing field, investing in physical infrastructure,
encouraging diversification of food consumption patterns, improving rural financial
markets to improve traders’ capacity to absorb surplus production, and encouraging
the development of regional maize trade and market-based risk management instru-
ments to manage maize prices.
[ ] ©AFD / Managing food price instability in developing countries / April 2013
A. Chapoto and T.S. Jayne
Communication based on Chapoto and Jayne (2009)
http://www.aec.msu.edu/fs2/papers/idwp102.pdf
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Who is right in this controversy? Does recourse to C-instruments stimulate or inhibit the
development and use of A-instruments? Both hypotheses are supported by solid
empirical evidences. In fact, if we look closer, the two are not incompatible. When
stabilization policies are successful, i.e. when they effectively prevent prices from
reaching extreme values, they have a beneficial effect on the development of A-
instruments (as occurred in Indonesia). Conversely, when recourse to C-instruments
results in increased price instability (as occurred in a number of eastern and southern
African countries), they contribute to increasing the price risk and discouraging
producer, processor and trader investment and storage. The key to success therefore
lies in the governance of C-instruments: interventions must be triggered only when
prices move outside a band that is defined in advance and is known to all; and the
floor price and ceiling price that trigger interventions must be set at realistic levels
(1.5.3). If these conditions are met, then recourse to C-instrument results in more
stable and more predictable prices, and this in turn greatly stimulates investment in
A-instruments. It should also be recalled that non-intervention is not a credible
strategy: all know that the State will intervene if prices rise too substantially. It is
therefore better to know when the State will intervene (ceiling price) and how (ins-
truments and the manner of their implementation). A well managed stabilization
policy is therefore the best option we have for stimulating the development of
A-instruments. 
In efforts to improve the governance of price stabilization policies, certain States have
set up forums with private actors (see box 16 on the multi-stakeholder platform set up
in Madagascar for rice). 
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Improving the governance of stabilization policies 
by setting up forums with private actors: 
the case of rice in Madagascar
Box
Rice plays a strategic role in Madagascar both for the income it provides (43% of
agricultural Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 12% of national GDP, see FAO/UPDR,
2000) and its role in household consumption (about 115 kg/inhabitant/year, see
Carimentrand, 2011). Given the poverty of Madagascar's population, holding rice pri-
ces stable is key to food security. 
It was the inadequate management of the 2004 food crisis that led to the develop-
ment of a novel scheme for the governance of stabilization policies. Back in 2004, the
domestic market saw an unprecedented rise in prices (+ 90% between January and
December) due i) to a sudden depreciation of the national currency, ii) a rise in the
international price of rice and iii) damage caused by two violent hurricanes. The State
intervened by negotiating the purchase of 100,000 tonnes of rice from the government
of Thailand and by granting special facilities to a group of importers charged with the
operation, subsidizing transport and fixing distribution margins. But this operation
failed to avoid a shortage: it was very late getting off the ground, was very disorganized
and discouraged traders – suffering from great uncertainty – from importing (Dabat
et al., 2006). Because i) deficits and needs had been poorly estimated, ii) government
actions lacked transparency and iii) actions were poorly coordinated with the private
sector, State interventions even served to worsen the situation. 
It was in this context that two new tools intended to help decision-making were set up
in 2005, with the aim of instituting a new form of governance that would encourage
the circulation of information and involve private actors. L’Observatoire du Riz (OdR)
produces and disseminates market information both to private actors and public
decision-makers. It publishes prices bulletins (every week), technical and economic
reports on the rice market (several times a year) and market outlooks (often at the
request of decision-makers). La Plateforme de concertation et de pilotage de la filière
riz (PCP Riz) is made up of eight panels representing the different actors in the market
chain. Its mission is to: i) prompt meetings, dialog and information sharing between
private actors and between them and the State, and ii) submit proposals to the
government concerning rice policies in general and rice price stabilization policies in
particular. The Platform builds on information provided by the OdR. 
As these two schemes have been operating for five years, their contribution to and
limitations in the design of public policies can now be evaluated. The rice market
faced three crises during this period. From February to April 2007, hurricanes caused
major damage to transport and production infrastructure in certain regions. Close 
16
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market monitoring and consultations between the State, donors and the OdR meant
that suitable measures could be taken (trade restrictions were lifted and targeted
emergency aid was provided). As a result, the price rise was limited both in space
and time. When international prices soared in 2007-2008 the scheme provided a
better estimate of needs and greater transparency with regard to public interventions
(negotiation with India of the purchase of 50,000 tonnes of rice at preferential prices,
exemption from VAT, seed and fertilizer subsidies for off-season production). As a
result, importers knew that prices would rise: therefore, they placed their orders early,
and no speculation occurred. The rise in international prices therefore was not felt on
internal markets. Finally, in 2009, amid a political crisis that was sweeping the country,
the government set up the distribution of 50% subsidized rice whereas the harvest
was at its height. The PCP intervened, asking for this operation to be halted, and this
reduced the duration of these distributions and their depressive effect on the price of
local rice. Altogether, since 2005, the market has not witnessed any major upsets
despite a disturbed international and national context. 
Although is can be stated that the OdR undeniably improved the accuracy of infor-
mation provided to decision-makers concerning the state of the national market, the
actual degree to which PCP weighs on public decisions is more difficult to establish,
although it has undoubtedly initiated a change in policy making. The scheme's main
limitation is its purely consultative role: in periods of crisis, short-term political goals
easily outweigh advice from PCP. Another limitation is that PCP members do not all
have the same economic power and skills, and this in particular penalizes producers. 
C-instruments and B-instruments: complementary instruments 
C-instruments are also criticized for generating a crowding out effect on B-instruments.
Provision by the State of free protection against instability is alleged to discourage
recourse to private price risk hedging instrument. True, the argument has some degree
of pertinence in developed countries. For instance, ever since CAP reform brought
an end to price stabilization within the European Union, Europe's grain producers
have greatly increased their use of futures markets. But this argument does not hold
for DCs given that i) B-instruments in these countries are underdeveloped (even in
the absence of public intervention) and ii) producers in these countries have little
access to B-instruments. The argument tends to suggest that C-instruments and
B-instruments are complementary. The first are relevant for DCs whereas the second
are suitable for developed countries. 
H. David-Benz.
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Another form of complementarity between B-instruments and C-instruments lies in
the use of B-instruments by governments as a means to avoid passing on instability
to State budgets. This stems from the problem that the use of C-instruments leads
to public expenditure that is both irregular and unpredictable given that stabilizing
interventions are triggered by changes in price. Price stabilization in this case means
that the instability is passed on to State budgets. States can nevertheless turn to
B-instruments in order to stabilize the cost of stabilization policies. Thus, if a parti-
cular State is aware that it will have to intervene if domestic harvests are poor, it can
take out weather insurance. Another State which fears that international prices will
soar can acquire a call option. If its fear materializes, the State will intervene but the
cost of its intervention will be buffered (in the first case the State will receive a payment
from the insurance company; in the second case it will obtain supplies at a moderate
price by exercising the option). 
C-instruments and D-instruments: competitors but complementary
As both C-instruments and D-instruments are based on public interventions, they
are in competition for budget resources. The approach with C-instruments involves
buying and selling at the market price in order to inject or withdraw the largest
quantity possible with a given budget (or to minimize the cost of an intervention
that involves a given quantity). The approach with D-instruments leads to a smaller
quantity being either distributed for free or sold at a subsidized price (generally
targeting vulnerable populations). Therefore, the two approaches are in part contra-
dictory. For any given budget, the State can either choose to have a maximum effect
on market prices, or a maximum effect on the price received or paid by targeted
groups. The tension between these two approaches can be clearly illustrated by the
Ethiopian government's policy in 2008 in response to soaring prices (see box 17).
April 2013 / Managing food price instability in developing countries /©AFD [ ]
2. Selecting the right instruments for strategy implementation
ASavoir_N17_GB_BAT_2_(V2).qxp  12/04/13  8:37  Page 191
Stabilizing Wheat Prices in Ethiopia: Subsidies,




Context. Due in large part to substantial variations in altitude and rainfall across the
country, Ethiopia produces a wide range of cereals, each accounting for less than 30
percent of national cereal production. Maize (27 percent of cereal production in
2008/09), teff (21 percent), sorghum (19 percent) and wheat (18 percent) are each a
major staple in part of the country. Since there is little international trade apart from
wheat imports (both food aid and commercial imports), however, consumption shares
of cereals are almost identical to their production shares except for wheat (22 percent
of total cereal consumption).
In spite of remarkable growth in Ethiopia’s agricultural production from 2004/05 to
2008/09, prices of major cereals (teff, maize, wheat and sorghum) fluctuated sharply
in both nominal and real terms. Much of the increase in nominal cereal price was
associated with overall macro-economic inflation which reached over 50 percent (on
a year-to-year basis) in mid-2008, making stabilization of food prices a high priority
for the Ethiopian government. The rise in international wheat prices was not a major
factor in movements of domestic wheat prices in 2007 and early 2008, however,
because food aid imports kept domestic prices significantly below import parity.
Later, when macro-economic inflation helped push up domestic wheat prices in late
2008 and 2009 to levels above import parity prices, foreign exchange rate rationing
prevented private sector imports and direct transmission of international prices to
domestic markets (Figure 1).
Policy implemented. In mid-2008, in an effort to lower domestic wheat prices, the
government intervened in domestic markets by importing wheat on a commercial
basis and then selling 283 thousand tons of the wheat at fixed subsidized prices
(generally 300 Birr/quintal, only about half of the wholesale price of wheat in Addis
Ababa market). Most of this wheat (55 percent) was sold to flour mills; 23 percent of
the subsidized wheat was sold to consumers through selected urban shops and 18
percent of the wheat was sold to rural village-level consumer cooperatives. Overall,
less than 2 percent of the wheat (8,100 tons) was sold to wholesale traders, and none
after September 2008, due to concerns that traders did not pass on the huge implicit
subsidy to consumers. 
Effectiveness. Sales of government imported wheat reduced real wheat prices in
domestic markets from July through October. Average wheat consumption per month
was estimated about 192 thousand tons per month, equal to about 770 thousand
tons total over the four month period of July to October, 2008. Announcement of
planned imports of 157,500 tons of wheat and disbursements to millers and wholesale
traders contributed to a 12 percent fall in wholesale wheat prices in Addis in July 2008 
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relative to the June 2008 price (24 percent in real terms). Wheat prices rose slightly in
real terms in August, but nonetheless averaged about 20 percent below June 2008
real price levels from August through October 2008. October 2008 real prices were
26 percent below a projected real price without the import intervention (the June
price plus an estimated 2 percent per month real seasonal price rise).



























































































Price of wheat in Addis Abeba in Birr/quintal (2006-2009):
wholesale price, import parity price and State imports
sales price
Figure 19
Import parity price    State imports sales price











Source: Dorosh and Ahmed (2009).
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These reductions in food prices are somewhat less than a simulated 34 percent
decrease using an elasticity of wheat demand with respect to wheat price of -0.8 (a
level approximately equal to econometric estimates using cross-section household
level data). Two factors likely accounted for the smaller than expected real price
decline. First, wheat millers may not have milled all the wheat received or sold all the 
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wheat flour produced by October 2008. Second, imported wheat is not a perfect
substitute for locally produced wheat, so increases in imported wheat quantities
would likely have smaller effects on prices of locally produced wheat than on prices
of domestic sales of imported wheat.
Cost. These sales at the low official price also implied huge rents (excess profits) for
traders and millers who were able to purchase wheat at 300 Birr/quintal and sizeable
income transfer to poor households who were able to purchase government wheat
directly. The total value of these rents and subsidies (which accrued to various actors
according to their share in total subsidized wheat distribution) reached about 900
million Birr (about US$90 million).
[ ] ©AFD / Managing food price instability in developing countries / April 2013
8Table Ethiopia: Subsidy on Government Wheat Sales,
August-October, 2008
August 94.8 3,000 6,600 3,600 341 34.3
September 121.5 3,000 6,375 3,375 410 40.5
October 66.4 3,000 5,375 2,375 158 15.5























Source: Dorosh and Ahmed (2009).
Policy Alternatives. One alternative to this policy would have been to auction
government wheat imports in domestic markets. Such a policy would eliminate rents
accruing to recipients of subsidized wheat. It would also have generated additional
government revenue (through sales at a higher price), while having essentially the
same effect on market prices as government subsidized sales, since the volume of
wheat injections into the Ethiopian wheat market would have been the same.
Another policy alternative would have been to promote private sector imports. As of
March 2008, foreign exchange for imports was rationed, effectively stopping private
sector wheat imports. Domestic wheat prices rose above wheat import parity prices
after May 2008, indicating that it would be profitable for private traders to import
wheat if they had access to foreign exchange at the official exchange rate. As a result, 
2. Selecting the right instruments for strategy implementation
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import parity did not provide a ceiling on domestic prices of wheat. Instead, domestic
wheat prices rose above world prices beginning in May 2008, reflecting the inability
or unwillingness of private importers to take advantage of the profitable trade oppor-
tunity. Factors such as lack of access to foreign exchange, policy uncertainty related to
government imports and domestic sales, and concern over possible seizure of private
stocks all likely contributed to this lack of private sector import supply response.
Although government imports and sales reduced market prices from extremely high
June 2008 levels, market prices still averaged 36 percent above import parity prices
from July to October, 2008. Inhibiting private sector imports through foreign exchange
rationing thus resulted in lower wheat imports, higher wheat prices, lower wheat
consumption, and reduced welfare for net wheat consumers.
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But relations between C-instruments and D-instruments are not restricted to this
competition for budget resources. The two instrument categories are also comple-
mentary insofar that C-instruments facilitate the work of D-instruments: by preventing
prices from soaring too high, C-instruments reduce the number of households that
need D-instruments, both in the short run (price shocks are less violent) and in the
medium run (household decapitalization is slowed). 
2.3.5. Obstacles hindering the use of C-instruments 
Various factors may prevent developing countries from using C-instruments. 
The first of these factors is the State's capacity to implement these instruments,
with the main obstacle of course being their cost. This can be a major problem for States
with very limited budgetary resources. Another problem is whether the State has the
means to govern these instruments effectively (infrastructure, qualified personnel,
databases, information systems, etc.). An emblematic example of this type of problem
is when a State has difficulty controlling its borders, as is the case for land borders in
many African countries that are particularly porous because of smuggling activities
and corruption. Evasion of the grain export bans decided by many West African
countries during the 2007-2008 clearly illustrates this porosity (Staatz et al., 2008).
Moreover, because of re-export trade, land border porosity may lead to some
degree of porosity in borders with the international market. A famous example of
this is Benin that for many years re-exported rice to Nigeria during the period that
Paul Dorosh and Hashim Ahmed
Communication based on Dorosh and Ahmed (2009)
http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/esspdp04.pdf
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it prohibited or heavily taxed rice imports (Galtier and Tassou, 1998). A regional policy
(or at least the coordination or national policies) could solve this problem.
The feasibil ity of C-instruments may also be limited by factors related to the
characteristics of the goods (perishability, tradability). For example, if the product
whose price we are seeking to stabilize is perishable, it is impossible (or very costly)
to build up public stocks. Likewise, it is impossible to use border measures if the
product is not tradable. These limitations can generally be overcome, but only at a
high cost. For instance, it is sometime possible to stock perishable or fragile goods, but
this requires considerable resources (phytosanitary treatments, refrigerated systems,
etc.). Similarly, the price of a non-tradable good can be stabilized by applying border
measures on a tradable product with which it is substitutable. For instance, in Sahel
countries, the price of (non-tradable) millet can be stabilized by varying the tariffs
placed on rice imports. These technical limits can nevertheless constitute major obsta-
cles to price stabilization. For example, a major proportion of the caloric intake in some
African countries is provided by perishable, non-tradable products that are poorly
substitutable with tradable goods (cassava, yam, plantain). This makes C-instruments
powerless given that neither public storage nor border measures can be implemented.
The medium-term solution therefore lies with A-instruments for some of these
instruments can to a certain extent render these products storable or tradable. For
example, cassava can be stored if milled into flour. Likewise, the development of
warehouse receipt systems improves product tradability. Thus, A-instruments can boost
the effectiveness of C-instruments. 
A third series of limitations concerns instrument compatibility with the country's
international commitments, particularly with WTO rules (but also the country's
participation in custom unions or free-trade areas). WTO rules usually restrict “internal
support measures" such as input subsidies and the use of public stocks (see box 18).
These rules, however, are applied with considerable flexibility in developing countries.
For instance, input subsidies are tolerated if they concern producers who “have low
incomes or possess limited resources". And public stocks are accepted if “their purpose
is food security" and if "buying and selling occurs at current market prices". And
regarding “border control measures" (taxes, subsidies and quantitative restrictions),
WTO rules are asymmetrical. Although countries have the right to take measures
that place them at a disadvantage in international competition (e.g. import subsidies
or export restrictions), measures that place them at an advantage, e.g. import tariffs
or export subsidies, are tightly regulated. For instance, all export subsidies must in
principle be reduced then disappear in 2013. Import quotas are prohibited. Only
fixed tariffs are tolerated on condition i) that they remain below ceilings determined
[ ] ©AFD / Managing food price instability in developing countries / April 2013
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in 1994 (“consolidated levels"), or ii) the country finds itself in the situation described by
the special safeguard clause. The tariff may be modified on an ad hoc basis (so long
as it remains below the consolidated level). By contrast, indexed tariffs are prohibited
even if the highest tariff band is below the consolidated level (see the decision
concerning the dispute between Argentina and Chili). All these rules could come in
for review if Doha round negotiations are restarted and a new agricultural agreement
is reached.
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WTO rules for agricultural products are mainly formulated in the agreement called
“GATT 1994" (which itself reproduces a large proportion of the text in the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT] 1947) and in the Agricultural Agreement.
These documents describe the general principles and the exceptions that may concern
countries, products and exceptional situations. WTO imposes many restrictions on
C-instruments, particularly those that may support local production: internal support
measures that include both input subsidies and the use of public stocks, and border
control measures (both tariffs and quotas on imports and subsidies for exports). 
Internal support measures are accepted (“green box") only if they are decoupled
(since they are in this case assumed to have a minimal impact on production volume).
Otherwise, a ceiling is set on these measures (fixed at less than 5% of production
for developed countries and less than 10% for DCs) and they are subject to reduction
(“orange box"). However, investment subsidies and agricultural input subsidies are
tolerated if they concern producers who “in member developing countries have
low incomes or possess limited resources”. Production subsidy instruments used
by developing countries are therefore compatible with WTO rules on condition
that they do not concern large farms. This means that production subsidies need
to be targeted in certain countries that include large land owners. Likewise, public
stocks are accepted if their purpose is food security, if their management is trans-
parent, and if buying and selling occurs at current market prices.
Regarding border control measures, the general principle is that quantitative measures
are prohibited (they must be converted into tariffs), as are indexed taxes and subsidies. 
Nevertheless, the prohibition on quantitative measures – quotas, licenses, bans – does
not apply to the export of food products (see article 11 of Gatt 1994 and article 12
of the Agricultural Agreement). The decisions taken by many countries in 2007-2008
to ban grain exports did not therefore breach WTO rules.
What restrictions does WTO impose on public price 
stabilizing instruments?
Box 18
2. Selecting the right instruments for strategy implementation
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Only fixed rate taxes and subsidies are tolerated. In addition, taxes on imports and
subsidies for exports must comply with a ceiling , and must be reduced over time.
The most drastic measure concerns export subsidies: these have to decrease then
disappear in 2013 (the only point agreed upon in 2005). Regarding taxes on imports,
rate ceilings (“consolidated levels") were determined in 1994 (on the basis of past levels
for developed countries, whereas DCs obtained the right to choose their consoli-
dated levels). However, these “consolidated" levels can no longer now be modified.
They must also be reduced over time (except for Least developed countries [LDC]).
An initial reduction took place before 2002: 36% reduction between 1995 and
2000 for developed countries and 24% between 1995 and 2002 for DCs (except
LDCs). A further reduction in ceilings was scheduled in 2005 (the magnitude of
this reduction was linked to ceiling levels at the start of the period: high, moderate or
low). This measure also applies to regional trade agreements: WTO member countries
may form custom unions on condition that they set a common external tariff that
is less than the customs duties previously in force in the member countries of the
union. As for tariffs indexed on international prices or domestic prices, these are
prohibited by WTO, even if the upper bound of the band is beneath the consolidated
level! Only ad hoc increases in tariffs are possible, on condition that: i) they remain
beneath the ceiling defined by the consolidated level or ii) the country finds itself in
the situation specified by the “special safeguard clause" (article 5 of the Agricultural
Agreement). This clause provides for customs duties to rise temporarily above the
consolidated level. This measure, however, is limited in time (one year) and is tightly
confined by a system of triggering (price or volume) thresholds that are deemed
to be too restrictive by countries such as India that made it a casus belli at the last
WTO negotiation conference (July 2008) where the clause was to be revised. 
[ ] ©AFD / Managing food price instability in developing countries / April 2013
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The last obstacle in the path of C-instruments is their political feasibility. For example,
the producers' lobby may be opposed to selling part of public stocks, or to any reduc-
tion in import tariffs (and even more so to temporary import subsidies). The solution
to this problem lies in symmetry: public interventions must protect both consumers
(if prices soar) and producers (if prices collapse). This symmetry, or reciprocity, can
only be guaranteed if the stabilization scheme is governed by rules that are fixed in
advance and are known to all. Economic actors are more likely to accept an intervention
that to them is disadvantageous if they are assured that, if the price climate swings
the other way, they in turn will benefit from stabilizing interventions. Let us here in
passing note that this leads to recommendations for indexed taxes or subsidies on
imports and exports which are currently prohibited by WTO rules (only ad hoc tariff
variations are allowed, see box 18). 
2.3.6. The advantages, limitations and perverse effects 
of C-instruments 
What are the advantages of using C-instruments? What effect can they be expected to
have on price instability? Can public interventions based on C-instruments facilitate
the emergence of other instrument categories? Or compromise their emergence?
What roles do context and governance play in the performance of C-instruments?
We will address these by considering the advantages, limitations and perverse
effects of C-instruments.
The advantages of C-instruments
C-instruments play a vital role in price stabilization. C-instruments are the only ins-
truments that can be mobilized in the face of imported and endogenous instability.
Let us consider first the case of imported instability. Here, A-instruments are mainly
ineffective (even though private stocks may spread over time the passing on of
international instability to the domestic market). Importers and exporters may use
B-instruments to hedge price risk but this generally will not stabilize domestic prices
given that an importer has no interest in selling below the import parity price, even
if covered against a rise in international prices. The only means to mitigate the pas-
sing on of international instability to the domestic market consists in using border
measures. Likewise, nothing compares to C-instruments in their capacity to deal with
endogenous instability. True, to reduce endogenous instability we could simply rely on
free trade to reduce the parity price band .[ 98 ] But sometimes the price needs to be
2. Selecting the right instruments for strategy implementation
[98 ] But free trade increases the country's exposure to imported instability. It also deprives the government of a 
slice of its revenue.
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stabilized below the import parity price (or above the export parity price), which is
impossible through free trade. And sometimes the quantity available on the domestic
market needs to be increased very rapidly in order to counter speculative bubbles and
panics. In this case, it is not sufficient to rely on imports. Public stocks are necessary.
C-instruments also play a key role in countering natural instability: even in situations
of natural instability, A-instruments cannot prevent prices from soaring (even if it is
assumed that markets operate perfectly, see Williams and Wright 1991). C-instruments
are therefore necessary complements to A-instruments, particularly in order to protect
consumers. But C-instruments can also counter natural instability through another
channel: by facilitating the emergence of A-instruments. 
By stabilizing prices, C-instruments stimulate investment. This in turn facilitates agri-
cultural modernization and hence triggers the process of economic development. It
is now recognized that the structural transformation of agriculture is generally a
necessary step along the road to economic development (Timmer 1988; World
Bank 2007; Timmer 2009a). And this is the second advantage of C-instruments (see
box 13 on the Indonesian case). 
Price stabilization by C-instruments is also essential to guarantee food security as
C-instruments complement D-instruments and enhance their effectiveness. When
a large proportion of the population slides into the red because of a price rise, it is
very difficult to operate targeted transfers to a multitude of vulnerable households.
In this case it is often more effective, and less costly, to intervene in order to stabilize
prices. Price rises are thus reduced and this reduces the number of households in
difficulty, which in turn facilitates their targeting by D-instruments. In the same manner,
by reducing the amplitude and frequency of price surges, C-instruments reduce the
number of households that fall into the poverty trap and this facilitates household
recapitalization by D-instruments. 
The limitations of C-instruments
C-instruments nonetheless have certain limitations. Firstly, most C-instruments can
only be applied to products that possess certain properties: public stocks can be
used only for non-perishable goods, border measures apply only to tradable goods,
input subsidies are useful only on goods whose yields can be increased. Action can
of course be taken on the price of one product by intervening on another product
with which it is substitutable. For instance, in Sahel countries, the price of millet can
be stabilized by varying the tariffs on rice imports. But these crossed effects are limited
by the substitutability between products, which is often only partial. For example,
when in 2005 the price of millet soared in Mali because of a poor harvest (the “locusts
[ ] ©AFD / Managing food price instability in developing countries / April 2013
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crisis"), the import parity price of rice halted the rise, but only after the price of millet
had doubled (Galtier et al., 2010)! This problem is particularly acute for products
that are: i) important for food security, ii) perishable and iii) non tradable. This for
example is the case for cassava or plantain in certain African countries. As already
mentioned, the solution here lies to a great extent in A-instruments that may to a
certain degree render these food products more storable, tradable or substitutable
with tradable goods. 
Another important limitation of C-instruments is their cost. For example, public
stocks need to be very large if they are to have an effect on prices, and are therefore
costly. In some years, public stocks in Zambia purchased up to 30% of the country's
maize production! Likewise, in 2008, the lifting of import tariffs in many countries
was not enough to stabilize domestic prices. Substantial subsidies would have been
needed to achieve this. 
Finally, problems of governance can sometimes compromise stabilization policies.
For example, traders may not pass on tariff reductions or subsidies. Import or export
quotas may be circumnavigated if the State does not control its borders. Public stocks
may in part be siphoned off by State officials. 
The perverse effects of C-instruments 
C-instruments may also cause perverse effects. As already mentioned, ad hoc (unpre-
dictable) interventions may discourage trade and private storage, and in this way
increase price instabil ity. The same may happen if the price band used to trigger
interventions is too narrow (hindering large-scale trade) or if the ceiling price is not
sufficiently high to cover production and storage costs. The effect is even more
disastrous if the State announces an intervention then fails to intervene (see box 15
on the maize price stabilization policies of different eastern and southern African
countries). Clumsy public interventions may in the long run block the development of
A-instruments (e.g. warehouse receipt systems). The governance of price stabilization
policies can nevertheless be improved by following a few simple rules (1.5.3.). The State
must establish intervention prices (floor price and ceiling price) at realistic levels. These
intervention prices should be announced in advance and must be observed. Improving
the governance of stabilization policies may involve setting up forums with private
actors (see box 16 on the platform set up in Madagascar for rice). 
Another perverse effect of C-instruments is the budgetary instability they may cause.
The cost of C-instruments is not evenly spread over time. They are particularly costly
in situations of soaring prices for here the State must resort to costly interventions
April 2013 / Managing food price instability in developing countries /©AFD [ ]
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(e.g. reduced taxes, subsidies or use of public stocks). Some economists have even
argued that stabilization policies simply shift instability from prices to other variables,
such as the State's budget. We can even go further and consider that budgetary
instability may lead to policy instability (as these are dropped when the State can no
longer support their financial cost). This instability can then in turn enhance price
instability. As we have already seen, solutions to this problem can be found by govern-
ment use of B-instruments and by the setting-up of international D-instruments
targeting DCs (1.6.1.). 
Also, variable border measures have the perverse effect of exporting instability onto
the international market. This is seen for tariffs, subsidies and quotas. A famous
example of grain prices being destabilized by border measures occurred when many
countries banned rice exports in 2008. These measures (taken in response to soaring
international prices), reduced supplies on the international market and exacerbated
the price surge (Headey and Fan, 2008; Christiaensen, 2009; Headey, 2011). Mirroring
this, export subsidies (set up in times of surplus) will depress international prices.
The same problem is encountered in importing countries. Variable import tariffs
mean that these countries’ demand on the international market is rendered insensitive
to price. This demand rigidity means that all adjustments are made by the supply
side, and this amplifies price instability. But these destabilizing effects are different
from one country to another: they are major for large countries and negligible for small
countries. They are also probably more marked for exporting than for importing
countries. These negative externalities prompt us to consider the role the interna-
tional community should play in regulating border measures (through the WTO) and
stabilizing international prices (1.6.2 and 1.6.3).
Finally, by biasing price incentives in its favor, stabilization policies may cause excessive
development of the agricultural sector. This may take the form of an excessive growth
in production (particularly if the price stabilization measures are coupled with input
subsidies.[ 99 ] Given that food consumption is rigid (increasing little when prices fall),
this surplus is difficult to absorb in the domestic market. If the good is non-tradable,
or if the country is landlocked, the surplus is also difficult to export. Two courses of
action are then possible. Either the government at all costs defends the floor price
it established, which is excessively costly, [ 100 ] or it gives up the fight and the overpro-
[ ] ©AFD / Managing food price instability in developing countries / April 2013
[ 99 ] This is not purely hypothetical: Zambia generated a surplus of about 1,000,000 tonnes of maize in 2010. 
[ 100 ] It has for instance been estimated that Zambian public maize stocks in 2010 cost 2% of GDP and 5% of the 
State budget (Nkonde et al., 2011). 
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duction causes prices to collapse with the risk of causing production to fall the
following year (cobweb dynamics). Moreover, if, thanks to the floor price, the agri-
cultural sector continues to attract a large proportion of capital and labor, it may
slow the development of non-agricultural rural and urban activities that play a major
role in structurally transforming the economies of DCs (Timmer, 2009a). These pro-
blems appear to be caused by the inappropriate use of C-instruments, namely a floor
price fixed too high (see the example of Zambia in box 14) or maintained for too
long a period when no longer necessary because agriculture has already undergone
its structural transformation (see the example of the European Union). The solution
here is to fix the floor price at the right level then gradually reduce it in line with the
modernization of the country's agriculture. It is nevertheless noteworthy that the
reduction in the floor price must be undertaken gradually for although it stimulates
the development of non-agricultural activities, it may also cause excessive outflows
of labor from the agricultural sector. The optimal dosage must therefore be found
that balances the rate at which non-agricultural activities are developing with that of
labor movements to these activities .[ 101 ]
2.3.7. What can we achieve with C-instruments?
Should C-instruments be used? Are these much criticized instruments useful or
necessary for managing the problem of food price instability in developing countries?
The answer is clearly “yes". C-instruments are indispensable for the management of
imported and endogenous instability (where all other instrument categories are
powerless) and of great use when dealing with natural instability (where all other
instrument categories are insufficient). By stabilizing prices, C-instruments make a
major contribution to improving the food security of developing countries. Price
stabilization by C-instruments also stimulates green revolutions (that are obstructed
if prices are too instable), and this has knock-on effects in other sectors of the eco-
nomy and thus accelerates the country's development. 
What can States (or Regional Economic Communities) do? They can implement
effective food price stabilization policies on their internal markets. Different C-ins-
truments are available to them for this purpose, with the most important consisting
April 2013 / Managing food price instability in developing countries /©AFD [ ]
2. Selecting the right instruments for strategy implementation
[101 ] Some experts have put forward the idea that these problems can be solved by production quotas where 
floor prices are guaranteed for limited quantities of product. This option has a number of disadvantages: it is 
costly to administer and could give rise to corruption. It is more logical, simpler and more effective, to gradually
reduce the floor price, particularly if the country has already accomplished its green revolution. Once the floor
price is so low that it loses all economic meaning , it can simply be abolished.
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of border measures and public stocks. The instruments used must be selected to
match the context as their relevance depends greatly on local circumstances (country
or product characteristics). Border measures are in most cases necessary and it is often
pertinent for these to be supplemented by public stocks. Border measures are restrict-
ed by WTO rules, but States nevertheless do have some room for maneuver. When
green revolutions are well advanced, the scheme can be lightened (floor price gradually
reduced then abolished). But, the floor price must not be reduced too rapidly in order
to slow the flow of labor leaving agriculture and thus facilitate its absorption by other
sectors of the economy. The ceiling price, on the other hand, must be maintained for
a while in order to protect consumers. It is only once the economy has developed
sufficiently that the ceiling price is no longer needed since at this point, food accounts
for only a small proportion of household expenditures and price instability has few
consequences in terms of food security.
The governance of these instruments is vital if stabilization policies are to be suc-
cessful. Good governance means realistic stabilization targets (a broad price band
moving with long-term market trends) and sufficient resources being invested in the
operation. Public intervention must be rule-based, predictable (measures announced),
credible (the State must keep to its word) and free from collusion with private actors
(if, for example, the State imposes import or export quotas, it is preferable for these
quotas to be allocated by auction).
Policies that aim to stabilize domestic prices are obviously the responsibility of
DC States or Regional Economic Communities, though some may find it difficult to
develop or finance a pertinent and consistent stabilization policy. Support from the
international community may in this case prove necessary. Also, as stabilization policies
conducted by different countries may lead to the instability being exported onto
international markets (particularly when based on border measures), international
rules are required to restrict these destabilizing effects on international prices without
preventing developing countries from stabilizing their domestic prices. Current WTO
rules need to be modified in order to play this role in a satisfactory manner. For the
same reason, C-instruments should be used by the international community to sta-
bilize prices of basic food products on international markets. We will return to these
questions in the book's general conclusion.
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2.4. D-instruments: a vital role whose structural 
part must be expanded
D-instruments aim to transfer a good (food, cash, food vouchers and sometimes
inputs) to certain categories of the population (persons suffering from malnutrition
or vulnerable to malnutrition, e.g. young children; poor households or households
living in areas considered to be “at risk"). Conventionally, D-instruments are activated
only in a crisis. But certain D-instruments are being increasingly activated in a structural
manner to recapitalize households that have fallen into the poverty trap. Here, the
aim is to increase their resilience to shocks. 
Unlike C-instruments, D-instruments enjoy a great deal of legitimacy. Virtually no-one,
even the most “liberal", contests the need for public intervention when this saves lives
(Hayek, 1988). In the "optimal strategy", the protection afforded to poor consumers
relies almost exclusively on D-instruments (1.2.1). 
Although the principle of using D-instruments is virtually unquestioned, many have
criticized the manner in which they are implemented in practice, and a great deal
has been written on the distortions and perverse effects of food aid. For instance, if
aid is excessive or does not arrive at the right place at the right time, it may cause
prices to collapse which is detrimental to producers and all those holding stocks.
Perverse effects may also be structural: the fear that excessive food aid is about to
be distributed, causing prices to collapse, can be enough to induce a crowding out
effect on stocks and investment. Like for C-instruments, poorly managed D-instru-
ments may obstruct the development and use of A-instruments. These criticisms
have resulted in the emergence of codes of good practice, such as the Charter for
Food Crisis Prevention and Management drawn up by the countries in the CILSS
and the Club du Sahel. Some countries have made major efforts to improve the
governance of D-instruments (see box 21 on the Programme de Restructuration du
Marché Céréalier in Mali). Conventional instruments such as food aid have on some
occasions been replaced by others that cause less distortion (such as cash transfers). 
In addition to their perverse effects, it is the limitations of D-instruments that have
recently been highlighted, particularly since 2005 in Sahel countries. The “Niger crisis"
in particular heightened the awareness of many experts, policy-makers and donors
to the huge vulnerability of many households decapitalized by successive crises.
D-instruments in such cases are blamed for failing to prevent household decapita-
lization and the worsening of the nutritional situation of the most vulnerable.
Paradoxically, although the legitimacy of D-instruments is not in question, they are
at present in "crisis" and this is an opportunity for change. 
April 2013 / Managing food price instability in developing countries /©AFD [ ]
2. Selecting the right instruments for strategy implementation
ASavoir_N17_GB_BAT_2_(V2).qxp  12/04/13  8:37  Page 205
206
A SAVOIR
We will begin by presenting the rationale of D-instruments. We will then describe the
diversity of D-instruments and the characteristics that set them apart one from ano-
ther. We will then discuss the complementarity and substitutability relations between
D-instruments and between these instruments and those in other categories. We will
then address the question of obstacles to the use of D-instruments before outlining
their advantages, limitations and perverse effects, and will conclude on the role that
should be given to D-instruments in the food price instability management scheme.
2.4.1. The rationale of D-instruments
D-instruments aim to transfer goods to certain household categories (possibly with
a matching contribution). The aim here is to ensure that poor households do not
reduce their food consumption and production, and remain in possession of the
resources required to react to future price shocks.
2.4.2. The different D-instruments
D-instruments differ by a) the nature of the goods transferred, b) the nature of
the matching contribution, c) the targeting of beneficiaries and d) the structural or
conjunctural character of instrument activation. The goods transferred may take the
form of food or cash, more rarely food vouchers or agricultural inputs. The matching
contribution (if any) may take the form of work (as in cash for work and food for
work ), or money (if the transferred goods are not distributed for free but subsidized,
as with moderately priced sales) or the adoption of specific behaviors by recipient
households (such as sending their children to school or attending family planning
awareness meetings) .[ 102 ] Targeting may rely on a wide variety of methods and may
be conducted on different scales: areas, population categories (e.g. children through
school food programs), households or individuals (e.g. underweight children or breast-
feeding women). A particularly interesting method is “self-targeting" that consists in
creating conditions such that only households requiring aid actually ask for it .[ 103 ]
Finally, transfers may be structural or be activated only in a crisis (if food prices rise
substantially). 
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[102 ] The Progresa (now Oportunidades) program developed by Mexico was the main source of inspiration for 
these conditional transfer programs. This Mexican program kicked off with 300,000 beneficiary households in 
1997 and today has 5 million participants. Other conditional transfer programs have been developed in other 
emerging or developing countries, the most famous being Bolsa Família in Brazil and the Productive Safety Net 
Programme in Ethiopia.
[103 ] As self-targeting introduces a degree of flexibility (households in part choose the quantity of transfers they 
receive), this may lend certain D-instruments one of the most beneficial properties of B-instruments.
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A plethora of instruments can be obtained by crossing the different modalities of
these four dimensions. Some, however, may only exist theoretically, or be seldom
used. Table 9 gives the main instruments used (classified according to the nature of
the goods transferred and the nature of the matching contribution).
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9Table D-instruments taxonomy in relation 
to the nature of the goods transferred and the nature 
of the matching contribution 
Food
























































These four dimensions are not independent. For instance, assets transfers are only used
structurally (to recapitalize households). The same applies to transfers conditioned
by the adoption of specific behaviors. By contrast, food for work and cash for work
programs are D-instruments suitable for emergency interventions. Another example of
interdependence between the dimensions is the fact that the nature of the goods
transferred and the nature of the matching contribution may facilitate self-targeting.
For example, if the good distributed or sold at a “moderate" price is a low-quality cereal,
this will not interest households with the means to buy supplies on the market.
Likewise, if the help is provided against unpleasant or poorly paid work, only house-
holds in difficulty will ask for it. 
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2.4.3. Complementarity and substitutability relations 
between D-instruments
These instruments aim to help vulnerable households maintain their production
or consumption levels even when their real income (purchasing power) falls. Their
effectiveness depends on the quality of the targeting (will all vulnerable households
receive aid?), the magnitude of the transfers, and their use by households. Also, the
effectiveness of an instrument must be balanced with its cost (what matters is effi-
ciency). Last, but not least, any distortions caused by D-instruments (e.g. price collapses
following an inflow of aid) must be taken into account.
When used alone, each D-instrument will have a hard job meeting all these per-
formance criteria given the trade-offs between them. For example, excessively strict
targeting (to reduce costs by avoiding transfers to households not in need), may
result in elevated administrative costs and above all may lead to a proportion of the
vulnerable population being overlooked. Mirroring this, “spreading the net as wide as
possible" will result in high costs and generate distortions. Based on this, two stand-
points are possible. The first consists in considering D-instruments as imperfectly
substitutable one with another. Some are better than others according to certain
criteria, but less good when measured using the yardstick of other criteria. From this
standpoint, D-instruments should be chosen by weighing their different advantages
against their disadvantages. Different authors have put forward “decision trees” intend-
ed to provide guidance when choosing D-instruments (Barrett and Maxwell, 2006;
Creti and Jaspars, 2006). The second standpoint consists in constructing combinations
of complementary instruments such that the disadvantages of some are compensated
by the advantages of others. We will now consider these two approaches.
Choosing between imperfectly substitutable instruments
Here, the aim is to choose a D-instrument by weighing its advantages and disadvan-
tages against those of other D-instruments. A first step is to show how the different
characteristics of D-instruments affect their performance. We will consider succes-
sively the nature of the goods transferred, the nature of the matching contribution,
the targeting of beneficiaries and the structural or conjunctural character of the
transfer. 
Transfers in kind (i.e. food products or inputs rather than cash) have certain advantages
but also many disadvantages. Let us start with the advantages. First, as already men-
tioned, transfers in kind can contribute to self-targeting if the goods transferred are
of poor quality. Second, they encourage households to use the transfers they receive
[ ] ©AFD / Managing food price instability in developing countries / April 2013
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to maintain food consumption or production (true, households can always sell the
food or the inputs they receive but this generates transaction costs). Third, particularly
in Africa, cash transfers are often managed by men whereas food transfers are manag-
ed by women and this contributes to the food being used for family consumption.
According to Rogers and Coates (2002), cash transfers, unlike food transfers, have
no effect on child caloric intake! However, transfers in kind also have disadvantages.
They generate additional costs (due to product distribution logistics) and above all they
are liable to cause distortions (an inflow of food aid may cause prices to collapse). 
Asking for a matching contribution also has advantages and disadvantages. Asking
for work in return facilitates self-targeting. Asking for money in return (i.e. subsidizing
instead of distributing for free) reduces costs and distortions (less difference with
the market price than for free distribution), but it reduces the amount of the trans-
fers and above all may exclude some extremely vulnerable households. Asking for a
matching contribution therefore has an ambiguous effect on the extent to which
vulnerable households are covered: it generates a positive effect through self-targeting
but also a negative effect by excluding some poor households. 
Targeting is also crucial. Different targeting methods may be used, and each has its
advantages and disadvantages (see box 19). Strict targeting aims to reserve aid for
those in need. It saves on costs and reduces distortions. If the savings made are added
to the aid, this can increase the average amount of the transfers. But if the targeting
goes too far, it generates high administrative costs and above all increases the risk of
excluding households really in need. This is why various authors have criticized “the
targeting obsession".
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The problem in low-income countries is not so much what is desirable, but what is
feasible. Effective instrument implementation is generally conditioned by three factors:
the financial capacity to fund interventions, the availability of the information required,
and administrative capacity. Limited financial capacity weighs on intervention design
as it forces a choice between the reach and the intensity of a given transfer. Concen-
trating resources on the poorest or most vulnerable is in this case the means to
increase the service that can be provided with a given budget or produce a given
impact at a lower cost. Another advantage of targeting is that it reduces the disturb-
ing effect of aid on the market (particularly if aid is reserved for those that cannot
access the market). Finally, aid is sometimes specifically aimed at lifting households or
groups out of the poverty trap, which once again involves targeting. 
It is therefore crucial to choose the right targeting method to reach the target popu-
lation since this to a great extent will determine the intervention's effectiveness.
Possible options include administrative targeting and self-targeting. Administrative
targeting means selecting specific regions, areas or communities (geographic targeting)
or specific households or persons (category-based targeting). The first type may be
used by planners or project personnel, but also by the recipient community (community-
based targeting). Self-targeting on the other hand does not rely on the selection of
participants but on incentive measures inserted into the intervention program in order
to restrict participation as much as possible to members of a target group. When
these incentives are introduced by making changes to market mechanisms, we use
the term market-based targeting.
When using administrative targeting, decisions on the eligibility of different persons
or groups are taken by “project" personnel on the basis of whether or not the candi-
dates correspond to predefined eligibility criteria. They may, for instance, include a
“resources" criterion: to be eligible for the program, the household or person must
possess the minimum quantity of resources required for adequate food consumption
(resource indicators may be based for instance on per capita income, areas cropped
and cattle hold). Such an approach therefore requires the collection and analysis of
much data. It should be noted here that most forms of targeting have an administrative
side, either for the definition of project areas, targeting criteria, or target groups. 
Geographic targeting is a possible version of administrative targeting and is used to
determine eligible beneficiaries. Interventions can be geographically targeted by region,
district, municipality or community if these areas are relatively homogeneous with
regard to the availability of food products, income or other vulnerability indicators.
This form of targeting is based on the fact that the poor are often concentrated in
The advantages and disadvantages of different
targeting methods
19Box
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certain regions. On the whole, the smaller the geographic unit employed, the more
precise the targeting. However, the paucity of data available for small geographic
units and the practical aspects of managing interventions may prevent small units
from being used. Category-based targeting methods use poverty-correlated individual
or family characteristics that, if possible, are easy to spot. Age and disability are
frequently used indicators. In the last version, called community-based targeting,
organizations in the community take decisions on allocating transfers in accordance
with predefined criteria. In some cases, the communities may even contribute to
designing these criteria. The target group, household or person is often selected by a
multilevel targeting scheme: geographic targeting is employed to select large areas
(regions, groups of villages), within which eligibility criteria are applied to households
or persons. 
Conversely, self-targeting means that a good or service is made available to all, but is
designed in such a manner that only the poor will choose it. Poorly paid, unpleasant
physical labor will not interest those who are not poor. Likewise, poor-quality food
will find buyers only among the poor. In general, the greater the advantages, the less
precise the self-targeting. Whereas other forms of targeting require human resources
(and information) to decide on criteria and check eligibility, with self-targeting, the
decision whether or not to take part is taken directly by the household or person
concerned. This decision is based on three main factors: a) the cost of taking part (work,
long queues, etc.), b) the quantity and quality of the goods and/or services transferred
and c) the negative social image of taking part (stigmatization). Experience with past
crises has led many governments to consider using self-targeting during interventions
as a means to reduce budget costs and direct transfers more effectively to those most
in need. Market-based targeting is a form of self-targeting where access to aid depends
on the individual's choice to buy or sell specific goods and services on markets. 
There are no simple rules for selecting an appropriate targeting method and the
diverse natures of the contexts in which interventions take place often leads to huge
differences in the method of targeting finally chosen. In general, targeting strategies
must be in phase with the structural characteristics of the intervention area (roads,
institutions, human resources, etc.). Likewise, although certain targeting methods
go hand in hand with certain instruments, it is often necessary to combine methods in
efforts to increase overall effectiveness. For instance, combining self-targeting with
geographic targeting will yield a powerful, tried-and-tested targeting instrument, parti-
cularly for emergency food aid.
In an ideal world, maximum quantities would be transferred to target beneficiaries
with minimal leakage, but in reality some compromises must be made, firstly between
targeting precision and its cost. A second consists in arbitrating between the risk of 
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allowing certain individuals, who theoretically are not eligible, to access the aid, and
the risk of overlooking some of those in need. Broad targeting provides maximum
effectiveness but does not optimize the cost/effectiveness ratio (efficiency).
Conversely, narrow targeting increases efficiency to the detriment of effectiveness. 
Limited financial capacity and the fear of distorting markets have often led to a veri-
table “hunt for leaks" and a “targeting obsession" in the use of aid. But, focusing only
on leaks to the non-poor may lead to inadequate cover for the poor (Van de Walle,
Devereux). And where poverty is widespread, targeting is largely superfluous and
costly to administer. 
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Finally, the question of whether transfers should be structural or conjunctural is also
of major importance. Conjunctural measures are activated only when a “crisis" occurs
(e.g. when food prices soar). Structural transfers are far more costly and are therefore
liable to be of a lower magnitude. Their targeting can perhaps be better as not decided
in an emergency but based on large-scale surveys and substantial databases .[ 104 ] But
the main advantage of structural transfers is that they can recapitalize households
that have already fallen into the “poverty trap". Also, households can anticipate
structural transfers and may therefore count on them, facilitating their expectations
and encouraging investment. To this extent, “structural" instruments share common
features with private risk hedging B-instruments (insurance and hedging mechanisms).
Finally, the effects on distortions is not the same. Conjunctural transfers cause
distortions that are for the most part unpredictable. Structural transfers are regular
and predictable, and play a redistributing role. However, as we will see later, both
conjunctural and structural transfers are necessary (and to a large extent are com-
plementary).
Table 10 presents a summary of all the above considerations. Each line in the table
summarizes the manner by which the considered characteristic affects the perfor-
mance of D-instruments. For example, a transfer in kind has beneficial effects (com-
paratively to a cash transfer) on the proportion of vulnerable households covered
(thanks to self-targeting) and on household incentives to use the transfers received
2. Selecting the right instruments for strategy implementation
[ 104 ] When structural transfers do exist, their targeting scheme can be used for emergency transfers (the amounts
transferred are increased in periods of crisis). See for example the use of Ethiopian PSNP during the 2011 
food crisis in the Horn of Africa.. 
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to maintain its level of food consumption. By contrast, this transfer is more costly
and causes greater distortions than a cash transfer. 
Transfers in kind + + - -
(vs in cash)
Transfers with 





Strict targeting  
























The effect of the different characteristics 
of D-instruments on their performance
10Table
All the advantages and disadvantages of a given instrument can be characterized by
reading across the lines in this table which may therefore serve to compare different
D-instruments and provide guidance when choosing the right instrument in a given
context.  
Table 10 can also be read in a column-based manner where the question, for example,
is how to improve the proportion of vulnerable households covered (or how to reduce
costs or minimize distortions). Table 10 makes it obvious that several instruments
need to be used if the different performance criteria are to be met simultaneously.
And this highlights the complementarity between category D instruments. 
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Combining D-instruments to make the most of their complementarities
Analyzing efficient combinations of D-instruments in detail would take us far too long.
Not even an entire book would suffice. Here, we will simply make a few comments
on the subject. Firstly, it should be noted that, on the ground, a combination of
instruments is often employed in order to impact different populations or solve dif-
ferent problems. For example, certain instruments may aim to help poor households
maintain their level of consumption whereas others may focus on helping people most
at risk of malnutrition (such as young children and breast-feeding mothers). Secondly,
these instruments are often employed in a certain sequence. In times of crisis, the
first instruments used are the cheapest and those that cause the least distortion.
The other instruments are activated only later, if the crisis worsens. For instance, during
the 2004/2005 crisis in Niger, “soft" instruments were activated first (from the 2004
harvest): food for work, cash for work, free distributions for cereal banks and cattle
feed banks, and moderately priced grain sales in high-risk areas. It was only when the
crisis worsened that free distributions of food were organized on a large scale for
2.5 million people (see box 20). 
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Like in other Sahel countries, the government of Niger in 1999 set up a national scheme
for food crisis prevention and management based on shared decision-making and
management between the State of Niger and its main donors: the Dispositif national de
prévention et gestion des crises alimentaires (DNPGCA). The scheme is based on three
components: an information system, a coordinating and decision-making structure, and
intervention instruments. 
The information it needs is provided by an early warning system (EWS) drawing from
several information systems, namely agricultural surveys and market information
systems for agricultural products (SIMA) and cattle (SIMB). The Commission mixte de
concertation (CMC) along with its Select Committee (CRC) are charged with making
decisions. A consultative body, the Comité national PGCA, is intended to associate
different Niger ministries, administrations and NGOs in the decision-making process.
Decisions are implemented by the Cellule crise alimentaire (CCA) – reporting to the
Prime Minister's staff – supported by the grain marketing board (Office des produits
vivriers du Niger, OPVN) with assistance from regional and county committees (local
Lessons learned from the 2005 food and nutrition crisis 
in Niger and their application in the development 
of public schemes for crisis prevention and management
20Box
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authorities and technical services). Scheme-based interventions employ a range of
instruments: i) food for work, cash for work and cereal banks which are implemented
ex ante (before the lean period); ii) the sale of “moderately priced" grain, which has
become the scheme's instrument of choice because of its suitability for self-targeting
(grain – retail – sales involve long queues) and its capacity to weigh on prices; iii) the
distribution of free, emergency seed; iv) the distribution of zootechnic inputs; v) the
distribution of free food, considered as a last resort. These interventions are based on
the co-managed Stock national de réserve (SNR) and the common donors fund (FCD).
The SNR is made up of a physical stock (national emergency reserve or SNS consisting
of 50,000 tonnes of millet-sorghum) and a food security fund (FSA) equivalent to
60,000 tonnes of grain. 
The 2005 food crisis highlighted the weaknesses of this scheme hitherto considered
as particularly effective. More fundamentally, it showed how the causes of food inse-
curity have changed in the Sahel: the crisis did not arise from a shock in grain supplies,
but from the fact that a large portion of the rural population found it difficult to
access food. The living conditions of these households have been in constant decline
for the last 20 years, particularly in the main grain producing region of the country.
The Scheme – which closely monitored the possibility of a “supply crisis" – was unpre-
pared for the management of a “resilience crisis". 
At the end of 2004, after the harvest, EWS predictions focused on a deficit in the
production of grain and fodder, but failed to anticipate price tensions and problems
finding supplies on the regional market (namely in Nigeria). It did not take account
of an erosion in household resilience and did not include malnutrition that in conse-
quence was not monitored. 
An emergency plan was drawn up based on the sale of moderately priced grain and
mitigation actions (cereal banks and food for work based on labor-intensive infra-
structure projects). But the implementation of this plan was hindered by the fact that
the Scheme could not mobilize sufficient grain: firstly, the SNR was small (17,000 tonnes
instead of the 50,000 tonnes planned); then requests for aid sent to donors (78,000
tonnes of grain as an initial request in December) failed to elicit a reaction given that
donor attention was focused elsewhere (namely on the consequences of the tsunami
in the Indian Ocean); and finally, the Scheme, like the WFP, was unable to procure
supplies on the regional market because of the deficit in Nigeria (without counting the
ban placed on grain exports by neighboring Sahelian countries, in contradiction with
the rules of UEMOA). 
Against a background of record grain prices, the alert sounded by WFP (following a
nutritional survey) and the NGO MSF on the gravity of the infantile malnutrition
situation caused a heated debate in Niger and drew international media attention to 
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the crisis. The action taken by the Scheme was considered to be insufficient and
pressure from WFP and humanitarian agencies, taken up by the media, imposed a
humanitarian response based on the generalized distribution of free food. The Scheme's
cohesion started to crack and WFP acted alone in supporting the switch to emergency
aid against the will of other Scheme members. This resulted in a governance crisis. 
Whereas the government and WFP up to June had been unsuccessful in mobilizing
donors and thus procuring the financial and grain resources necessary for the Scheme's
mitigation plan, this second period saw the arrival in Niger of a host of aid actors
(United Nations agencies and international NGOs) and considerable financial and
human resources. In a very short period the Scheme and WFP agreed on a food
distribution program that was to concern 2.5 million people in the country.
In all, large-scale free food distributions and nutritional recovery operations contain-
ed the crisis and brought relief to populations in the lean period. But they failed to
prevent the decapitalization and reduction in the resilience of a large number of rural
households. 
Useful lessons about the instruments used by the Scheme may be learned from the
2005 crisis: 
• The sale of moderately priced grain showed that it has limitations when prices rise
substantially: if the subsidy is too high, all households want to gain access to the grain
and the self-targeting approach fails (which was the case when market prices soared).
If the subsidy is low, grain remains out of the reach of vulnerable households. 
• Food for work operations and the supply of cereal banks aim to improve the situation
of households both in the short and medium terms. But experience has shown that
the timelines inherent to setting up these actions are difficult to shorten in a severe
crisis and their potential benefits in this case are out of reach. 
• Free distribution. When other tools are insufficient, the distribution of free food
becomes the only solution. This distribution is not managed by the Scheme but by
humanitarian actors (WFP and international NGOs) that have the capacity to inter-
vene rapidly with substantial resources. The decision on whether or not to distribute free
food gave rise to heated discussions inside the Scheme, undermining its governance. 
More generally, the crisis in Niger turned a spotlight on the strong inter-relationships
between the structural and conjunctural determinants of food crises. Schemes must
adapt to this paradigm change. They must modify their warning system in order to very
closely monitor household resilience and changes in infantile malnutrition. They must
also modulate their response. Sahelian countries are currently renewing their instru-
ments, particularly with the introduction of projects that aim to strengthen vulnerable
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household “safety nets”. But the possible broadening of crisis prevention policies to
include more long-term food security determinants is still the subject of debate bet-
ween donors. In Niger, most donors would prefer to see the Scheme first consolidate
what it already does. 
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Communication based on Michiels and Egg (2008) 
2.4.4. Complementarity and substitutability relations 
between D-instruments and A-, B- and C-instruments
D-instruments and A-instruments have mainly complementary relations. Although
it is true that if poorly managed, D-instruments may crowd out A-instruments (causing
unexpected price falls, increasing the risk for market actors and discouraging them
from building up stocks), the broad range of D-instruments includes means that can
solve these perverse effects (targeting , cash aid rather than in kind, etc.). Otherwise,
D-instruments show marked complementary with A-instruments by making up for
their deficiencies and shortfalls. The most obvious complementarity concerns insolvent
households. A-instruments cannot do much to help them and this is the main reason
why D-instruments are necessary. Sometimes, a simple division of tasks is all that is
required, with A-instruments dealing with solvent households and D-instruments
with insolvent households. But sometimes this complementary goes even further.
For instance, cash transfers help markets develop by allowing insolvent actors to use
them. This in particular is the case for safety nets that provide structural transfers to
recapitalize vulnerable households, thereby allowing them to sustainably reconnect
with the market. Moreover, when transfers are made in kind and procurements are
made locally, purchases by the State or aid agencies are also a means to support the
development of A-instruments. For instance, WFP buy grain on commodity exchanges
in Ethiopia and Zambia. Finally, D-instruments also have a role to play in facilitating
the reconversion of people leaving agriculture when this undergoes its structural
transformation (green revolution). 
The relations between D-instruments and B-instruments are also mainly comple-
mentary in nature. As already mentioned, a sort of sharing of tasks is seen between
these two risk hedging instrument categories (1.2.1). B-instruments are fairly unsuited
to protecting consumers and the poor. They are also of little use in high-risk, non
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probabilizable situations. However, a degree of intersection may be seen between
the households covered by the two categories. For example, poor households may
have access to microcredit. It is therefore not entirely impossible that (free) D-instru-
ments could sometimes slow the growth of (costly) B-instruments. However, this is
very much a fringe phenomenon in DCs given that i) B-instruments are almost
inexistent in these countries ii) households with access to D-instruments are almost
always different from those with access to B-instruments.  
Their relations with C-instruments fall more into the realm of substitutability because
of the budgetary arbitrage between these two instrument categories. However, this
should not mask the deep-seated complementarity that unites D-instruments and
C-instruments. On the one hand, by preventing food prices from rising excessively,
C-instruments can i) reduce the number of households needing emergency aid (thus
facilitating targeted transfers through D-instruments) and ii) reduce household
decapitalization (thus facilitating the work of safety nets aiming to increase vulne-
rable household resilience by providing structural transfers). On the other hand,
D-instrument do what C-instruments are unable to do, such as protecting vulnerable
households from moderate price rises or recapitalizing households that are already
in the poverty trap. 
2.4.5. Obstacles hindering the use of D-instruments 
As D-instruments are public, their development does not run into the same pro-
blems as private A-instruments or B-instruments whose growth is dependent upon
whether or not private actors take the risk of investing in their development or are
willing to use them. In principle, D-instruments (like C-instruments), are dependent
only upon the political will of governments. 
The problem, however, is more complex. D-instruments may prove to be too expensive
with respect to a State's limited budget resources. This problem is particularly acute
for structural transfers (due to their cost): this is why safety nets have shown little
development in DCs. This may lead to instrument undersizing (inadequate transfers
or very restrictive targeting). The problem is further worsened by imperfect targeting
that results in part of the transfers going to people not in need. 
Another problem is the State's skills in governing D-instruments. If transfers are to be
made to targeted people (while avoiding leaks and perverse effects), then adequate
infrastructure, qualified personnel, information systems and databases are required.
Emerging countries such as Brazil and Mexico often possess the necessary resources, but
many developing countries do not. 
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These problems can in part be overcome by judiciously selecting the D-instruments
used and the manner in which they are implemented. For instance, successful
self-targeting both minimizes leaks and avoids targeting-related information and
administrative problems. It thus makes a dual saving on costs. External financial
assistance is nevertheless almost always necessary to support the development of
D-instruments in developing countries.
2.4.6. The advantages, limitations and perverse effects of D-instruments
The advantages of D-instruments
D-instruments play a crucial role as they can achieve what no other instruments in
the other categories can achieve. Firstly, they alone are able to protect insolvent
consumers from food insecurity. In addition, not only can they help them face up to
shocks, they can also help in a more dynamic perspective by recapitalizing house-
holds in order to increase their resilience to future shocks and lift them out of the
poverty trap. To do this, D-instruments must be activated in a structural manner
(not only in crisis periods). Finally, if price stabilization has allowed a green revolution
to take place, then many households will be obliged to leave agriculture. D-instruments
have a major role to play here by helping people during this structural mutation
(namely by facilitating their connection with the labor market in rural and urban areas). 
Also, when activated in a structural manner, D-instruments have predictable effects.
In this case they enhance the security of poor, vulnerable households and thus play
the same role as that played by B-instruments for wealthier households and enter-
prises. D-instruments thus admirably supplement B-instruments insofar as the two
do not in general target the same users (for a more detailed analysis of the comple-
mentarity between D-instruments and B-instruments see 1.2.1.)
If well managed, D-instruments can also boost the development of A-instruments.
Firstly, certain instruments (moderately priced sales, cash transfers, food vouchers),
can help insolvent households reconnect with the market. Secondly, when aid is pro-
vided in kind and is purchased locally, these purchases by the State or aid agency (such
as WFP) may constitute a powerful incentive for market modernization (dissemination
of quality standards, development of a “culture" of compliance with contracts, increase
in the use of warehouse receipt systems and commodity exchanges, etc.).
Finally, D-instruments may also intervene on another scale to support countries that
find themselves in difficulties due to price instability. For example, importing countries
facing soaring international prices may rapidly run short of foreign exchange reserves.
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This may lead to a rationing of food imports or a fall in the exchange rate. These effects
can be avoided by developing meta-D-instruments (designed for countries), e.g. the
STABIMP mechanism that was mentioned above (see 1.6.1.). 
The limitations of D-instruments
In the “optimal strategy", D-instruments were alone responsible for ensuring the
food security of poor consumers. 
The 2005 Niger crisis strikingly highlighted the limitations of D-instruments, at least
in their classical role of providing emergency aid. Although food aid and other
D-instruments used in periods of crisis over the last few decades have avoided famines
(or reduced their magnitude), they have not managed (for example in the Sahel coun-
tries) to prevent the decapitalization of poor households that are now very vulnerable
to (even small) shocks. This means that D-instruments are not enough to protect
vulnerable households from food insecurity: a ceiling price (provided by C-instruments)
also needs to be set. But this also means that the use of D-instruments should be
expanded through a revision of the rationale behind their activation. D-instruments
have a more important role to play than simply emergency aid: certain D-instruments
should be used more structurally to recapitalize households. Some schemes are
already doing this, such as the Productive Safety Net Programme [PSNP] in Ethiopia
(Gilligan et al., 2009). 
Another limitation is flawed targeting. The risk here is that certain people in need
will not receive the transfers provided by D-instruments. This risk can be minimized
by opting for “broad" targeting. But here the risk is that costs will rise considerably
(and perverse effects will be generated). The targeting must therefore be “right",
i.e. sufficiently strict to reduce costs and adverse effects, but not too strict so as not
to run the risk of failing to cover households in difficulty (and also keep targeting
costs within reasonable limits). But the “right" targeting can only be achieved if
information systems and databases are available. Targeting , particularly in sub-Saharan
Africa, has often been based on the concept of “high risk areas". These areas are atten-
tively monitored by specialized information systems: early warning systems [EWS].
The EWS gather data of different types such as grain production, grain prices, the
relative price of grain and small ruminants (that often play the role of savings in kind),
and dispensary attendance rates. When several indicators swing into the red, the
alert is sounded. These schemes have long been considered as effective, but the
2005 Niger crisis spotlighted their limitations. Firstly, indicators mainly based on
large-amplitude shocks are of limited relevance when small shocks are enough to
push households into the red (because they are decapitalized). Secondly, given that
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food insecurity is increasingly urban, the “high risk area" concept is less and less
relevant. An alternative would be to operate targeting at the household level, but
this would require large (regularly updated) databases. Some emerging countries
(such as Brazil), but very few developing countries, possess such databases. 
The perverse effects of D-instruments
If poorly managed, D-instruments can cause perverse effects. In particular, excessive
or poorly-targeted food aid may cause prices to collapse. The simple possibility of this
risk may be sufficient to discourage private storage (crowding out effect), or even
obstruct the development of A-instruments.
These perverse effects have a number of causes. The problem may arise from the
governance of D-instruments, for example if public decision-makers cave in to pressure
from the street or lobbies, or take action based on cronyism. Flawed targeting may
also cause distortions. Finally, logistic problems may further worsen the situation
(for example if aid is delivered too late).
Solutions to the above lie in part in recourse to D-instruments that cause less distortion
(such as cash transfers). And above all in better governance. These interventions, like
for C-instruments, must be regulated by rules, and these rules must be announced
in advance and must be observed. Good governance practices must be adopted
both by developing countries and by donors as both in the past have failed in this
area (it has happened that the quantity of food aid provided has correlated more
with the stocks of donor countries than with the needs of recipient countries).
These good governance practices may be expressed in charters such as the Charter
for Food Crisis Prevention and Management drawn up by the countries in the CILSS
and the Club du Sahel. They may also arise from bilateral agreements between the
governments of developing countries and the donor community (see box 21 for the
example of the Programme de Restructuration du Marché Céréalier [PRMC] in Mali).
However, with the spread of democracy in Africa, the emergence of a civil society
and the call for food sovereignty, aid co-management practices with donors are
starting to show their limitations. For instance, in Sahel countries (Burkina Faso, Mali
and Niger), in addition to the public stock co-managed with donors, another stock
has been set up managed in a discretionary manner by the government.
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Coordination of public interventions as a tool 
for instrument governance: the case of the Programme 




In low-income developing countries, price instability is increased by unstable food
policies. These countries lack the resources necessary to implement policies in this field,
and when donors make up for this lack, their efforts are often made in a piecemeal,
uncoordinated fashion that reduces the consistency of public interventions. 
PRMC’s solution to this problem is often cited as an example. The program was launched
in 1981, just before a structural adjustment program was signed with the IMF, and was
part of a proactive policy intended to facilitate and complement the market liberaliza-
tion process. This policy aimed to promote food security by improving grain market
efficiency and by reducing the distortions arising from public interventions. 
PRMC's novelty was that it instituted State-donor joint decision-making for the use
of two instruments that are highly strategic for the country's grain policy and food
security: the emergency reserve (Stock National de Sécurité, SNS) and a fund built up
from food aid (first, revenue generated by sale of the food received; then monetary aid).
In both cases, State-donor co-management was based on dual signature. This scheme
played a major role in driving grain and food policies. It presents two advantages. 
First, it coordinates decision-making between donors and the State and – something
far rarer – between donors themselves. This coordination has proved to function well
– meetings of the PRMC technical committee are effective in terms of debate and
decision-making – though they are driven more by donors than by the Malian
experts and policy-makers who in the main are rather reticent about liberalization.
It also led to improved coordination between the different structures within the Malian
administration: namely the grain marketing board OPAM (in charge of managing the
SNS and which has now been placed under the control of a State/donors plan contract)
and the ministries of Finance, Trade and Rural Development. It succeeded in rendering
grain policy more consistent and more effective.
PRMC's second advantage is that for two decades it has directly or indirectly mobilized
substantial resources in support of dry cereals (millet, sorghum and maize), a sector
hitherto neglected by an agricultural policy that focused on cotton and irrigated rice
grown in the Office du Niger area.
Over its first phase (1981-87), PRMC helped the State withdraw from the grain sector
(public monopolies were dismantled and price controls removed). It accomplished
this by using food aid to avoid sudden price hikes and by restructuring OPAM and
taking charge of SNS management. It then played a major role in building the market 
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through actions to stimulate market competition and transparency in the face of
an oligopoly of large wholesalers (namely those engaged in rice importation): it
financed the grain market information system (MIS that was later converted into the
Observatoire du Marché Agricole [OMA]), supported the setting up of small whole-
salers’ organizations, provided credit to wholesalers, and placed variable tariffs on
imported rice. At the same time, PRMC organized itself in order to ensure its mission
regarding food crisis prevention and management, which entailed the setting up of an
information system (agricultural survey, grain balance sheets and EWS). PRMC there-
fore played a key role in a food security policy that was constrained by the structural
adjustment program. In line with the aims of market liberalization, it prevented public
stocks and food aid tools from being used to stabilize prices whereas at the same time
it avoided food crises by preserving room for maneuver for public interventions
targeted on populations and areas in difficulty.
Looking back on PRMC's activities, it may be stated that it has helped improve the
efficiency of the grain market and food security in Mali. Its role in making grain policies
consistent is often cited as a reference.
But is the PRMC model still valid today? As such, the model is suited to facilitating and
complementing liberalization policies. Back then, when State intervention was vilified
and strictly limited to the provision of public goods, co-management both helped the
Malian authorities make the reforms recommended by donors and implement a num-
ber of measures excluded from the structural adjustment program (namely lending
the SNS a role that went beyond the conventional role of emergency reserves). Today,
the spread of democracy that began in the late 1990s, the weight of public opinion, the
growing role of the media in consumer defense, the increasing popularity of the notion
of food sovereignty, and recently, the new-found legitimacy of public interventions
when food security is threatened, mean that the co-management model is no longer
applicable. 
PRMC's role was called into question in the early 2000s following a reduction in donor
involvement and, above all, because the field of food security was reappropriated by
the national authorities. PRMC was criticized for being first and foremost the donors'
instrument and for having placed the emphasis on short-term policies that did not
free the country from its dependency on imported food. The Commissariat à la Sécurité
Alimentaire (CSA), reporting directly to the President, was set up in 2004 with a more
comprehensive, strategic approach to food security and the goal of better connecting
food crisis management (short-term food security) with the development of agricul-
tural production (long-term food security). PRMC kept its mandate of food crisis
prevention/management and it now operates as a CSA department. But its mission
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2.4.7. What can we achieve with D-instruments?
What attitude should governments and donors adopt with regard to D-instruments?
These instruments play an indispensable role in protecting vulnerable households
from food insecurity. Only D-instruments are able to ensure that insolvent house-
holds maintain their capacity to consume. D-instruments are therefore “must-haves",
even though when used alone they are not enough to guarantee food security. 
The manner in which D-instruments are used should nevertheless be modified.
Their perverse effects must be reduced by improving their governance and, when
possible, by choosing less distorting instruments. This will prevent them from damaging
private stocks and more broadly the development of A-instruments. It is even possible,
and desirable, to select and implement D-instruments in such a manner that they
have beneficial effects on A-instruments. For instance, cash aid can connect insolvent
consumers to the market. Also, public stocks induce food procurement that can be
made an instrument of market modernization. 
And above all, certain D-instruments must be used structurally rather than simply as
crisis management tools. Here, the aim is to maintain or restore household capitals
and thus maintain the capacity of households to manage risk (resilience). If it follows
clear rules, the structural use of D-instruments also has the advantage of providing
a degree of predictability for the beneficiaries of transfers. This reduces the risk facing
these actors and thus encourages them to invest (a little like the expected effect of
B-instruments). Finally, if the structural transformation of agriculture (sought through
price stabilization) actually occurs, this will vest D-instruments with a new role (for
which plans should already start to be laid): that of helping the transition of labor
leaving agriculture.
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is henceforth part of a more ambitious framework that includes the decentralization
of food security policy to municipalities and its inclusion in ECOWAS's regional agri-
cultural policy. It can be imagined that the role of coordinating public inventions it
inherited from PRMC will be quite a challenge for CSA to meet. 
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Conclusion 
This book has analyzed the possible strategies and instruments that can be used to
manage the problem of food price instability in developing countries. What practical
conclusions can we draw from this analysis? 
Food price instability is a huge problem for developing countries  
Food price instability on domestic markets has dramatic consequences for consumers
with certain poor households being obliged to reduce their consumption during high-
price periods. These temporary reductions in consumption may have long-term effects:
a deterioration in the health of household members and even death for some. This
decrease in human capital, caused by undernutrition, may lead to a fall in household
income (as its production capacity is diminished) and an increase in its expenditures
(for example on drugs). The household thus becomes even more vulnerable to future
price shocks. Food price instability may also affect less poor households. Even though
they are not obliged to reduce their food consumption during high-price periods, they
are obliged – if they are to maintain their level of consumption – to dip into their savings
or sell some of their assets. This decapitalization reduces the household's capacity
to react to future shocks. Moreover, price instability causes agricultural producers to
invest very little. This low level of agricultural investment in turn keeps prices unstable as
production remains highly sensitive to climatic hazards and little responsive to price
incentives. This instability also results in high production costs which in turn maintain
food prices at high levels. When food products account for a significant percentage
of household expenditures, or a country’s trade balance or a State's budget, food price
instability can also generate macroeconomic instability. In some cases it can also induce
social unrest (see the urban riots that occurred in 2008 in about 40 DCs). All these
phenomena (undernutrition, decapitalization, lack of investment, green revolutions
blocked, macroeconomic and social instability) can hamper the economic development
of DCs.  
Food price instability on international markets further complicates the problem by
generating instability on domestic markets, by making it more difficult for countries
to use international markets to control their internal instability, and by generating
balance of payments imbalances in some importing and exporting countries. 
ASavoir_N17_GB_BAT_2_(V2).qxp  12/04/13  8:37  Page 225
226
A SAVOIR
Food price instability cannot be controlled solely by modernizing 
production and markets
This is because food price instability has three root causes…
We have seen that food price instability in a given country may be natural, imported
or endogenous. As imported instability itself is primarily the result of international price
instability (of natural or endogenous origin), food price instability may be considered to
be fundamentally due to natural factors and endogenous dynamics. These dynamics
may be divided into two categories: firstly the cobweb and secondly speculative bubbles
and panics. This means that we can identify three root causes of price instability:
Firstly, natural hazards and production sensitivity to these hazards. We have called this
natural instability.
The second is the “simultaneous" nature of production choices: sowing dates are
not so different for a given crop in different production areas (at least those in the
same hemisphere) and production lags mean that when some farmers are sowing the
others have not yet harvested their crop. Prices cannot therefore reveal to any given
farmer the production choices already made by the others. This leads to incorrect price
expectations (excessively optimistic if the price was high in t or excessively pessimistic
if the price was low in t). Collectively, this generates an excessive production reaction to
price variations (even though, at the individual level, production price elasticity is
low). This is the cobweb.
The third cause is the positive feedback between price movements and price expecta-
tions. Here, a price rise encourages the belief that prices will continue to rise. This belief
causes certain behaviors (massive purchases, stock retention) that drive prices up. This
positive feedback is the basis of speculative bubbles and panics.
…which can neither be eradicated…
Certain natural hazards (diseases, pests) could always be slightly reduced, but will never
disappear entirely. For those that are climatic in nature, the tendency is to increase
and the notion that we can obtain a status quo (thanks to international climate talks)
is already very optimistic. Appropriate technology (e.g. irrigation systems, drought-
resistant varieties, phytosanitary products or glasshouses) could be used to render
crops less sensitive to natural hazards. But this could never concern more than a
small proportion of the world's agricultural production. 
Attempts to prevent production decisions being taken simultaneously would mean
using varieties with such a short cycle that when some farmers are sowing others
have already harvested. A more balanced distribution of food production between
Conclusion 
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the two hemispheres could also help reduce the simultaneous nature of production
decisions. But whatever we do, we could only reduce, never eliminate, the source of
cobweb dynamics.
Finally, speculative bubbles and panics are based on deep-seated psychological
determinants such as the fear of going short and the desire for profit. 
If we accept that the causes of food price instability can never be eliminated, is it at
least possible to buffer their effect by improving food markets?
…nor sufficiently buffered by food markets. 
Food production can be a factor in price stabilization if it is highly responsive to
price movements. Cropped areas or yields must be rapidly increased if prices rise,
which means that extra land must be on hand or that inputs must be available to
boost yields. This is not always the case. Additionally, even when this is the case, the
production response is always uncertain (as it depends on climatic hazards) and
delayed (the production cycle lasts several months).
Private storage has a stabilizing effect on prices, and it is recognized that storage
buffers a large part of the instability caused by natural hazards (Williams and Wright,
1991). It also reduces cobweb dynamics. Finally, it discourages speculative bubbles
and panics. But very little multiannual private storage in actual fact takes place. 
Trade also has a very potent stabilizing effect by ensuring that deficits in some areas
are compensated by surpluses in others. If trade is able to connect areas that are
sufficiently far apart for natural hazards not to be correlated, it will diversify the risks
stemming from natural hazards. Trade can also reduce speculative practices and
panics but has a more ambiguous effect on the cobweb (some experts consider that
trade tends to “synchronize" local cobweb dynamics, ultimately increasing price
instability, cf. Boussard et al., 2006). Anyway, transport and transaction costs bound
long-distance trade. Although it is possible (and desirable) to reduce these costs by
developing infrastructures and market institutions, for products such as grain, the
stabilizing effect of trade will always be limited.
The capacity of production, storage and trade to stabilize prices is also weakened by
vicious circles that make food price instability a self-sustaining phenomenon. As price
instability is a risk for agricultural producers, it complicates their access to credit and
discourages them from investing. But without investment, agricultural production
remains sensitive to climatic hazards and little responsive to price incentives, and this
in turn maintains a high level of price instability. Price instability also makes storage,
Conclusion 
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and particularly multiannual storage, very risky.[ 105 ] Storage is therefore discouraged,
and this also contributes to maintaining price instability at a high level. Finally, food price
instability also pushes households to fall back on self-consumption strategies, which in
turn makes markets narrow and prices unstable. 
Risk management instruments cannot protect the producers 
and consumers of developing countries from food price instability  
In the 1980s and 90s, agricultural liberalization and the lapse or collapse of international
commodity agreements (ICAs) led many experts to predict a boom in risk-hedging
instruments (B-instruments). This has not yet happened in developing countries, at
least not for grain or other food products. Crop insurance and futures markets
have seen very little development in these countries. Moreover, even when they do
have access to these tools, DC producers and traders make very little use of them.
Theoretical reasons are behind this, namely adverse selection and moral hazard pro-
blems, and the systemic nature of certain risks (Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981; Cordier
and Debar, 2004).[ 106 ]
This of course may change in the future. Adverse selection and moral hazard problems
may be reduced or overcome by developing new B-instruments. For example, weather-
indexed insurance is better from this standpoint than crop insurance. The “systemic"
nature of certain risks (correlated risks) can in part be resolved by allowing the local
providers of risk-hedging tools to cover themselves through other B-instrument provi-
ders operating on a large scale. For instance, if traders and producer organizations
have the possibility to hedge their own risk on futures markets, they may accept to
set in advance the price they pay producers. Likewise, a microfinance institution or
a company offering the producers in a given area credit or crop insurance may hedge
the systemic risk of a poor harvest in this area by taking out weather-indexed insurance.  
Action may also be taken to stimulate the development of B-instruments or boost their
use by DC food producers and traders. This may take the form of technical support and
even subsidies (see action already undertaken by the World Bank, cf. CRMG, 2008).
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[ 105 ] Academic studies have shown that competitive private storage is optimal, but this is true only if it is assumed 
that actors likely to build up stocks (producers and traders) are risk-neutral (Williams and Wright, 1991).
[ 106 ] To which should be added practical problems stemming from a lack of information for market actors and 
the technicity of these instruments. 
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However, we should not forget that this approach has its own limitations. B-instruments
will likely undergo a certain degree of use in developing countries, including in the
food products sector. But access to these tools will likely – at best – be open to only
a small percentage of the country's producers and traders, and this particularly applies
to those involved in food products. The dashed hopes of the last 25 years should
urge us to caution when considering the development potential of B-instruments.
The rice futures contract set up in Bangkok in August 2004 (AFET White Rice 5%)
often has no quoted price because of a lack of transactions. 
At the same time, the capacity of public risk management tools (emergency D-instru-
ments) to protect consumers in developing countries from price rises is itself also
limited. Transferring food, cash or food vouchers to vulnerable households when crises
occur has proved to be insufficient as a strategy. The 2005 crisis in Niger demons-
trated that the main cause of malnutrition was to be found in the poor responsive
capacity of households decapitalized by a succession of crises (Michiels et al., 2008;
Michiels and Egg , 2008; Blein and Egg , 2009). Here again, risk management is not
enough: a structural change is needed to increase household resilience. 
We therefore, at this stage, appear to have reached a dead end. Food price instability
cannot be controlled solely by modernizing production and markets. And the produ-
cers, traders and consumers of developing countries cannot be effectively protected
from the consequences of this instability (because of the shortcomings of public
and private risk management instruments). 
The long-term solution lies in rendering price instability “inoffensive"
through green revolutions and economic development  
It should be recalled that the two main problems stemming from food price instability
are that it obstructs green revolutions and causes food insecurity. Therefore, price
instability is less serious in a country that has already completed its green revolution
and whose potential productivity gains have already been made. Only modest
investments are required (simply to replace worn out or obsolete equipment). Price
instability may nevertheless still be a major problem for consumers. However, once a
country has reached a sufficient level of development, the proportion of a household's
income spent on food tends to fall. Falling food prices (in real terms) contribute to
this. As does the increase in incomes induced by general economic development.
When food accounts for a small proportion of household expenditures, food price
instability is no longer a problem for consumers .[ 107 ]
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[ 107 ] Except for a few very poor households which should be helped using social transfers. 
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These two processes are closely interlinked as the structural transformation of
agriculture induced by green revolutions is a necessary step along the road to general
economic development (Timmer, 1988 and 2009a; World Bank, 2007; De Janvry,
2009; Barrett et al., 2010). Green revolutions release resources (capital and labor) for
other sectors of the economy. They reduce the cost of agricultural raw materials
and food (which in turn contributes to improving the nutritional condition of the
population and thus increases labor productivity). They generate foreign currency that
can be used to import machines and other equipment. Last, but not least, green
revolutions also result in increased agricultural income which i) boosts investment in
education and health (and thus increases labor productivity) and ii) creates rural and
urban employment in non agricultural sectors. 
The problem consists in triggering the process, i.e. paving the way for a “structural
transformation" in DC agriculture, while at the same time protecting consumers. 
A scheme based on all four instrument categories is needed to protect
consumers and pave the way for the “structural transformation" 
of DC agricultures 
According to the dominant doctrine – which we called the “optimal strategy” –, it is
the role of B-instruments to stimulate investments in agricultural production and
markets (whereas it is the role of D-instruments to protect poor consumers from
food insecurity, see 1.2.1). The rationale is that B-instruments (such as crop insurance,
weather-indexed insurance and price risk hedging tools), make it less risky to invest.
In theory, they may even stimulate investments by farmers and traders who do not
use these instruments: if a large enough proportion of actors use the instruments
and invest in agricultural production or marketing , this leads to less unstable prices
and therefore encourages other actors to invest as well (this is what we called the
“multiplier effect” of B-instruments, see 2.2.4). However, as we have already mentioned
on several occasions, B-instruments have so far been very seldom used by DC economic
actors. This could change in the future, but probably not to an extent that would
result in the structural transformation of DC agricultures (in particular, it is unlikely
that the critical mass required to induce the multiplier effect will one day be reached).
And in fact, no examples can be cited of countries that have achieved their green
revolution thanks to the security provided by B-instruments. History teaches us i) that
successful green revolutions have occurred only when price instability was moderate,
often thanks to floor prices supported by public schemes (see in particular the examples
of the European CAP and Asian rice policies) and ii) that farmers are able to use
B-instruments only after having increased their yields and their productivity.  
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The analyses presented in this book show that if developing countries are to achieve
the "structural transformation" of their agricultures while also protecting their
consumers from price surges, then they must use appropriate schemes based on a
combination of A-, B-, C- and D-instruments. These schemes rest on the following
six pillars:
Pillar 1: Instruments that aim to modernize production by stimulating investment in
agriculture: i) public goods (research and extension services) and ii) temporary input
subsidies (if necessary accompanied by the possibility to defer payment);  
Pillar 2: Instruments that aim to modernize markets by stimulating producer and trader
investments in infrastructure and market institutions: i) the public goods necessary
to allow markets to function properly (e.g. weights and measures) and ii) temporary
subsidies for certain instruments such that they can develop despite circularity
problems (2.1.5);
Pillar 3: Instruments that aim to stabilize expectations by providing information: i)
harvest forecasts, ii) prospective analyses of upcoming changes on the international
market, iii) stock estimates; 
Pillar 4: Instruments based on public interventions that aim to hold prices within a
predefined band by stabilizing internal availabilities : i) public stocks, and/or ii) variable
import and export tariffs or subsidies, and/or iii) import or export quotas; 
Pillar 5: Instruments that aim to transfer resources to vulnerable households both
during price crises (thus preventing nutritional problems and decapitalization) and
structurally (thus recapitalizing households): i) cash transfers with or without a mat-
ching contribution; ii) transfers in kind with or without a matching contribution; 
Pillar 6: Instruments used by States that aim to stabilize their budget or the country’s
balance of payments: i) futures markets; ii) weather insurance and iii) credits. 
Pillars 1 to 4 constitute a price-stabilizing scheme that can tackle all three types of
instability and their possible combinations. The resulting price stabilization will in
the short term protect consumers and producers, and in the long term will cause
agriculture to undergo a structural transformation in both its dimensions (production
and markets). This scheme will break the vicious cycle between price instability and
agricultural investment, and that between price instability and market narrowness
due to self-consumption. Pillars 1 to 3 are based on A-instruments. Pillars 1 and 2
help agriculture undergo a structural transformation both by stabilizing prices and
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removing other “obstacles" to production and market modernization (e.g. a lack of
public goods or circularity problems). Pillar 3 will increase market transparency and
price predictability. Pillar 4 is based on C-instruments and serves to stimulate the
investments necessary for the structural transformation of agriculture, and protect
consumers. A balanced scheme that protects both producers and consumers is easier
for the population to accept. The ceiling price serves both to protect consumers and
enhance the predictability of public interventions. Without such a ceiling , all know
the State will intervene if prices rise “too much", but do not know where the inter-
vention-triggering threshold is located. Finally, to ensure that the system operates,
the ceiling price must not be placed too low for in this case a large proportion of
storage and trade will no longer be profitable and the market will no longer be able
to function properly.
The system made up of pillars 1 to 4 will protect consumers in three ways. In the
short term by providing a ceiling price. In the medium term by causing food prices
to fall. This fall results from the modernization of production (green revolutions
decrease production costs) and the modernization of markets (large-scale spatial
arbitrage results in production being located in areas where production costs are
lowest). In the long term, since the general economic development stemming from
the structural transformation of agriculture will lead to staple food products
accounting for only a small proportion of household expenditures (therefore, any
instability in their prices will have few consequences in terms of food security). Yet this
is not enough to protect consumers, which is why pillar 5 – based on D-instruments –
is necessary (see 1.4.1.). Even moderate price rises may be enough in developing
countries to push vulnerable households into the red. Also, price stabilization cannot
help those who have already fallen into the poverty trap. D-instruments are therefore
necessary both conjuncturally (during crises) and structurally (for household recapi-
talization). D-instruments also play an essential role by accompanying the structural
transformation of agriculture. First, they can maintain or restore the connection
between the market and poor producers and consumers (through food vouchers or
cash transfers). Second, they are crucial in helping many rural households as they leave
agriculture by connecting them with non-agricultural rural activities and providing
access to the labor markets. Finally, D-instruments will always be needed in the long
term (even in cases of successful development) to help poor, vulnerable households.
In this case, they may primarily take the form of structural social transfers, as is already
the case in OECD countries.
In developing countries, food price instability does not only affect households (pro-
ducers and consumers). It also has an impact on macroeconomic variables, particularly
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the State's budget and the balance of payments. This impact may result directly
from price instability or arise from State policies enacted to counter price instability.
For example, reductions in import tariffs cause fiscal revenue to fall. In this case, the
instability is transferred from prices to the State's budget. This is a major problem
insofar as food price instability can in this case disrupt the country's entire economy.
Also, the budgetary impact of stabilization policies may compromise their sustainability.
The solution here is for States to protect themselves through B-instruments (futures
markets, agricultural insurance, credit): this is pillar 6. Let us suppose for example that
the State protects itself by taking out weather insurance. If the harvest is poor, it
must intervene (for example by releasing a part of public stocks onto the market, or
by decreasing import tariffs). These measures are relatively expensive, but their cost
is in part reimbursed by the insurance company. The same strategy can be used with
futures markets to provide protection against international price instability (see box
10 on the experience of Malawi in 2005). 
The scheme should of course be adapted to include the specificities of each different
country, as we have already seen (1.5.2). The weight of the different pillars may be
different from one country to the next. The instruments mobilized within a given
pillar may also vary. For example, pillar 4 – depending on the country – may rest on
public stocks, the regulation of imports, the regulation of exports, or on a combination
of these instruments (2.3.3). Finally, pillar 4 must only be used if it can be subject to
appropriate governance given that unpredictable public interventions may well increase,
instead of decrease, price instability (see box 15). The scheme loses its consistency if
pillar 4 is missing and the “structural transformation" of agriculture may not occur.
However, if pillar 4 is included but is poorly managed, the situation is even worse. 
The scheme should also be updated to match the country's progression along its
development path. The full scheme described above is suitable for developing countries
that have not yet accomplished their green revolution. Their agricultural yields and labor
productivity are low. Food prices are high and account for a substantial proportion
of household expenditures. Food price instability is a problem both for producers
(green revolution obstructed) and consumers (food insecurity). This is the current
situation in the vast majority of DCs. When countries have already completed their
green revolution, pillars 1 and 2 can be reduced by decreasing then doing away with
subsidies on inputs and market instruments. Similarly, pillar 4 can also be reduced,
the floor price being gradually lowered then abolished. However, the floor price
must not be reduced too rapidly so that labor flows out of agriculture at a rate that
can be absorbed by non-agricultural rural and urban activities. Price instability may
nevertheless still be a problem for consumers. This means that pillars 4 and 5 should
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be maintained, pillar 4 being based only on a ceiling price and pillar 5 being based on
transfers that are both structural and conjunctural (activated in crisis periods). Finally,
food price instability continues to cause macroeconomic imbalances, and here State
use of insurance instruments (pillar 6) comes into its own. For countries that are well
along the path in their economic development, grain and other staples account for only
a small proportion of household expenditures and price hikes have few consequences
in terms of food security. This means that pillar 4 may be removed (end of the ceiling
price) and pillar 5 may be reduced (structural transfers to poor households are still
necessary, but emergency interventions are no longer needed as food crises no longer
occur). Additionally, the weight of grain production in GDP and in international trade
has sufficiently decreased for price instability to no longer be a source of macroeco-
nomic imbalance. Pillar 6 (State use of insurance instruments) may be replaced by
the provision of information and training that facilitates the use of these instruments
by private actors (producers, traders, processors) .[ 108 ]
Here is should be specified that setting up this scheme may be constrained by
various limits over which States have little control, in particular foreign exchange
resources, budget resources, international price instability and WTO rules. Which
gives the international community a vital role to play.
The international community has a key role to play
The international community has a key role to play in helping developing countries
manage food price instability. This role may be divided into three components: provision
of bilateral aid to DCs, revision of WTO rules, and creation of an enabling environment
through a reduction in international price instability. 
Helping developing countries manage food price instability
Two types of support are needed: i) support for DCs to set up food price instability
management schemes and ii) specific support for countries facing difficulties paying
their food imports bill. This support may take the form of bilateral or multilateral
cooperation.
Helping DCs set up high-performance food price instability management schemes
(FPIMS) through technical assistance, the training of experts and financial aid. Technical
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[ 108 ] The recommendation to gradually do away with input subsidies and floor prices does not imply that agriculture
no longer needs public support in developed countries. It means that this aid (if justified) should take other 
forms. If the aim is to internalize the positive externalities generated by agricultural activities (the “multifunc-
tionality" of agriculture), then aid should depend on compliance with “good practices". If the aim is to encourage
a new structural transformation in agriculture (an “ecological" intensification, also called the “doubly green 
revolution"), aid here again must be conditional. 
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assistance is often necessary to help design these schemes. Training the experts who
will later be charged with implementing , operating and monitoring the scheme is
also crucial. Last, but not least, financial aid is needed as many developing countries
may find effective scheme implementation difficult given their limited budgetary
resources. This in particular is the case for policies designed to modernize production
and markets (pillars 1 and 2) and for safety nets, namely multiannual safety nets that
aim to recapitalize vulnerable households and thus increase their resilience (pillar 5).
Price stabilization policies (pillar 4) are less costly but are nevertheless beyond the reach
of many DCs. External aid is therefore often necessary, otherwise interventions may
well be too restricted (therefore ineffective) or intermittent (and therefore fail to
provide security to private actors). It would seem advisable therefore to set up a
competitive international fund to provide financial aid devoted to supporting price
stabilization policies (pillar 4). And this to tackle two problems. The first problem is
that poorly managed stabilization policies run the risk of causing a crowding out effect
on private stocks and imports, and thus increase rather than decrease price instability.
The second problem is that donors are reluctant to fund policies that have been
condemned for 25 years by the dominant doctrine. A competitive international fund
could contribute to solving them both. Introducing conditionalities and competition
between stabilization projects would guarantee the good governance of these policies,
particularly concerning transparent intervention prices and compliance therewith.
The fund would also lead to an accumulation of experience, and lessons learned would
be shared between DCs and the donor community. In this way, people's perception
of the advantages and limitations of stabilization policies would be based on empirical
evidences rather than on preconceived ideas. This means that the fund could kick off
with quite modest sums, with the idea being to initially finance a few pilot schemes. 
Helping “vulnerable" importing countries pay their food imports bill. International
price instability and/or production instability in DCs may cause sudden increases in
the food bill paid by importing countries. In certain countries this may cause the
exchange rate to fall or, worse, may lead to food import rationing. In such situations
external aid must be provided. This aid may take the form of food aid, but also credit
facilities or technical and financial support that facilitates government use of risk hedg-
ing tools (weather insurance, futures or options). In certain low-income countries it
may also take the form of a public scheme to stabilize food import expenditures
(inspired by the STABEX experience). 
However, the measures countries are allowed to use to stabilize prices on their
domestic market are restricted by WTO. The international community can there-
fore also help DCs by revising WTO rules in the light of their impact on food price
instability and food security. 
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WTO rules restrict the rights of countries to regulate their imports and exports .[ 109 ]
By so doing , they may deprive countries of the most effective stabilization instruments
they have. On the other hand, policies enacted by countries to regulate their imports
and exports may accentuate price instability on international markets. For example,
if exports are restricted in response to soaring international prices, this reduces
supplies on international markets, further increasing prices (as happened in 2008:
Headey and Fan, 2008; Christiaensen, 2009; Headey, 2011). These are clearly negative
externalities where the policies of certain countries have a negative effect on other
countries. WTO rules must therefore find the right balance: if too strict, they will
prevent countries from protecting themselves from turbulence on the international
market or from using the international market to protect themselves from internal
sources of instability; if too lax, they will increase the instability of international prices. 
Current WTO rules are a long way from striking this balance. Sometimes they are
too strict. For instance, variable import tariffs are prohibited (except in very special
cases) even though these are essential if importing countries are to stabilize domestic
prices, and often have only a fairly minor destabilizing effect on international prices
(particularly when levied by “small" countries). On the other hand, WTO rules may
sometimes be too lax. They allow countries to restrict food exports to any extent
they wish, and this can cause international prices to soar, or greatly accentuate price
surges (as occurred in 2008). It therefore seems reasonable to propose that importing
DCs should be given more freedom to use variable tariffs, and this especially concerns
“small" importing countries whose grain imports account for only a small proportion of
international trade. At the same time, the right of exporting countries to ban grain
exports should be restricted while leaving them the possibility to protect themselves
from international price surges.[ 110 ]
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[ 109 ] More precisely, they restrict the use of measures aiming to reduce imports (tariffs, quotas) or stimulate exports 
(subsidies). These rules therefore prevent countries from protecting themselves against falls in international 
prices. They also prevent them from using border measures when facing surplus harvests within the country.
In addition, WTO prohibits all tariffs and subsidies indexed on international or domestic prices. It authorizes 
ad hoc tariff changes under certain conditions, but the indexed nature of variable tariffs is critical if this 
instrument is to be effective as this alone guarantees tariff predictability (necessary to limit the crowding out 
effect on private stocks) and tariff reciprocity (necessary to ensure that this instrument is accepted by 
producers and consumers).
[ 110 ] A manner to proceed would be to authorize export quotas, with volumes set such to ensure sufficient supplies
for the domestic market. Experience gained with food aid (where volumes are often based on estimated 
food balance sheets) has shown that such an approach is feasible. 
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This change in WTO rules is necessary, but highly unlikely ever to be brought about .[ 111 ]
Moreover, even if new rules were to be adopted, they would hardly be enforced, at
least for rice which is crucial to the food security of the main exporting countries. Were
the international price of rice to soar, the governments of these countries are likely
to restrict rice exports (even if such restrictions were forbidden by the WTO) in order
to keep domestic prices at levels compatible with food security and social stability. In
other words, it is unrealistic to rely only on WTO rules to prevent “export ban bubbles”
(as happened on the rice market in 2008). The practical implication of this is that action
should be taken by the international community to reduce food price instability on
international markets. 
Reducing food price instability on international markets
Reducing food price instability on international markets is not a substitute for national
or regional policies that aim to reduce food price instabil ity on DC domestic
markets. First, it affects only imported instability. Second, it deals with only part of
this imported instability as parity prices may also vary because of changes in exchange
rates or transport costs. But reducing international price instability would create a far
more favorable environment for DCs. We have seen that they often find it difficult
to protect themselves from imported instability (1.3.2.) .  And international price
instability also complicates their use of the international market to counter natural
instability (1.3.2). Last, but not least, for some products (such as rice and to a lesser extent
wheat) the instability of international prices tends to be a self-sustained phenomenon
(see the export bans bubble that occurred in 2008). 
A widespread idea is that it is “impossible" to stabilize international prices through
storage policies. This idea is based on the presumption that the only way to reduce
international price instability is to build up huge public stocks managed by the inter-
national community. It also stems from the bitter aftertaste left by the failure of
International Commodity Agreements (ICAs). Almost all the stabilization schemes set
up by these agreements were dismantled in the 1980s, either because they were too
costly (the case for cacao) or subsequent to disagreements between producer and
consumer countries (the case for coffee). But in both cases the problems encountered
were exacerbated by the fact that the real aim of ICAs was not to stabilize but to
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[ 111 ] The proposal to change WTO rules in order to restrict the rights of countries to ban their food exports was 
discussed in 2011 during the G20 negotiation process. However, due to opposition from certain countries, 
the proposal included in the G20 action plan is far more modest (the measure is restricted to exports of “food
purchased for non-commercial humanitarian purposes by WFP”, see G20, 2011). Also, this modest proposal 
has not been endorsed by WTO. 
ASavoir_N17_GB_BAT_2_(V2).qxp  12/04/13  8:38  Page 237
238
A SAVOIR
support prices (Gilbert, 1996; OECD, 2011). It cannot therefore be concluded from
their failure that it is impossible for public schemes to stabilize international prices. 
In addition, using storage to stabilize international prices does not necessarily involve
the constitution of international public stocks. Less complex options can also be
envisaged, based on the idea that the management of national or regional stocks
can be coordinated. We have already seen that prices soar only when stocks are low
(see OECD, 2011 and figures 11 to 13). Maintaining stocks at sufficient levels would
therefore avoid price surges on international markets. This could be achieved through
an international agreement whereby countries (or Regional Economic Communities)
undertake to keep stocks equivalent to at least x months of their own consumption.
Another version of national stock coordination could concern the combined use of
these stocks in periods of crisis.
Finally, international price instability could also be reduced by specific policies that
tackle the main causes of international price instability: lack of market transparency,
excessive speculation on futures markets, biofuels, climate change, the cyclical nature of
agricultural investment and massive land purchases in certain countries. 
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Acronyms and Abbreviations
1GMIS First Generation Market Information System 
2GMIS Second Generation Market Information System
ACP African, Caribbean and Pacific 
AFD Agence française de développement
AFET Agricultural Futures Exchange of Thailand
AGRA Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa
ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations
BULOG Indonesian Food Logistics Agency
CAP Common Agricultural Policy
CBs Cereal Banks
CCA Cellule crise alimentaire (Niger)
CGD Center for Global Development
CIF Cost, Insurance and Freight
CILSS Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel 
CIRAD Centre de coopération internationale en recherche agronomique 
pour le développement
CMC Commission mixte de concertation (Niger)
COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CRMG Commodity Risk Management Group
CSA Commissariat à la sécurité alimentaire (Mali)
DC Developing Country
DfID Department for International Development (UK)
DJ-AIG Dow Jones – AIG Commodity Index
DNPGCA Dispositif national de prévention et gestion des crises alimentaires 
(Niger) 
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EAC East African Community
EAGC Eastern Africa Grain Council
ECART European Consortium for Agricultural Research in the Tropics
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
ECX Ethiopian Commodity Exchange
EDRI Ethiopian Development Research Institute
EGTE Ethiopian Grain Trading Enterprise
EWS Early Warning System
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
FAOSTAT FAO Statistics Division
FCFA Franc de la communauté financière africaine
FOB Free on Board
FPIMS Food Price Instability Management Scheme
FSA Fonds de sécurité alimentaire (Niger)
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GIEWS Global Information and Early Warning System
GMO Genetically Modified Organism
GNP Gross National Product
GREMA Groupe de recherche et d'échange sur la régulation des marchés agricoles 
(France)
ICAs International Commodity Agreements
ICT Information and Communication Technologies
IDDRI Institut du développement durable et des relations internationales 
(France)
IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFPRI International Food Policy Research Institute
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IGC International Grain Council
IMF International Monetary Fund
INRA Institut national de la recherche agronomique (France)
IRAM Institut de Recherches et d’Applications des Méthodes 
de Développement (France)
KACE Kenya Agricultural Commodity Exchange
LDC Least developed country
MAEE Ministère des Affaires étrangères et européennes (France)
MIS Market Information System
MRCs Market Resource Centres (Kenya)
MSU Michigan State University
NAIC Nigerian Agricultural Insurance Corporation 
NEPAD New Partnership for Africa's Development 
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NRI Natural Resources Institute
OdR Observatoire du riz (Madagascar)
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OMA Observatoire du marché agricole (Mali)
OPAM Office des produits alimentaires du Mali
OPVN Office des produits vivriers du Niger
OTC Over-the-Counter
PACDEX Pan African Commodity Derivatives Exchange 
PCP Plateforme de concertation et de pilotage de la filière riz (Madagascar)
PO Producer Organization
PM Import Parity Price 
PRMC Programme de restructuration du marché céréalier (Mali) 
PSNP Productive Safety Net Programme (Ethiopia)
PX Export Parity Price
Acronyms and Abbreviations
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RATIN Regional Agricultural Trade Intelligence Network (East Africa) 
S&P GSCI Standard & Poors - Goldman Sachs Commodity Index 
SAFEX South African Futures Exchange 
SIDA Swedish International Development Agency 
SIE Stock d’intervention de l’État (Mali)
SIMA Système d’information sur les marchés agricoles (Niger)
SIMB Système d’information sur les marchés du bétail (Niger)
SNR Stock national de réserve (Niger)
SNS Stock national de sécurité (Mali, Niger)
SPAU Stabilization Policy Analysis Unit
STABEX EEC-ACP export earnings stabilization scheme 
STABIMP Food import expenditures stabilization scheme
ToT Training of Trainers
TWLB Tanzania Warehouse Licensing Board 
UCE Uganda Commodity Exchange
UEMOA Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
USAID United States Agency for International Development 
USDA United States Department of Agriculture
VAT Value Added Tax
WFP World Food Programme
WRS Warehouse Receipts System
WTO World Trade Organization
WUR Wageningen University and Research Centre
ZACA Zambia Agricultural Commodity Agency
ZAMACE Zambia Agricultural Commodity Exchange
ZIMACE Zimbabwe Agricultural Commodity Exchange
ZNFU Zambia National Farmers Union
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Managing food price instability 
in developing countries
Food price instability has dramatic consequences in developing countries
where it hits consumers hard and causes food insecurity. The risk it entails
for producers is so great that it discourages them from investing. It therefore
obstructs green revolutions, and thereby blocks the road to economic deve-
lopment. In certain cases, price instability also generates political instability
and macroeconomic imbalances. Ever since the crises of 2005 (in the Sahel)
and 2008 (on international markets), the management of price instability
has figured large in the policies of developing countries and is back on the
international agenda (G20 action plan; work by FAO's Committee on World
Food Security).
Based on a comprehensive review of the theoretical and empirical literature,
this book identifies and analyzes four “pure” strategies that can be employed
to manage food price instabi l ity.  It  c learly underl ines the l imitations of
conventional solutions that rely on mixing a risk management strategy (using
insurance-based instruments) with a crisis management strategy (using emer-
gency aid). It explains why more structural solutions that require considerable
State involvement are needed to stimulate the modernization of agricultural
production and markets, and recapitalize vulnerable households.This cannot
be achieved solely by facilitating access to inputs and by transferring assets
to poor households: public intervention is necessary to prevent prices from
reaching extreme values. Such interventions must be based on a combination
of instruments that match the specificities of the national or regional context.
The international community has a key role to play in the success of these
policies. 
This book is intended for policy-makers, researchers, teachers, students, and
all those interested in price instabil ity, food security and the agricultural
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A critical analysis of strategies and instruments
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